Effective management of partnerships –
Practices of interagency collaboration in international development

DISSERTATION
of the University of St. Gallen,
School of Management,
Economics, Law, Social Sciences
and International Affairs
to obtain the title of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management

submitted by

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Dissertation no. 4532

Difo-Druck GmbH, Bamberg

The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and International Affairs hereby consents to the printing of the present dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein expressed.

St. Gallen, May 30, 2016

The President:

Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger

Acknowledgements

It has been a long and interesting but also challenging journey completing this thesis. The research project developed on three continents during a time of professional changes. Staying on track was not always a given and writing the last lines of the document make me remember all the people who supported me. In that sense, I am grateful to the following individuals who contributed to the success of this comprehensive project.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Kuno Schedler and Professor Thomas Eberle from the University of St. Gallen, my first and second thesis supervisors respectively, for their believing in me. While I sometimes did not see the way forward anymore, they did and motivated me on an intellectual as well as personal level with fresh ideas and good advice. This was truly boundary-spanning, not only across academic fields but also geographically. Likewise, I am grateful to Doctor Rosalind Eyben, Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) who inspired me with her ideas (clearly reflected in the references) and whom I had the pleasure to meet personally. The discussions with her helped a great deal to sharpen my thinking. Also, I am thankful to Fedor van Rijn and Karime Pichara for their comments on my manuscript.

Furthermore, I wish to thank the wonderful group of individuals that allowed me an insight into their world of development cooperation, of whom the ones who agreed to are named in the annex as interviewees. In particular, I want to thank Manlio Coviello from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean who made the whole research project possible.

Naming last what are in fact most important individuals in terms of their support is my family. My wife Desiré Baca Livelli who did not only have to live with me being absent from our life together while working on this research, but who always managed to motivate me anew once things seemed not to work out. Furthermore, my parents Judith and Clauspeter Kreuzer who were my orientation throughout my whole life supporting me in all possible ways on my career path never doubting my abilities. I dedicate this thesis to my parents as a small repayment of the debt I will always owe them.

Fabian Kreuzer
Santiago de Chile, December 2015

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Abbreviations

ADEME	=	Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Énergie (French Environment and Energy Agency)
ASA	=	Association of Social Anthropologists of the United Kingdom
CSO	=	Civil Society Organization
DAC	=	Donor Assistance Committee
ECLAC	=	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
e.g.	=	exempli gratia (for example)
GIZ	=	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Cooperation)
ICC	=	Interagency Collaborative Capacity
ICAT	=	Interagency Collaboration Assessment Tool
i.e.	=	id est (that is to say)
IO	=	International Organization
MERCOSUR	=	Mercado Común del Sur (the common market of South America)
NGO	=	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	=	Official Development Aid
OECD	=	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLADE	=	Latin American Energy Association
SICA	=	Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (system for the integration of Central America)
UN	=	United Nations
US	=	United States
USD	=	United States dollars
vs.	=	versus

Abstract (English)

This paper explores the effective management of partnerships in international development through an interagency collaboration approach. Interagency collaboration in development cooperation is frequent and a better management has the potential for significant cost savings. Notwithstanding this, virtually no research has been produced on interagency collaboration specifically dedicated to this field. Nevertheless, the history (power issues) and context (intercultural) of international development makes it a particular subject which is linked to current debates about ownership of development projects. Taking over existing approaches from other disciplines without adaptation does not seem appropriate.

As a consequence, a review is conducted regarding which concepts of interagency collaboration have been developed by other disciplines, focusing on public management where a vast research body exists. Emphasis is placed on identifying a theory that, on the one hand, explains the mechanism at play of how the different variables influence collaboration and, on the other hand, is based on empirically encountered managerial practices to link theory with practice. Six overarching themes are identified that are differently stressed by different theoretical concepts. Eugene Bardach's theory is identified as the most adequate framework to be adapted to research interagency collaboration in international development. It incorporates five of the six overarching themes while it leaves the necessary room for adaptation to incorporate the issues particular to the field.

Consequently, Bardach's theory is operationalized for exploratory research to produce an explanatory concept. A case study approach with a localist view is employed as a methodology to a typical, single case of interagency collaboration in international development. Served by evidence from documentation analysis, observation and interviews, the research provides an extensive account leading to a comprehensive framework explaining interagency collaboration in international development. The revised framework is the main contribution of this research. Besides this, the innovative way of structuring existing literature and concepts as well as new insights into the ownership debate in international development are considered contributions of this paper as well. Future research should further refine and validate the concept as well as deduce a management cockpit for the use of development practitioners.

Abstract (German / Deutsch)

Die Studie untersucht effektives Management von Partnerschaften in der Internationalen Entwicklung mittels des Ansatzes der interinstitutionellen Zusammenarbeit (Interagency Collaboration). Interinstitutionelle Zusammenarbeit in der Entwicklungskooperation ist häufig und besseres Management hat signifikantes Potenzial zur Kostenersparnis. Dennoch gibt es nahezu keine Forschung zur interinstitutionellen Zusammenarbeit in diesem spezifischen Feld. Die Geschichte (Macht) und der Kontext (interkulturell) macht Internationale Entwicklung zu einem speziellen Thema, welches mit den gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zur Eigenverantwortung von Entwicklungsprojekten (Ownership) verbunden ist. Die Übernahme von bestehenden Ansätzen ohne deren Anpassung erscheint nicht als angemessen.

Eine Übersicht über die Konzepte der interinstitutionellen Zusammenarbeit in anderen Forschungsfeldern bildet daher den Anfang mit Fokus auf dem öffentlichen Management (Public Management) wo ein umfangreicher Forschungsbestand existiert. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf der Identifikation einer Theorie, welche die Mechanismen erklärt, wie die unterschiedlichen Variablen die Zusammenarbeit beeinflussen, auf empirisch nachgewiesenen Management-Praktiken beruht und Theorie mit Praxis verbindet. Sechs übergreifende Themenkomplexe werden herausgearbeitet, denen unterschiedliches Gewicht in verschiedenen theoretischen Konzepten beigemessen wird. Eugene Bardachs Theorie wird als der angemessenste Rahmen identifiziert, der für die Forschung von interinstitutioneller Zusammenarbeit in der Internationalen Entwicklung angepasst werden kann. Diese beinhaltet fünf der sechs Themenkomplexe und lässt dennoch den notwendigen Spielraum um der Besonderheit des Forschungsthemas gerecht zu werden.

In Folge dessen wird Bardachs Theorie für exploratorische Forschung operationalisiert um ein erklärendes Konzept zu entwickeln. Die Fallstudienmethodologie mit einer lokalistischen Sicht wird auf einen typischen Einzelfall von interinstitutioneller Zusammenarbeit in Internationaler Entwicklung angewandt. Gestützt auf Daten von Dokumentenanalyse, Beobachtung und Interviews bietet das Forschungsvorhaben einen umfangreichen Bericht, welcher zu einem umfassenden Rahmen führt um interinstitutionelle Zusammenarbeit in Internationaler Entwicklung zu erklären. Das überarbeitete Konzept ist der Hauptbeitrag dieser Studie. Daneben werden der innovative Strukturierungsansatz der bestehenden Literatur und Ansätze, sowie die neuen Erkenntnisse zur Eigenverantwortung von Entwicklungsprojekten als Forschungsbeiträge gesehen. Zukünftige Forschung sollte das Konzept weiter entwickeln und ein Management-Cockpit für Entwicklungshelfer ableiten.

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1. Introduction: effective management of partnerships in international development – an approach through interagency collaboration

'Effective partnerships' is a buzz phrase that is currently all over the place in international development cooperation. International development projects happen in a highly complex environment trying to promote progress in the country or community where they are implemented with a multitude of stakeholders. Collaboration and coordination are always praised but little research or guidance is found on how this is done. This is the objective of the present research: providing an academic and rigorous approach regarding how to conceptualize and understand management of these partnerships in international development cooperation.

To begin the journey, this introduction elaborates on the background of the research project, the identification of the research gap, the research design and its findings. This is divided into four corresponding sections. As these sections follow the logical flow of the subsequent chapters, they provide an argued overview of the structure of the entire study at the same time.

1.1 Development of the research interest

The initial interest to explore partnership management in international development cooperation started for me on a personal level. While working for two years for an International Organization (IO) in Africa, I noted the amount of time staff members of my and other IOs had to spend on managing partnerships that are vital for implementing their projects. Very often, the implementation and success of projects is not only depending on the efficiency of the IO in charge of the project but also on the effectiveness of key partners involved. Examples include the relevant government agencies responsible for the development issue the project tries to tackle or other IOs and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working on similar topics to achieve economies of scale. Consequently, these partnerships are more than simple projects but complex interagency collaborations (understanding partnerships as a loose concept contrary to collaborations where achieving the objective requires joint work).

This experience left me with the question that subsequently became the overarching question for this research: how does interagency collaboration in international development cooperation work? Nevertheless, answering the question does not prove to be easy. First of all, navigating the development jungle is more complex than one would imagine. Numerous government agencies, bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs are working with different institutions and communities on different levels. Clearly, a more concise delimitation of the research interest was required. My review of the field and the associated definitions (e.g. development aid

and cooperation, IO, etc.) can be found at the beginning of chapter 2. Exploring the different players and definitions, I decided to focus my research on interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations. With these refinements in mind, the overarching question for the research project was narrowed to 'How does interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development cooperation work?'

Reviewing the history of international development aid (which is used interchangeably with development cooperation as explained later), it became clear that its colonial past determines some sensitivities which may impact interagency collaboration in the field. Different power relations in international development (Robb, 2004), in particular between donor and recipient, may lead to collaborations that are distant from the reality on the ground, closed networks of development professionals that are framing the debate about development and management tools that are forced onto partners. In addition, international development happens across cultures, which may add a further intercultural aspect to the problematic. This is linked to the current ownership debate in international development cooperation stressing the importance of recipient countries owning the projects implemented in their territories (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005/2008). This is detailed in sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3.

Further arguments for researching interagency collaboration are found in the development literature (elaborated on under 2.1.4). Collaboration is potentially able to avoid incoherence and doubled efforts (United Nations, 2006) and entails a strong financial component. In the case of the United Nations (UN), avoiding duplications is estimated to potentially save 20% of the budget (United Nations, 2006, p. 29). Consequently, the UN engages in a lot of interagency collaborations. However, this has its costs as well: for the United Nations Development Programme these are in the magnitude of roughly 240 million United States dollars (USD, Ronald, 2011, p. 13). Therefore, making interagency collaboration more effective through understanding its management mechanisms better may reveal significant cost savings.

1.2 Identification of the research gap

While some research on interagency collaboration in international development has been conducted, this is situated on two distinct levels. On the one hand, there are macro-level theories that explain how certain variables influence collaboration, the dependent variable. On the other hand, micro-level theories on particular issues are found based on managerial practices. However, virtually no approaches exist that combine the two; meso-level theories that connect a conceptual framework with the

necessary managerial practices. This is the conclusion of section 2.1.5, more on meso-level theories is provided in section 3.1.

Nevertheless, the existing approaches allow refining the overarching question of the research into more specific guiding questions in the quest of more suitable conceptual models. This quest brings the researcher to public management and other management literature that has explored the topic more profoundly than international development literature has. The literature review tries to find possible answers to these guiding questions (section 2.2):

1. Which managerial elements are important for interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
2. How do these elements affect interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
3. How do these elements manifest themselves in the management of interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?

As most of the insights into interagency collaboration in international development derive from public management literature, exploring the field was a natural next step. It became clear that much more research has been conducted on the subject in this field. However, authors often emphasize one logic of collaboration or overarching theme in particular. For example, some researchers see resource dependency as the key to understand interagency collaboration. Others stress the importance of environmental circumstances that explain the mechanisms of interagency collaboration. In that sense, six of these overarching themes were identified:

1. The environmental factors theme;
2. The organizational system theme;
3. The resource theme;
4. The power theme;
5. The governance theme;
6. The culture/logic theme.

These six overarching themes also serve as a structure for the existing literature and provide easy access for researchers. The identification of the six overarching themes is considered to be the first research contribution of this paper. Likewise, more approaches are found in public management that integrate these theoretical frameworks with empirically found managerial practices and add further theory (e.g. capacity, processes and the role of the individual). In addition, some related fields of management research provide useful insights into interagency collaboration, such as

project management, public relations theory in donor relations, joint venture research and intercultural management.

Notwithstanding this, no conceptual framework on the meso level was found that was fully suited to research interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development covering all themes. As the closest, Eugene Bardach's (1998) theory of interagency collaboration was identified. This theory works on the theoretical level that is required as well as covers most of the previous findings, solely power and interculturality are missing. Skillful craftsmen driving an increase in interagency collaboration measured as the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC) is a central idea. However, the framework is open for adaption, an advantage for future research. Therefore, Bardach's conceptual framework serves as the basis to research interagency collaboration in international development in the present project. The framework is extensively described in section 2.3.

1.3 Research design

Using Bardach's theoretical framework as the basis, it is possible to develop the research questions from the guiding questions. The research questions explored in this paper are:

1. Can Bardach's operationalized theory be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation?
   a. Which elements of the existing theory can be confirmed by empirical evidence?
   b. Are there elements that are missing? If so, which?
2. How do these elements impact the dependent variable – the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC)?
3. Which empirically found practices can be linked to which element(s) of the theory?

To explore the research questions, Bardach's concept is operationalized in section 3.3 making it useful for research. As the objective is exploratory research leading to an explanatory concept for interagency collaboration in international development, a theoretical contribution to the field, a single case-study approach is selected as the appropriate methodology. While this may leave the reader suspect an empirical-positivist view, this research recognizes that findings are context-sensitive opting for a localist view (Alvesson, 2003). The techniques used for conducting the case study are mainly based on Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009, 1993, 1981) in order to construct theory through pattern matching and explanation building. This is fully introduced in

4.1 and 4.2. The data gathering methods in the case study are documentation analysis, participant observation and semi-structured interviews (see sections 4.3 – 4.6). As the research subjects are involved in some of the research design and the findings are discussed with them, this has a component of participatory research.

As the case studied, an interagency collaboration project implemented by an IO with 19 government agencies (of which 14 are included), two donor agencies, one international consultancy and one observer IO is selected. The details of the case study can be read in section 5. Access to the field is gained through the IO. It is believed that it is a typical case study of interagency collaboration in international development focusing on IOs allowing for theoretical generalization. In this way, the research design assumes that the findings also hold true in other cases as a typical case is selected to the researcher's best knowledge. Furthermore, the criteria for good research (reliability, external validity, internal validity and construct validity) are strictly adhered to. However, the limitation lies in the fact that it is only one case in one world region. As international development happens in different parts of the world, the findings may be biased in that sense.

1.4 Research findings

The research findings are extensively presented with the least possible interpretation from the researcher in section 6. As field evidence (observation notes, interview records and case study protocol) cannot be made publicly accessible due to confidentiality agreements, the intention behind this is to increase reliability for the reader. Section 7 subsequently combines the findings with the previous theoretical part and delivers an in-depth interpretation.

The theoretical framework that is proposed to explain interagency collaboration in international development consists of:

1. A basis of two elements:
    a. The institutional setup and formal structures;
    b. The political setup and priorities.
2. Four static elements:
    a. The operating system (including communication, flexibility on operational and contractual levels, motivation, mutual understanding, accountability, and exchanges of assets);
    b. Resources (including turf and autonomy, monetary and other physical in-kind assets, people, political standing, and information);
    c. Steering a course (including vision/mission/goals, form: forum, and leadership);

       d. Culture (including organizational culture, negotiation process, and trust).
3. Two cross-cutting elements that are spanning across all static elements (and are the main addition to Bardach's initial framework):
       a. Power differences (including structural and actor-related power differences);
       b. Cross-cultural differences.
4. Two elements of developmental dynamics:
       a. Platforming (including institutional processes, interpersonal processes, and continuous improvement processes);
       b. Momentum (including opportunity for reinforcing effects and vulnerability).
5. The dependent variable in the form of the interagency collaborative capacity (ICC) measured through four indicators:
       a. Advances towards the project goals;
       b. More exchange;
       c. More mutual understanding;
       d. New projects.

In that sense, increasing the ICC requires a solid basis and the sound use of the static elements (taking into account the influence of the cross-cutting elements) through dynamic processes that are either sequenced (platforming) or random (momentum). The comprehensive, revised framework can be found in section 7.10. These elements are encountered empirically through practices, a list of which is provided as well. Smart practices – practices that allow craftsmen of interagency collaboration to create value on the cheap – are likewise identified (section 7.11).

The revised framework and the identified practices together answer the research questions. It is an affirmative answer to question number one, whether Bardach's theory can be applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development. All existing elements are confirmed (although sometimes in a modified way) and some new ones added. The concept provides the explanation of the mechanisms how these elements relate to the ICC and are indicated by practices found in the field.

Section 8 concludes the present research with a summary and reflections on the generalizability of the findings to explain interagency collaboration in international development in general. As contributions, structuring interagency collaboration literature according to overarching themes, the revised framework and new insights into ownership of development projects are stressed. Future research should be directed towards the validation of the findings through cross-case comparison as well

as practical operationalization of the findings in a management cockpit for development practitioners.

2. Management of interagency collaboration in international development cooperation: where to start and where to end?

As introduced, my research interest is interagency collaboration in international development. The question that I am exploring is 'How does interagency collaboration in international development cooperation work?' This requires clarifying the research field, definitions and an overview of the current status of research. For this, I draw on international development literature, public administration and general management. The elements identified as important as well as the shortcomings of current research are hereby emphasized to develop my own approach presented in chapter 3.

Starting from this interest, literature on international development was naturally turned to first. Maybe other researchers in the field have answered my question already? I realized quickly that it would not be that easy as "international development is a complex, multifaceted and fragmented academic field that aims to clarify the goals, means, and driving forces of improvements (or the lack of such) in the living conditions for the less privileged of the world's population." (Bull & Bøås, 2010, p. 2)[1] The field of international development has not been properly delimited nor is there consensus how to delimit it (notions include the 'Third World', 'backwards countries', 'developing countries' and others, see Bull & Bøås, p. 4-5). It is even contested if international development can be considered a discipline as it contains contributions from various disciplines (Bull & Bøås, 2010, p. 3).

Consequently, one has to understand better what international development cooperation actually means. Surprisingly, this is not even clear to development professionals or researchers. First of all, many different expressions are used for international development cooperation such as aid, (international) development aid, simply international development and others. I use them interchangeably in this paper. Nevertheless, aid often refers to Official Development Aid (ODA), "aid from governments in developed countries[2] to developing countries[3]." (Keeley, 2012, p. 49) This type of aid is monitored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its Donor Assistance Committee (DAC). It is, however, not the only form of aid. Besides governments, other organizations such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)[4] including foundations supply aid to developing countries as well, with the difference that these are voluntary contributions. In case of ODA, it is tax-payer money from developed countries channeled to developing

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[1] Another challenge is the potential influence of research on activity and policy (Barnett & Gregorowski, 2013, p. 2).
[2] Usually called the donors.
[3] Often called the recipients.
[4] Also sometimes called Civil Society Organizations (CSOs, Keeley, 2012, p. 57).

countries (Hancock, 1989, p. xiii). In addition to that, private philanthropy and government aid from countries that are not OECD members (notably China and Brazil) have become more important (Keeley, 2012, pp. 53-54). For my undertaking, focus will be on development aid that has three main characteristics: 1. it comes from governments, 2. it is directed towards economic development and welfare of developing countries, and 3. it is provided as a grant or loan below market interest rates (Keeley, 2012, p. 49). In addition, pure financial aid (aid that only consists of money transfers) is excluded as this requires only a minimum of interaction between the parties. Nevertheless, my definition includes bilateral and multilateral aid. Aid "is 'bilateral' when it's given directly by the donor country to people or institutions in the recipient country. It's 'multilateral' when it's provided to an international agency, such as the United Nations [UN]." (Keeley, 2012, p. 50) Consequently, it is important to understand what an international agency is – also called an International Organization (IO), the expression that I prefer.[5] An IO entails the following defining elements: it is 1. international, 2. a public sector entity that is not profit-oriented 3. established by intergovernmental processes and conventions, and 4. reports annually to a governing body composed of member states (Adamou, 2014, p. 222). However, I change the reporting requirement of the definition to 'regularly' instead of 'annually' as some IOs have biennial reporting cycles. Moreover, I prefer the term IO for my research as multilateral agency, the other expression that is often used, places a heavy weight on the governing and legal structure which is less relevant here. This definition permits to refine the question for my research to "How does interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development cooperation work?" to clearly emphasize my focus on IOs as a central aspect.

These definitions do not per se exclude (national or international) NGOs from development cooperation, but it changes the focus to IOs as the turning point of international development in line with my research interest. In this view, NGOs only come into play when they execute projects financed with grants provided to them. While being one share of NGO finance, this is not all of NGO funding as there are philanthropic, voluntary contributions as well. Although the outcomes of my research may be relevant for NGOs as well, this limitation is maintained as my research findings could otherwise be questioned on these grounds. Nevertheless, I will make use of the research conducted on NGOs in subsequent sections to build my theory. Likewise, this means that government staff, personnel of IOs and NGO employees working in international development are subsumed under the group called 'development practitioners' (Eyben, 2013, p. 4). It disregards contractual differences (full-time employees, consultants, volunteers, etc.). Together, they craft, execute,

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[5] I do not go into defining organizations per se which is extensively discussed in sociology, see e.g. Clegg, Vieira da Cunha and Pina e Cunha (2002, pp. 483-484).

monitor and evaluate development cooperation projects. "A 'project' converts inputs to outputs, in an enclave largely but incompletely screened from external forces; and it aims for impact on higher levels of objectives, but subject there to greater external buffeting, the more so the higher the level." (Gasper, 2000, p. 18)

Enumerating these different actors of international development already suggests that there are potentially various relationships between these actors, some of which may be collaborations. These relationships may not always be binary but with several different organizations involved, in some cases even down to the beneficiaries in the recipient country (Eyben, 2006a, p. 2). The following figure shows all possible links that may occur between the actors. My research will only focus on the collaboration between institutional players that participate directly in international development aid. This ensures compliance with the definition provided and hence the validity of my theory. Furthermore, it facilitates later generalization as communities (characterized as loose groups of individuals) may reveal other behavior and dynamics than more formally organized agencies. This is shown below.

Figure 1: Potential relationships between international development actors and focus of this research

Source: Author based on United Nations Environment Program (2014, p. 19).

It is obvious that these relationships may become quite numerous and abundant research on them should be available. The problem is that the "relationship words" in development talk are not properly defined (Arora-Jonsson & Cornwall, 2006, p. 80). It is important to stress that these relationships encompass different features that have to be taken into account. "Aid relationships", as they are sometimes called, in that sense

refer "to the matrices of rhetoric, ritual, power and material transactions." (Gould, 2004a, p. 1) For instance, Contu and Girei (2014) explore the notion and content of 'partnership' in international development with a focus on NGOs in Africa. They focus on equality and the political dimension of NGO partnerships in international aid (Contu & Girei, 2014, pp. 206-208). Contrariwise, Robinson (2000) explores the relationships of states with NGOs. As a consequence, it is necessary to define clearly how collaboration is understood when I develop my theory in the following. For orientation, it can be noted that the Worldbank (1998, p. 7) defines partnership as "a collaborative relationship between entities to work toward shared objectives through a mutually agreed division of labor." Honadle and Cooper (1989, p. 1534) provide insight into the definition of coordination which means for them to prioritize jointly. They identify three types of coordination: information sharing, resource sharing and joint action – the collaboration studied here is closest to the last one.[6] Döring and Schreiner mention in a footnote (2012, p. 346) that different terms are used for these kinds of relationships depending on the field. According to them, 'inter-organizational relationship' is the most common term in organization and management theory. In the public sector, 'inter-organizational collaboration' is used alongside with 'inter-organizational relationships'. In the UN context there are two more notions: 'interagency coordination' and 'interagency integration'. Confusingly, all of them refer to both organizing interdependencies (coordination) and incentives and motivation (cooperation).

2.1 Collaboration in international development cooperation

Departing from research on international development as a natural starting point, it is important to understand where the idea of development comes from to be able to appreciate the issues involved. Following that, the importance of interagency collaboration in international aid has to be illuminated and the challenges as well as the research conducted so far on collaboration management explored.

2.1.1 The idea of international development – history and implications

Development as such is a fairly new idea that has not been coherently defined and has changed its meaning according to the spirit of the time. It has to be understood in context and more research is needed (Moncrieffe, 2007, p. 14). Olivier de Sardan (2005, p. 42) notes that when the expression first got popular, it was understood as putting territory to value – shaped by the colonial powers putting overseas territory to value. Of course, the colonizers defined what was valuable and all territory not falling into the definition was free to be occupied even if other people had claims on these territories. In that context, development can be defined as "a sum of the social

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[6] For other definitions of collaboration see for example Bird and Osland (2005, p. 117).

processes induced by voluntarist acts aimed at transforming a social milieu, instigated by institutions or actors who do not belong to the milieu in question, but who seek to mobilize the milieu, and who rely on the milieu in their attempt at grafting resources and/or techniques and/or knowledge." (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p. 24)

In more recent times, namely after the Second World War, with the quasi-disappearance of colonialism, development got a new meaning focusing on economic development. It chiefly focused on countries that were not at the same level of economic development as the Western hemisphere. This came alongside the creation of different organizations dedicated to development such as the OECD or the Worldbank (note that the creation of the UN was first and foremost an idea to enhance security rather than development).[7] In the following years different theories about economic development were put forward from modernization (North, 2005) to path dependency (Mahoney, 2001a). Later, it was recognized that economic development was not enough but structural adjustment and good governance were required for countries to progress (Bull & Bøås, 2010, pp. 17-22). That ultimately led to adding a new dimension to the concept of development, the dimension of social and human development, including the creation of the Human Development Index (Bezanson, 2004, p. 127). In the 1980s, the concept was further extended to incorporate an environmental (and local) dimension (Bezanson, 2004, p. 132) which led to the current idea of sustainable development. "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43). Notwithstanding the enlargement of the meaning of development, the debate about how to do it is still ongoing, e.g. with the debate if development is only a question of funding (Sachs, 2005) or if it has to be locally led (Easterly, 2006). What is crucial to note from the debate on and construction of 'international development', is the fact that this was rather shaped by professionals and intellectuals in the so-called 'developed countries' or the 'West'. The people and officials from the countries that were to be developed had no say in that and they had even less control over it. This had two consequences: first of all it led to a certain misbehavior of the aid system (heavily coming under criticism in the 1980s) and, secondly, a particular way of thinking about the design of aid projects.

Hancock (1989) is an excellent reference for an impression on the past behavior of the aid and development industry when criticism arose. One problem was that the real needs of the country were not always taken into account. For example, development aid for shelter from Germany was not only not used but also had negative environmental impacts while rotting in Africa (Hancock, 1989, p. 13). Furthermore,

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[7] For an overview of the UN System and the Worldbank Group see Hancock (1989, pp. 47-58).

the money did not always reach the ones it was intended to help. The US Hunger Project, for instance, raised 6,981,005 United States Dollars (USD) but only 210,775 USD were spent in the countries of need, whereas the rest reminded in the United States (US) including about half a million USD in phone bills (Hancock, 1989, p. 6). Another example comes from the Worldbank where social events during the week of the annual meeting had a final bill of 10 million USD (Hancock, 1989, p. 38). Tying aid to conditions on buying services and goods from the donor was common (Hancock, 1989, p. 155), fully in line with US President Nixon's opinion: "Let us remember that the main purpose of aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves." (Hancock, 1989, p. 71) All this happened while the results of development aid were doubtful. For example, Peru's average per capita income fell by 20% and inflation increased from 30% to 160% between 1977 and 1985 during a structural adjustment program of the International Monetary Fund (Hancock, 1989, p. 62). The accumulated shortcomings of the aid system at the time led to increasing demands for more transparency and the subsequent implementation of more monitoring and control in the management of aid projects. Nevertheless, aid professionals are humans and thus not perfect, wherefore shortcomings continue to exist. For example, UN peacekeepers are investigated for sexual abuse of minors (Lee, 2015) at the time of writing this paper.

Furthermore, the design of aid projects was driven by the ideas of the professionals in the aid agencies, often with no or little consultation with those that they intended to develop. Anthropologists had a changing but key role in that. First, they served as advisors for foreign cultures for colonial regimes. Later in the 1980s, they became advisors on large infrastructure projects requiring research on the impact of macroeconomic measures. This led to two kinds of anthropology in development projects: on the one hand development anthropology (the earlier form of anthropology on developing foreign cultures) and, on the other hand, anthropology of development (anthropology concerned with the aid system, Eyben, 2009, pp. 73-76). In this sense, development anthropology can be seen as the instrumental view of aid and anthropology of development as the critical view. This modality of crafting projects led to prescribing solutions to problems based on the perception of development aid workers determined by their values and loaded with misconceptions (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, pp. 69, 73-81). Development projects followed the social logic of the ones that crafted them, which is not necessarily the same as the one of the people being developed (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p. 137). Popular knowledge of the locals tended to be ignored and scientific and technical knowledge favored (Olivier de

Sardan, 2005, pp. 153-165).[8] Thus, development and development projects became a political activity (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p. 4).

Lastly, a short remark is important on the different development situations or circumstances. Special circumstances are often claimed for development contexts in which a conflict has just come to an end. These situations are considered to be more complex[9] as "profound changes to relationships - personal, organizational, societal" have happened (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). This goes hand in hand with a decline in social capital, particularly outside the family or ethnic group, most importantly between the state and its citizens. Nevertheless, relationships are important for governance and collaborative relationships have to be restored (United Nations Environment Programme, 2014). Special attention has to be paid to restoring these relationships in order to re-embark on the way to development. The UN Development Programme (2010, p. 23), therefore, diagnoses that "what matters are the interrelationships of the national and international ownerships and the way they act together to generate development effectiveness." For that reason, understanding has grown that security and development are also linked (Allouche & Lind, 2013, pp. 6-7). Another aspect of this emergency aid is that it is ideally only for a short period of time, whereas development in a classical sense targets a long-term change. While the findings of my research potentially apply to both emergency and development aid, the latter is the focus of this research. This protects my findings against contesting claims that the special nature and complexity of emergency situations have implications for interagency collaboration. After all, emergency aid anyhow only accounts for a tenth of all the aid provided by donors (Keeley, 2012, p. 48).

2.1.2 Issues influencing the management of international development projects

The history of aid already gave a glimpse that particular issues around the management of international development projects may be expected. They develop on an international scale in a context of an inherent power imbalance: on the one hand, the ones that want to give a donation and have a past of progress; on the other hand, the ones that want to progress but were unable to do so by their own means. This is further mixed with colonial heritage, interests and money. Therefore, issues managing development projects that may impact interagency collaboration as well are elaborated on in the following. While the issues are connected, I have tried to structure them maintaining the links.

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[8] Different colonial heritage in this respect matters as in French colonies more space was given for local interpretations on the way to the development goal (not on the goal as such though), notably in Africa (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p. 43).

[9] For the description of the concept of a complex emergency see Bennett (2000, p. 168).

The first issue is distance of the ones that craft and manage development projects from the ones they are trying to help. This is an issue with many aspects. It starts with the fact that projects of international development aid are usually designed and approved in headquarters in developed countries, not where they are needed or implemented. That means that the ones paying for the projects (notably tax payers) have only little means to review if their money is spent wisely (an accountability problem, Eyben, 2006b, p. 51-52). Moreover, the exercise of control by the agency providing assistance is sometimes seen as a lack of trust by the ones that receive aid (Hinton, 2004, p. 216). Beneficiaries exhibit mistrust against evaluations, as they may result in the discontinuance of a project they value (Shutt, 2006, p. 156). This may result in an us-versus-them dynamic. In addition, highly educated development professionals sometimes disregard the value of local opinion about a project (Gasper, 2004, pp. 48-51). As a consequence, projects are occasionally so distant from local realities that they are not of any use. This concerns projects but even entire 'solutions'. The 'solutions' proposed by international development for fuel-efficient cooking are an example. When aid workers thought about the problem of deforestation through wood-based cooking, they crafted more efficient stoves. But these were not adapted to what people needed and wanted. As a result, stoves provided by international agencies were not used (Crewe, 1997). IOs have tried to address the issue of distance with trainings such as immersions. Immersions are "occasions when professionals learn directly from encounters with people living in poverty by staying with them and reflecting on the experience" (Irvine, Chambers, & Eyben, 2006, p. 63).

However, distance is not only a matter of managing in-country projects from headquarters. Even when staff are on the ground in the country, they have a different reality from the people they try to assist. Normally they learn about needs and decide on solutions in meetings, policy dialogues and other fora (Irvine, Chambers, & Eyben, 2006, p. 64). In fact, big bilateral agencies create new ideas through meetings "in which human relationships are the environment that creates new ideas" (Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006, p. 94). This means that they often only communicate with certain people and groups of society. Eyben (2004) describes the process of developing the poverty reduction strategy paper in Bolivia. She notes two important details: firstly, although being locals, the drafters were from the same ethnic background, professional background and class as the donors and used the same concepts (Eyben, 2004, p. 61). Secondly, the interaction with the local communities was always filtered by government officials or local NGOs (Eyben, 2004, pp. 66-67). This raises the question if development professionals are able to capture the reality on the ground and, if so, whose reality, notably as development staff often do not leave their comfort zone and stay within their familiar socio-cultural background (Hinton & Groves, 2004, p. 15). Coming back to the example from Bolivia, newly arriving development staff were reported to have been included quickly in the higher levels of Bolivian society as they

dedicate themselves to similar activities, their children go to the same schools etc. (Eyben, 2004, pp. 64-65). Consequently, much of the challenge to learn about and capture local conditions falls on the individual staff member. It requires going to the field equipped with sound diplomacy and negotiation skills (Allouche & Lind, 2013, pp. 34-35). A call for "brokerage" can be heard in this respect (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, pp. 173-178). Brokerage in that sense means "actions to build a shared understanding amongst actors whose interests may vary significantly and whose capacities to act in support of these interests may be unequal" (Allouche & Lind, 2013, p. 32).

The network is a second, closely-related issue. Development professionals, as other professionals, are part of networks which they rarely leave. In fact, there are no individuals without relationships as sometimes assumed by certain management concepts (Eyben, 2014). Network analysis has thus been employed widely in international development, although the aspects of power and the contact with other organizations have not received adequate attention (Wilson & Eyben, 2006, pp. 116, 118). However, focusing only on one's own network has two implications. Besides not taking advantage of the opportunities offered to learn about local realities, this may mean missing out on using existing local networks (Wilson & Eyben, 2006, p. 125). Nevertheless, these networks are important for sharing information, e.g. about resources, procedures of other agencies and so forth (Shutt, 2006, p. 163). Local networks and the networks with the government may even be crucial for the success of the project (Shutt, 2006, p. 164). Shutt (2006, p. 164) found in a case study that the motives for developing organizational relationships were financial needs and strength of personal relationships, whereas organizational goals and ethical considerations came second. However, building networks takes time which development professionals that rotate from country to country do not have. The NGO Action Aid reports that a real problem for their partners is that their staff rotates so quickly that they feel they do not have time to build trust and develop a relationship (Chambers & Pettit, 2004, p. 154).

Furthermore, the distance between the local reality and the development practitioners' own network, combined with the resources they hold, trigger a third issue, the issue of framing in aid. Framing refers to how we understand a problem and may reflect how a problem is represented or is not represented in society's debates (Moncrieffe, 2007, p. 2). Debates about development are historically framed by (Western) development professionals. Labeling is closely linked to that: how people are categorized by themselves or others (Moncrieffe, 2007, p. 2). In international aid, this has often again been done by outsiders. The poor usually do not refer to themselves as 'the poor', it is a label that international development has coined for them – and may be erroneous without understanding the local realities (Moncrieffe, 2007, p. 9). In that sense, putting

a label on someone involves a position of power (Moncrieffe, 2007, pp. 2-3). The concept of 'fragile states' is such an example of labeling by the Worldbank and the OECD and an outcome of a normalization process driven by IOs (Nay, 2014, p. 215). As a consequence, the termini in development projects have to be carefully examined (Chambers & Pettit, 2004, pp. 137, 140). At the end of the day, labels are first of all valid for the labeler (Klouda, 2007, p. 102). 'Poverty' is a good example in that sense. Chambers (1995, p. 179) notes that 'poverty' is either a basket for everything or a very technical definition based on income poverty.[10] Notwithstanding, both concepts are very different from the understanding of the local people ('the poor') themselves that see the issue as much more complex (Chambers, 1995, p. 185). For development professionals, this simplification may be needed in order to make 'poverty' (and associated programs) manageable.

The difficulties in flexibility adapting development projects to the local context is a forth issue. Normally, one would expect development professionals to adapt their projects to local conditions and learn from experience but the aforementioned issues may be an obstacle to that. Eyben's (2007, pp. 34-35) account reports about a vocational training project in Sudan. She discovered that most of the trainees came from good neighbourhoods because the training centre was built in a good neighbourhood and admission officers gave preference to neighbours and relatives. As Eyben felt accountable to the donors (less to the people of Sudan!) she changed that. But when she tried to bring the project closer to the target population she discovered that the training was not adequate to the skills and the intervention was useless. While Eyben at least attempted to adapt the project to work better and be more useful, this is often not even possible. Aid projects are approved based on certain inputs combined with a way to expected outputs and outcomes – this is not changeable even if it would be better for development. Bromwich (2009, pp. 314-315) looks at an NGO project that was supposed to form village development committees for programming and monitoring. However, the committees were found to work as 'peace committees' as well as they provided a platform for dialogue. This was not anticipated by the initial project and no further funding could be provided for the activity although valuable for development. In that sense, the main management tool in international development is the project's logical framework (called 'logframe'). It specifies exactly how the inputs shall be used to achieve outputs detailing desired outcomes of development. This management tool heavily determines the relationships of an agency with others, what it can do and what it cannot do. It represents a linear logic of thinking that may not be shared by all involved (Marsden, 2004, pp. 97-98). In fact, (public) management itself

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[10] Eyben (2007, p. 37) notes that development econometricians and sociologists working together often do not realize that their 'group' termini are different: econometricians see 'groups' as categories that the researcher defines whereas for sociologists a 'group' is one that understands itself as such.

is questionable on this ground (Eyben, 2010, p. 2), notably if the beneficiaries come from more metaphorical cultures driven by story wisdom.[11] This is sometimes even true within an aid agency. For example, the Swedish International Development Agency has conducted a reflection exercise with its employees and was surprised about how much the visions differed (Arora-Jonsson & Cornwall, 2006, p. 88).

Besides the logframe, the use of other management tools without any reflection may be questionable in international development as well. Marsden (2004, pp. 99-103) recalls the experience of a monitoring visit (organizational procedure) to a Nepali NGO by the donors. The staff of the local NGO waited for the evaluators the whole day, prepared a special meal and everybody gathered to greet them. In contrast, the donor's evaluators arrived late and were focused on when to leave again. When they conducted the interviews for the project evaluation, some of the local staff asked what the right answer was as they expected the "thulo manche" (big people) to speak and them to listen. Conducting the conversations in English further contributed to that. Working with IOs and donors can sometimes even distance the development practitioners from the beneficiaries. For instance, a local Nepali NGO noticed that once they entered a partnership with an international donor, they had more resources but less time to work with the communities (Marsden, 2004, pp. 103-105). One reason for that was the expansion of the program which required more travel distancing staff further from the communities. Again, managing development projects is associated with a strong component of individual staff members' capacities. Pasteur and Scott-Villiers (2006, pp. 95-101), for instance, describe their experience working with donor instruments managing projects in Uganda and Brazil and recognize the importance of interpersonal and conversation skills. Thus, managing the human side of change is crucial and context-specific. Elements of this have to be the analysis of the common interest of the parties, awareness of self and others, trust and emotional intelligence (Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006, pp. 102-104, 107).

In conclusion, it has to be noted that there are particular issues in the management of development projects. I identified four but, in my view, all of them derive from a power difference.[12] This is mainly due to one party providing a donation to the other party without accountability ties. Crewe (1997, p. 59) explicitly diagnoses a difficulty for outsiders to work with European aid agencies due to secrecy and ideological and philosophical orientations as a product of historical developments. Thus, the stronger party is able to maintain "unilateral and imposed decisions" including on the management of the project (Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006, p. 100). This is further

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[11] There is even a call for pro-poor public management (Chambers, 1998).
[12] Other authors also use the expression power relationship. Robb (2004) even provides an overview of power relations in the history of aid.

aggravated by the distance of the donor to local realities. Respecting each other's values, gathering as much information as possible and making sure it is possible to revise and adapt is necessary. This is a process that Eyben (2007, p. 42) calls never-ending inclusiveness. This includes special attention to the social relations in the context of aid and its politics (Eyben, 2010, pp. 6-7). In this way, it is possible to recognize the fluid and multi-layered process of power in international aid (Eyben, 2010, p. 2). The individual staff of the development agencies is at the heart of this (Eyben, 2010, p. 3).

2.1.3 Ownership – a particular issue between the donors and the recipients

Having analyzed the issues at play in the development cooperation world, there is one issue that has received particular attention at the international stage: ownership. Ownership refers to who the owner of an international development project is and should be, the traditional providers of ODA that pay for it or the recipient countries. While the issues remain essentially the same as detailed before, the amount of work on it justifies a closer look into its principles. OECD's DAC led this process through the Paris Declaration of 2005 recognizing the importance of development projects being owned by the governments of the recipient countries (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005/2008). In 2008, this was reaffirmed with the Accra Agenda for Action, notably in paragraph nine on building more effective and inclusive partnerships (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005/2008). While in theory the donors thus recognize the importance of local ownership, it is noticed that cooperation often remains an empty phrase with northern actors imposing interventions on southern actors (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 2000b, pp. 1, 9-10). The word easily suggests that everyone is now part of a "common enterprise" masking power dynamics at play (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 2000b, p. 13). While joint design, implementation and evaluation of projects by donors and recipient countries are demanded, this rarely happens (Killick, 2004, p. 229). Likewise, the donor's view is strongly reflected in the concepts. For example, the OECD (2001, p. 4) defines what it sees as "difficult partnerships" – partnerships where there is doubt about aid being used for development goals instead of for enhancing power structures combined with partners that are not reliable when it comes to ensuring effective policies and their implementation. The OECD (2001, p. 8) diagnoses that one of the key reasons for these "difficult partnerships" is weak (government) capacity.

To ensure local ownership, donors are recommended to rely more on bottom-up approaches, to include the marginalized and to empower locals and their knowledge (Arvidson, 2004, p. 229). In essence, this is true on government as well as on the community level. Local ownership and partnerships then lead to more sustainable and

more effective development, which is achieved in more efficient ways. At the same time, projects gain political legitimacy and government involvement (Mosse, 2005, p. 10). Development practitioners emphasize ownership particularly in development situations that are just emerging from conflict as building peace cannot be imposed by outsiders (Donais, 2009, p. 3). However, it leaves the question of who should then be the owner (Donais, 2009, p. 11) and can be a concern for donors as well as for recipients worrying to lose control over their own country (Killick, 2004, p. 230). To overcome the dilemma, Owusu (2004, p. 115) recommends recognizing the power of the donor as a first step. One main problem is the ambivalence: someone needs to lead but everyone should count at the same time (Arvidson, 2004, pp. 230-231). Nevertheless, giving up ownership (from the donor side) towards more ownership on the recipient side implies ceding control (Chambers, 1995, p. 197). And it should include the disclosure of information, particularly financial information, as a step towards greater accountability (Owusu, 2004, p. 113). On the recipient government side, Kakande (2004, p. 90) argues for self-confidence to communicate its demands. In that sense, principles for partnership should be based on the equal recognition of partners, accountability and stability (Kakande, 2004, pp. 92-95). In this respect, one can note that good governance is not any longer only demanded from recipient countries but likewise from bilateral and multilateral agencies (MacLachlan & Carr, 2005, p. 1).

2.1.4 The reasons for interagency collaboration in international development

Having introduced the particular, challenging context of managing international development projects, this section turns to exploring collaboration in international aid. The reason is simple: if collaboration is not important, researching the topic might not be worthwhile. However, this is not the case. Collaboration is quite frequent between different actors on various levels on numerous issues (which could have been inferred from the figure with potential relationships under section 2).

One reason for the numerous (and increasing) collaborations between IOs and other development actors are sheer numbers. For 1909, Schwenger (2013, p. 7) reports the worldwide number of Inter-Governmental Organizations as 37 and the number of international NGOs as 176. By 1988, this had increased to 899 and 6,056 respectively. In 2010, the numbers further increased to 950 Inter-Governmental Organizations and 12,086 international NGOs. The multiplication comes with more collaboration – between all of these organizations. For example, Liese (2008) explores UN and non-state actor collaboration and argues against the pre-dominant view that UN and non-state actor relationships only started in the 1990s. She demonstrates that relationships of this kind have existed since the 1960s (Liese, 2008, pp. 7-11).

Another reason for (increased) collaboration between IOs and other actors of development cooperation is the necessity of doing so in order to ensure an adequate addressing of needs. The creation of IOs in the first place can already be seen as a response to an international cooperation problem (Johnson & Urpelainen, 2014, p. 180). However, these IOs later turned out not to be able to appropriately deal with newly emerging threats and challenges. The challenge posed by HIV/AIDS in the 1990s is an example. Several IOs raised (or tried to raise) several millions of extra-budgetary funds for separate programs only resulting in doubled efforts (Johnson & Urpelainen, 2014, p. 177). The donors demanded integration but rather than crafting a new organization, the solution was a joint program of existing agencies: UN-AIDS (Johnson & Urpelainen, 2014, p. 178). Three areas where interagency coordination seems particularly important due to the nature of the task are structural adjustment, service delivery and natural resource management (Honadle & Cooper, 1989). Arguments for more cooperation with NGOs in particular are the reduced costs of NGOs, a better adaptation to local needs, their use of local resources and, as a result, a more efficient use of government resources (Schwenger, 2013, p. 72). In some cases, NGOs are also favored because the local government (the other potential counterpart for the donors) is seen as corrupt or not efficient (Schwenger, 2013, p. 72).

Particular pressure has mounted on the UN, as the biggest, most universal IO, to collaborate and coordinate more. The increase in UN agencies alongside overlapping mandates has resulted in incoherence and doubled efforts. This is called regime complexity in international relations (Betts, 2013, p. 69) and "refers to the way in which two or more institutions intersect in terms of their scope and purpose" (Betts, 2013, p. 71). It comes with challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, there is the opportunity for new partnerships, with the UN being the leader for a topic making the overall UN System more effective. On the other hand, it can mean shifting politics away from the fora, the organization leads and competition (for resources such as finance, attention, etc.) – in the worst case deviating the organization's attention away from its core mandate (Betts, 2013, p. 75). In that sense, effective collaboration is a matter of re-inventing itself for the UN in order not to become obsolete (Warner, 1997).

The "Delivering as One" initiative tries to address the matter of fragmentation of the UN System through reform (United Nations, 2006, p. 8). Besides the aforementioned arguments of a longstanding practice of piecemeal approaches and failure to recognize local ownership, the main argument for the initiative is the duplication of efforts and associated costs. At the moment the High Level Panel investigating the matter delivered its report, the UN System included 17 specialized entities, 14 funds and programs, 17 departments in the UN Secretariat and five regional commissions as well as five training and research institutes (United Nations, 2006, p. 9). At country level,

more than one third of the UN country teams included 10 or more UN agencies, several even more than 20 (United Nations, 2006, p. 10). At the same time, about a third of the country teams only had budgets of less than 2 million USD per agency (United Nations, 2006, p. 10). That makes the UN a small player compared to governments or development banks (Ronald, 2011, p. 9) and led to inconsistencies and excessive administrative overhead. This was most notable in the aforementioned areas that require strong collaboration – sometimes called cross-cutting issues such as water and energy – where several agencies have mandates (Ronald, 2011, p. 11). For instance, more than 30 agencies were found to work on environmental issues (United Nations, 2006, p. 10). Lack of coordination was likewise found with the donors, particularly the Worldbank (United Nations, 2006, pp. 10, 20). The High Level Panel concluded that avoiding duplication could reveal savings of up to 20% of the budget (United Nations, 2006, p. 29). Furthermore, coordination can decrease the transaction costs faced by partners such as governments, local institutions and donors (Ronald, 2011, p. 12).

Since the arguments in favor of coordination are clearly laid out, the costs of coordination have to be recognized as well. These are mainly related to staff time spent on coordination and collaboration. As the UN implemented some of the recommendations by the High Level Panel, limited data on the costs is available for this example of an IO. Surveys for the UN Development Programme indicate that 23%-27% of staff time in the country offices is spent on coordination (Ronald, 2011, p. 10). That does not even include the time spent on these activities by regional office and headquarter staff (Ronald, 2011, p. 11). The total costs for UN coordination borne by the UN Development Programme are estimated to 237.5 million USD in 2010 (excluding other agencies' costs but including humanitarian coordination, Ronald, 2011, p. 13). It is equivalent to 1.6% of the total development expenditures (2009) by all UN agencies combined (Ronald, 2011, p. 16). That is a substantial amount. Notwithstanding this, given the benefits of coordination, not coordinating is not an option. Therefore, one can conclude that the need to coordinate and reducing the costs of doing so through better management are two sides of the same coin. As much of the coordination tasks seem to be rooted on the level of the individual staff member in IOs, the way towards making collaboration more efficient is through more effective management techniques. The big share of staff time dedicated to these tasks shows the need for more guidance; management guidance regarding what to do, and how and why to do it.

2.1.5 Managing interagency collaboration in international development

As the reasons why interagency collaboration is important are clear now, further elaborations on what is known about it in international development are required. This keeps a focus on the relevance for IOs given my research interest.

The literature can be grouped into two types of theories.[13] On the one hand, there are authors that look at the bigger picture and provide macro-level theories. On the other hand, there are authors that emphasize a particular aspect of collaboration on the micro level.[14] Resource-based theory used to explain the UN's behavior in partnerships is an example of what is understood as a macro-level theory in this research (Murphy, 2008). This theory analyzes collaboration mainly as transaction flows (Murphy, 2008, p. 34), which has its implications for managing partnerships. Mutual dependency theory looks at the flows of money and information in donor-recipient relationships to draw conclusions about the management of collaborations (Shutt, 2006, p. 154), another example for this kind of macro-level explanations. On the micro level, authors explore one aspect of managing collaborations in detail without making reference to the macro-level context. For example, Pasteur (2006, p. 31) explores double-loop learning to improve managing partnerships. Tarp and Rosén (2012, pp. 17, 24) research the potential of coaching in post-conflict development. It is rather this stream that emphasizes the importance of the individual in interagency collaboration (MacLachlan & Carr, 2005, p. 1) and that decisions are shaped by personal behavior (Pasteur, 2006, p. 21). This is particularly complicated in development organizations as they are operating in different cultural contexts. As a consequence, the meaning and importance of different relationship aspects have to be managed as a crucial task (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 2000a, pp. 217-218). It is also on the micro level where research on collaboration management in particular cases is located, such as Allende and Anaya (2010) on disaster relief or Bennett (2000) on emergencies.

While both groups of research, on the macro and the micro level, are important, they leave the question regarding how they work together. For instance this should explore how double-loop learning in managing interagency collaboration links to coaching, resource planning and so on. Likewise, while the implications of a resource-based view on managing collaborations have been researched, what does that exactly mean for managing motivation? A development professional who has to make an interagency collaboration work is still left in the dark regarding what actions to take and how these will impact overall collaboration. No theory about managing

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[13] I only include here literature concerned with the management of international development projects – other literature exists that researches other aspects of interagency collaboration and development in general, e.g. the importance of interagency collaboration amongst national government entities to foster development in a country (Chibber, 2002).

[14] Döring and Schreiner (2012, p. 329) present a different classification of the existing literature.

interagency collaboration in international development connecting the macro-level theories (explaining the mechanisms) with the micro-level theories (detailing the concrete aspects of collaboration) appears to have been formulated yet. One could say they would connect management practices to outcomes. Some promising attempts have been made in the recent past. These either start with a macro-level theory and deduce management practices or analyze empirically found practices and develop a larger theoretical framework. This work is focused on collaboration in peace operations due to their complexity (Roberts & Bradley, 2005, p. 112), which has also been the target of several UN integration reforms (Campbell, 2008, pp. 556-557).

Herrhausen (2007) presents a macro-level network theory but gives guidance for practically managing cooperation in UN peacebuilding. Although UN peacebuilding falls short of being a perfect network, good practices can be deduced: a clear mission, improving the information and resource flows and building capacity of the employees (Herrhausen, 2007, pp. 31-35). Social control mechanisms such as a common culture require more attention in the future (Herrhausen, 2007, pp. 35-38). Roberts and Bradley (2005) similarly employ a macro-level framework. They develop the "special purpose community" as an adequate management vehicle including practices for social attachment and social control (Roberts & Bradley, 2005, pp. 122-123). Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and von Hippel (2005) provide another attempt to translate macro-level theory into practice for integrated UN missions. They emphasize the importance of five practices: a form that follows function (based on best practices), a sound vision, a stringent mission planning process,[15] adequate funding and resources and strong leadership (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005, pp. 17, 19, 20-25, 35-37).[16] Döring and Schreiner (2012) examine inter-organizational collaboration among UN organizations. Their approach is based on a micro-level case study in Liberia and intends to understand the causal mechanisms of collaboration through empirically identifying collaboration practices between UN agencies (Döring & Schreiner, 2012, pp. 326, 331). They identify practices in the following categories as important (Döring & Schreiner, 2012, pp. 337-341): 1. performance appraisal, 2. recruitment and selection, 3. training, 4. interaction and leadership, 5. collaboration relevant experiences, 6. familiarity of partners, 7. individual commitment, 8. agency culture, and 9. collective culture.

While these attempts are closest to what this research is looking for, most of them do not provide sufficient integration of causal mechanisms and empirically found management practice. Furthermore, they usually focus on only one type of

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[15] The UN has established the Integrated Mission Planning Process to address the matter (Campbell, 2008, pp. 560-561).

[16] Some of these issues are taken up again in Jennings and Kaspersen (2008).

collaboration (e.g. UN-UN) but do not capture the whole range of possible interagency collaboration. Lastly, they do not pay attention to the intercultural context and the history of international development. Nevertheless, it is to note that all these theories on managing interagency collaboration are based on existing concepts from the fields of public or private management.

The starting point seems to be public management recognizing that aid agencies are bureaucracies as well. As other large bureaucracies, aid agencies see process and relationship management purely as a transaction cost (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 200a, p. 219, Eyben, 2006b, p. 43). In essence, this is inherent in the bureaucratic model (treating clients equally, rational thinking).[17] Other topics from public management are similarly adapted to look at interagency collaboration management in international development. For example, governance structures and mechanisms are explored to explain the difficulties managing collaboration in UN agencies (Taylor, 2000, p. 194). As already mentioned, network theory is used to explore e.g. informal networks (Eyben, 2006b, p. 45). One stream of research expands that to system theory (Eyben, 2006b, pp. 48-49). Likewise, the impact of new public management on collaboration in international development is explored (Eyben, 2009, p. 94). New Public Management shapes relationships in development projects through 'results' and 'evidence' (Eyben, 2013, p. 13).[18] This evolved over time from value for money via the management by objectives to the management by results discourse (Eyben, 2013, pp. 11-12). Results-based management puts pressure on some partners, as the donor usually defines the acceptable evidence (Eyben, 2006b, pp. 51-52) hence creating a power hierarchy (Eyben, 2010). This goes hand in hand with the aforementioned logframe (Eyben, 2013, p. 13), which is likewise often only used when external actors (e.g. donors) demand it (Gasper, 2000, p. 22). The findings are often comparable to the ones of cooperation between NGOs as similar power relations are at play fostered by the flow of money and knowledge and transmitted through management practices (Contu & Girei, 2014, p. 222).

Private management is used to explain particular aspects of managing interagency collaboration in international development. Project management has been studied for development projects and its impact on partners (Cusworth & Franks, 1993) and principal-agent theory employed on cooperation in the creation of Inter-Governmental Organizations (Johnson & Urpelainen, 2014). Even business continuity management in IOs has been explored (Adamou, 2014) as well as motivation and demotivation for

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[17] This view introduced by Weber has also been criticized for not paying attention to politics and personal networks (Minogue, Polidano, & Hulme, 1998, p. 3).
[18] New public management is seen as a product of Western liberal democracies (Common, 1998, p. 65).

collaboration in IOs (MacLachlan & Carr, 2005, pp. 1-4). In conclusion, public and private management are the two fields that are most promising to continue my quest to find a theory that is able to connect management practices of interagency collaboration with the mechanisms of how they work together.

2.1.6 Summary: the need to continue the quest

Starting my quest to understand the management of interagency collaboration in international development focusing on IOs, research on international development was explored first. What is understood by 'development' is contextual and comes with a connotation of colonial heritage, interests and money. The baggage development carries leads to several issues that affect the management of international development cooperation. The first issue is distance as projects are often designed by staff that do not understand the local realities of the people they serve. This is reinforced as development professionals may find it challenging to go beyond their familiar networks, the second issue. Adhering to familiar networks combined with distance leads to framing as a third issue. As such, development professionals impose their definition of the problem. Lastly, development agencies and their staff have difficulties being flexible and adapting projects to local context and it is complicated for them to learn from experience. This is partly due to the rigidity of the management tools they employ and in turn impose on partners. Ownership is a particular issue that has received much attention on the international stage. While being based on these four issues, it particularly concerns the promise from the donors to leave the recipient country in charge of its development. This does not always happen, partly because there is an ambivalence as to who should lead and be accountable for a project. In the end, all of these issues derive from a power imbalance between donors and recipients.

Looking further into interagency collaboration, the reasons for collaboration were identified. An affluence of IOs, better delivery, fit of the projects, reducing incoherence and less doubling of efforts were the main arguments. The UN was cited as an example where better coordination is estimated to be able to save 20% of the budget. Although collaboration thus has notable benefits, it also has its costs. At the UN Development Programme alone, 23-27% of staff time is used for coordination tasks with an estimated cost of 237.5 million USD. This led to the conclusion that collaboration must be managed more efficiently while keeping its benefits. This happens through better understanding of interagency collaboration management practices. A review of the research on managing interagency collaboration in international development, notably IOs, showed that two types of research exist. On the one hand, there are macro-level explanations with little use for managing a particular case. On the other hand, there are micro-level explanations with little understanding of how the mechanisms work that connect with macro theories. The

objective of this research is something that connects the two, is theoretical and at the same time of use for the interagency collaboration manager. In the recent past, some authors began research on this in peace operations but do not provide a general theory and do not pay enough attention to context. It is important to note that all this research is based on existing public or private management literature.

2.2 Managing interagency collaboration: insights for international development cooperation

Since the field of international development did not provide a satisfying theory how managing interagency collaboration in international development cooperation works, the following turns to the research that has been conducted in the other sectors. This will not only draw on public management, the traditional source, but also third sector and private sector management literature. It should be noted that research on interagency collaboration has proliferated in these fields in the past and it is virtually impossible to name all the work that has been done. This section is therefore limited to reviewing the main ideas and structuring them according to the needs of this research. The aim is to find a theory that connects macro-level explanations with the necessary insight into how to manage interagency collaboration as a manager, thus connecting the micro with the marco level. The resulting theory should nevertheless be adaptable as well, because it has to be modified for international development. The modification should be able to capture the particularities found for international aid – notably power. With the insights gained in the review of the international development literature, it also becomes clear that the overarching question 'How does interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development cooperation work?' can be refined. It was already clear, that there are macro- and micro-level approaches to explore the topic. For the following elaboration, the overarching question can be translated consequently into the following guiding questions:

1. Which managerial elements are important for interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
2. How do these elements affect interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
3. How do these elements manifest themselves in the management of interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?

2.2.1 (Public) Management and International Organizations

Public management is the form of management in IOs. Mathiasen (2005, p. 644) differentiates three areas in international public management: 1. the management of

international organizations, 2. public management changes in countries in response to external forces, and 3. the transfer of public management practices from one country to another. Furthermore, public management is rather flexible as it does not favor one theory in particular but is about theorizing, often with application to selected cases (Evans & Wamsley, 1999, p. 123). This is also the challenge for public management, as the cases are never the same and finding and providing recipes is therefore not easy (Behn, 1993, pp. 47-49). Consequently, public management is a diverse field that has drawn on different sources and disciplines itself which cannot be canonized (Lynn, 1996).[19] In a sense, it "is inconveniently ambiguous." (Lynn, 1996, p. 47). It offers a variety of different points of view as well, e.g. sociology and public management (Kaboolian, 1996), economics and public management (Weimer & Vining, 1996) or psychology and public management (Weiss, 1996). This naturally entails a close relationship between political sciences and public management and leads to a link with governance, although the exact relationship to the latter is still being discussed (Ellwood, 1996, p. 52). While some authors would say that "public management is governance, but not all governance is public management" (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997, p. 2), some see it as a next step in the evolution of public management (itself an evolution of public administration)[20] towards new public governance (Osborne, 2010). Internationally, the wide range of possible disciplines to draw from and the potential research topics have led to different emphases (Thom & Ritz, 2006, pp. 13-14 and Jones & Kettl, 2004).

While the following draws mainly on public management literature, this is not exclusive and in some aspects even difficult to differentiate as public management and private (and third sector) management are closely related. Many of the concepts and theories used in public management originated in private management research. For instance Bozeman (1993a) distinguishes between two streams of public management: the P-approach (from the public policy schools) and the B-approach (from the business schools).[21] Collaborations have been a topic extensively discussed in management. This is mostly due to a rise in collaboration in all sectors, private, public and non-profit (Connelly, Zhang, & Faerman, 2014, p. 17), e.g. in the health care sector in the United Kingdom (Meads & Ashcroft, 2000). However, different names have been employed for collaboration, such as partnerships, alliances or others (Connelly, Zhang, & Faerman, 2014, p. 18). This may lead to confusion in two ways. Firstly, there are

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[19] For a history of public management see Lynn (2005). A review of the notions of bureaucracy and their implications can be found at du Gay (2000).

[20] The distinction of public management and public administration is not uncontested and often considered arbitrary. In this view, the two should either be considered synonymous or administration as one function of management (Lynn, 2003, pp. 15-16).

[21] Their commonalities are listed as well (Bozeman, 1993a, pp. 4-5). Another overview of similarities and differences can be found in Lynn (2003, pp. 16-17).

different termini for 'collaboration', and secondly, several interpretations (or theoretical points of view) of the term 'collaboration' exist (Huxham, 1996a, p. 7).[22] In general, definitions of collaboration encompass the following: "Collaboration implies a positive, purposive relationship between organizations that retain autonomy, integrity and distinct identity, and thus, the potential to withdraw from the relationship." (Cropper, 1996, p. 82) Collaboration in this regard is seen as closer than cooperation as it includes co-laboring shared resources, defined structure, relationships and communication (Bingham, O'Leary, & Carlson, 2014, pp. 6-8). It is usually employed to solve problems that cannot easily be solved by a single organization and the process develops in order to achieve common goals – one of the basic values is reciprocity (Bingham, 2014, p. 250). These inter-organizational relations can be horizontal, e.g. between different metropolitan governments, or vertical, e.g. between national and subnational level (O'Toole, 2003, p. 235).[23] Examples include but are not limited to intergovernmental relations in the US (Bish, 1978), intergovernmental environmental policy implementation (Mayntz, 1978), relationships of the federal state with local government in Germany (Scharpf, Reissert, & Schnabel, 1978) or regional planning in Denmark (Bogason, 1978).

Given that these definitions cover the above elaborations on international development cooperation, insights from public management research are potentially generalizable to international development aid. In fact, international development cooperation can be seen as one area of public management (if conducted by public institutions). In that respect, it is to note that my definition of an IO considers IOs as public organizations (being international, public sector entities without profit orientation established by intergovernmental processes reporting regularly to member states). And as a matter of fact, research on public organizations has been applied to IOs as outlined above, e.g. Ness and Brechin (1988). Likewise, public management research has been applied to other IO topics such as the influence of IOs (EU, Worldbank, OECD) on domestic administrative reform (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2003).

2.2.2 Overarching themes of importance in modeling interagency collaboration

Analyzing the vast body of interagency collaboration literature, I noticed certain repeating themes[24], depending on author and time. These overarching themes naturally

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[22] McQuaid (2010, p. 127) for example employs the term interagency cooperation for what I would understand as interagency collaboration. He provides an overview of different definitions of partnership as well (McQuaid, 2010, pp. 128-130).

[23] For the differences between intergovernmental relations and intergovernmental management see Agranoff (1996, pp. 210-211).

[24] I prefer the notion of themes for two reasons. First of all, they reflect, in my view, the blurred boundaries between them. Secondly, they are not associated with any existing concepts nor interfere with connotations such as hierarchy, network and market (Wollmann, 2003, pp. 595-596).

reflect topics of current importance of (public) management in general as well. They are on a macro rather than a micro level and provide a logic as to how the independent variables included in the theme affect collaboration (dependent variable) but often do not go into details regarding how to manage collaboration comparable to the development literature. While some of the literature can be clearly associated with one overarching theme, it does not mean that the themes are exclusive. This is also going to be the entry point for a comprehensive theory. It has to be noted that this research is, of course, not the first to discern the important issues of interagency collaboration in public management. One classification of interagency collaboration theories is to differentiate between transaction cost economics, resource dependency, inter-organizational relationship and network (Hewitt, 2000, pp. 59-61). While this is very similar to what was found in international development literature, it is too impractical for collaboration management in my view.[25] Meads and Ashcroft (2000, pp. 43-46) as well as Schluter and Lee (1993, pp. 69-92) provide a much more manageable taxonomy for assessing relationships to this respect: commonality, parity, multiplexity, continuity, and directness. Another, rather management-oriented, five-dimensional classification is presented by Thomson, Perry and Miller (2014, p. 98): governance, administration, mutuality, norms and organizational autonomy. They also point out the importance of capturing the processes involved in each of these dimensions. An interesting typology comes from Ranade and Hudson (2003, p. 41). Similarly to my structure, their approach is based on the issues that have to be overcome to advance with interagency collaboration: structural, procedural, financial, professional and status and legitimacy issues. The classic from Melaville and Blank (1991, p. 20) used climate, processes, people, policies and resources as a structure. All of these classifications have their purpose in their respective context. The structure presented in this research was developed because a typology able to absorb the theoretical links between the macro level and the level of collaboration (dependent variable) as well as the managerial practices under them was needed. Thus, I propose environmental factors, organizational system, resources, power, governance and culture as the six overarching themes to structure the existing literature.

Environmental factors are often named as the initial reason for starting an interagency collaboration. Afterwards, they have to be dealt with and managed throughout the whole collaboration effort. Particularly, crises are associated with changes in issues such as legitimacy, interdependency of tasks, delivery and flexibility that push towards better collaboration among the providers (Thom & Ritz, 2006, p. 8).[26] This is quite comparable to my findings for the international development world and it likewise

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[25] Classifications exist for collaboration in the non-profit sector as well, e.g. Murray (2002, p. 293).
[26] New Public Management and New Public Governance can likewise be interpreted as responses to such crises (Thom & Ritz, 2006, pp. 9-10).

often happens around issues cutting across economic, social and environmental dimensions (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, p. 33). Human services integration is one of the most popular topics studied by public management researchers in this regard, focusing on structural changes to programs and changes in nature and delivery of services (Agranoff, 1991, p. 535 or Melaville & Blank, 1991).[27] The focus on environmental and contextual factors spurred practitioners' guides on what to do in interagency collaboration such as Melaville and Blank (1993). Health care coordination in the United Kingdom is an example (Osborne, 2002)[28] but also welfare systems, such as in Halligan (2006) for Australia.[29] Common to these practitioners' guides is that they address the public manager, the individual, in the case (Radin, 1996, pp. 157-162). An interesting review of collaboration during the construction of the international space station comes from Lambright and Pizzarella (2014). They mention complications in this multinational collaboration due to the sovereignty of the partners (Lambright & Pizzarella, 2014, p. 231). This is interesting regarding the focus of this research on international development, as it also happens between sovereign parties. However, Lambright and Pizzarella (2014, pp. 237-238) limit themselves to political aspects and do not take intercultural difference into account.

A second overarching theme found in the literature circles around elements required by the organizations to collaborate is an organizational system to make collaboration work. The intention is to understand how the effort is able to motivate all collaborators for a common interest as well as how to organize exchanges (O'Toole, 2003, pp. 239-242). While this includes resources, they are treated separately as this theme is more about the communication around the exchange and knowledge sharing among the participating agencies and agents as well as the accountability and legitimization structure (McQuaid, 2010, pp. 130-134). Information sharing is central in that respect (Connelly, Zhang, & Faerman, 2014, p. 25). Other articles on certain particular topics also deserve to be subsumed here as well, e.g. Gazley (2014) on motivation to collaborate and Ingraham and Getha-Taylor (2014) on incentive structure for collaboration. Bryson and Crosby (2014, pp. 67-71) provide a good summary of the topics that are considered as covered by the organizational system theme in this research: legitimacy, trust, structure and design, internal logic, planning and power, and public value. Particularly, literature on New Public Management is valuable to identify elements in this theme as New Public Management has dedicated lots of research to transactions based on contracts, incentives (Kaboolian, 1998, p. 190), result

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[27] Often with a network theory lens to it including provider, contributor, reputation and constitution-building networks (Bardach, 1994, pp. 2-4).

[28] Another example for mental health care in California can be found in Brewer (1975).

[29] Likewise, more specialized topics have been analysed such as interagency collaboration in the US for trade regulation (Government Accountability Office, 2013).

orientation and performance (Schedler, 2004).[30] Much of this has led to outsourcing of services (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, p. 32) and, consequently, the need for more guidance on out-contracted services in inter-organizational collaboration (Jones & Kettl, 2004, p. 454). Thus, collaborative joint action can be seen as an integral part of New Public Management (Conteh, 2013, p. 503). This is sometimes said to have developed with the emergence of the hollow state (Klijn, 2005, S. 265) which "refers to a general-purpose unit of government that relies extensively on contracts with third parties (nonprofits, firms, or public agencies) to deliver services to citizens." (Milward, 1996, p. 79).[31] The transition to New Public Management requires a culture change in the administration with more responsibility for the individual and, consequently, the re-thinking of motivation (Schedler, 1996, p. 8), another above-mentioned issue.

As a third overarching theme, resources are identified as an important reference in the existing interagency collaboration literature. Although this has overlap with the organizational system and could be subsumed under the second theme as well, a separate theme is dedicated to resources. Two reasons have provoked that decision. Firstly, resources are a quite prominent topic in the literature on collaboration. Secondly, the debate around the elements allocated to the organizational system circles rather around the terms of exchange whereas the discussion on the actual flow of assets is included under the resource theme. This is consistent with the research conducted on resource dependency – the main theory attributed to the theme.[32] Some researchers even see this as the core of inter-organization theory (Klijn, 1997, p. 21). Originally, the resource dependency theory investigated the degree of external control that resources as a source of power are able to exert over organizations (Pfeffer, 1978).[33] Resource dependency was seen as a strong incentive for organizations to collaborate (which is the relationship with the dependent variable) – e.g. for businesses a reason for mergers (Finkelstein, 1997, p. 789). Notwithstanding this, the strong statistical correlation found at the beginning had to be relativized in subsequent studies (Finkelstein, 1997, p. 799). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005, p. 168) point out that two aspects of dependency have to be differentiated: power imbalances between organizations and mutual dependence. Resource dependency is not limited to money, as other scarce physical and human resources such as authority were also found in empirical studies as reasons for interagency collaboration (Benson, 1975 and Misener

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[30] A diagram of streams in New Public Management literature can be found in Barzelay (2001, p. 4).

[31] And, as a consequence, the affluence of private management research in public management, e.g. principal-agent theory (Meier & Hill, 2005, p. 59).

[32] Transaction costs (which all collaborations entail) have to be considered as well (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, p. 47). Resource dependency theory is complementary to transaction cost economics (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005, p. 194).

[33] And has consequently been applied to different subjects such as budgeting and power in universities (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).

& Doherty, 2013, p.139). Also, the reliability of the flow is an important consideration (Benson, 1975, p. 233). Decision-makers are geared towards acquiring these resources in this view (Benson, 1975, p. 232).

Similar to resources and based on the discussion of the international development literature, a fourth overarching theme can be identified: power. Power is discussed in interagency collaboration mainly in relation to power over resources (Pfeffer, 1978). Therefore, it could be merged with the resource theme as well. Its importance for international development cooperation in a broader sense has led me to dedicating a separate theme to it. Still much of the discussion of power in interagency collaboration is related to direct power resources, such as money and authority with feedback effects between the two (Benson, 1975, p. 234). In this view, resources may mean more power or more power may lead to more resources (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980, p. 638). Likewise, network theories have looked into power and conflict issues (Agranoff, 2006, pp. 61-62). Nevertheless, research dedicated exclusively to power (such as Clegg, 1977 or Clegg, 1979) have come to a much more complex understanding than what is reflected in interagency collaboration theory (Belaya & Hanf, 2009, p. 1040). Focus is mostly placed on the reasons for collaboration and trust (Belaya & Hanf, 2009, p. 1040) – which does not adequately capture the four power-related issues identified in international development. At its very basics, power conceptions have to take into account at least the fundamental two streams: structural (social) and actor-centered aspects of power (Hayward & Lukes, 2008, pp. 5-6).[34] Only with both views in mind, it is possible to reflect structural aspects of power in collaboration as well as the actions individuals take – i.e. actors are able to make the choice not to exercise their power (Hayward & Lukes, 2008, p. 7). In the interagency collaboration field, few authors incorporate the distinction. Amongst the authors that do are Huxham and Vangen (2005, pp. 177-184) who recognize that power has macro-level and micro-level aspects. The macro level serves to explore source and dynamics, whereas the micro level (individual) serves to explore language, identity, membership, meeting management and other aspects.

Furthermore, the question should be asked how an interagency collaboration actually stays on track towards the goals it intends to achieve as well as how the process of determining the goals works in the first place. This fifth overarching theme of steering a course or governing has been identified by Vangen, Hayes and Cornforth (2014, p. 2) as a major research gap so far.[35] Nevertheless, much can be learned from the

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[34] Belaya and Hanf (2009, pp. 1041-1046) identify three perspectives: social, psychological and managerial and conclude that they mainly differ in sources and consequences of power.
[35] It has to be noted that collaborative governance (governance through collaboration) is not the same as governing collaboration (governance of the collaboration as such, Vangen, Hayes & Cornforth, 2014, p. 2). For an example of the former on education, not further discussed in my work, see Fauske

existing literature on governance of collaboration in this respect, as governance is about actors, structures and processes enabling direction and coordination of resources (Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2014, pp. 9-18).[36] While the current course of one organization determines the decision to collaborate (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, p. 39), maintaining a course in an interagency collaboration becomes much more difficult. In that sense, governance, as the whole set of regulations, practices, people and regimes, is needed to keep on track (Lynn, 2003, pp. 21-22).[37] However, as collaborations are often described as networks and a lot is thus not based on regulations, relational aspects come in and a larger understanding of governance is required as "the process that influences decisions and actions within the private, public, and civic sectors." (Bingham, 2014, p. 250)[38] Alter and Hage found through empirical research that this notably applies when work volume is high and processes are brief (Alter & Hage, 1993, p. 171). In this regard, the insights provided by network governance can be helpful for steering the course of collaboration as well (Conteh, 2013), although networks are not the only form of interagency collaboration (Agranoff, 2006, p. 57).[39] The elements that fall under this theme are neatly described by McQuaid's (2010, pp. 138-142) success factors for interagency collaboration: strategic focus, leadership, trust, mutualism, organizational complementarity and outcome-oriented procedures. Two central aspects in this theme are trust (Klijn, 2010) and leadership (Crosby, 1996 and Bingham, O'Leary, & Carlson, 2014, pp. 4-5).[40] This may require some new skills from public managers (Osborne, 2010, pp. 11-12). In that sense, the form of steering the course should be included, too. In networks, a commonly found feature is the election of some kind of steering body, such as a council, board or others, which determines the goals by established mechanisms (Agranoff, 2006, p. 58). With many organizations collaborating, it may be that the different organizations (as well as the involved individuals) pursue different goals in the same interagency collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 104).

(2006). Not all authors, however, adhere to this typology (Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2014, p. 4). An overview of the differences can be found in Vangen, Hayes and Cornforth (2014, p. 7).

[36] Governance has different meanings in the literature. Klijn (2010, pp. 303-304) identifies four: 1. governance as corporate governance, 2. governance as new public management, 3. governance as intergovernmental relations, and 4. governance as network governance.

[37] As I am only interested in how interagency collaboration works in general and do not look into legal (Bingham, 2014) or legitimacy issues (Provan, Kennis, & Human, 2014).

[38] Rüegg-Stürm (2012, S. 6) notes that this is particularly challenging at the system borders.

[39] The interest in governance can be seen as one reason why the network became interesting for public management in the first place (Klijn, 2005, S. 259). Meier and Hill (2005, pp. 61-62) provide an overview of the network view of public management.

[40] While it is impossible to fully recap the findings here, it should be noted that Crosby (1996, pp. 613-614, 616-625) provides a coherent leadership framework and a deduced typology of leadership styles.

The last, sixth overarching theme encountered in the literature is concentrated on the way people in an interagency collaboration think – the culture of the relationship.[41] The question is what kind of culture (or rationale) prevails within the interagency collaboration.[42] While the question is fairly obvious to pose, it is surprising how little literature has been dedicated to it in researching interagency collaboration in the public sector. An example for the topics to be looked at is negotiations. What happens in negotiations? For example, is the atmosphere rather characterized by arguments for competitiveness as in New Public Management or does bureaucratic logic prevail (Haldemann, 1995)? This also influences trust building and reciprocity (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, p. 36). This requires coordination with different stakeholders, notably for organizations that have multiple bottom lines (Schwenger, 2013, p. 99), and is influenced by the ideas stakeholders have about the organization and the purpose of interagency collaboration. This view may change over time (Thoenig, 2003). Changes in the dominant paradigm of public management (e.g. from traditional public management to New Public Management) often require changes in culture as well. In that sense, administrative culture is the total of behaviors and codes practiced in administration and always interpreted subjectively (Schedler & Proeller, 2009, p. 267). This may influence, e.g. the interpretation of rules (Schedler & Proeller, 2009, p. 269). One recent stream of public management research that may become very insightful for understanding interagency collaboration in the future in this respect, is the work around multiple rationales in public organizations. The idea behind the concept is that the definition of purpose for public organizations that work based on the division of (knowledge-based) labor on highly interdependent and specialized processes in the context of differentiated societal functional systems, may be heterogeneous and ambiguous (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013, pp. 13-15). This is a phenomenon known from private management but has been introduced with New Public Management in public organizations as well (Schedler, 2012, pp. 361-362). The different rationales about purpose are rooted ultimately in different reference systems of the stakeholders (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013, p. 44). The management of these multiple demands can be handled differently, but one approach is developing a reflective competence with the manager (Schedler, 2012, p. 373).

In sum, these six overarching themes have to be integrated by any theory explaining interagency collaboration comprehensively, connecting the issues that have to be managed with their impact on collaboration. While one that is all encompassing still remains to be found, the next section turns to some of the approaches that go in that direction. An interesting question will also be how exactly the themes are combined in the management of interagency collaboration and how this is manifested in practice.

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[41] For a review of the use of 'culture' in organizational studies see Dingwall and Strangleman (2005).

[42] This is based on the culture (identity) of the organization as such (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 23).

2.2.3 Managing collaboration: integrating overarching themes and practice

Contrary to development, authors have made attempts to understand what management of interagency collaboration linked to theory looks like in the public management field. It is important that these approaches are based on empirical research to gain insight into managerial practices on the ground. This results in approaches that are on the theory level that is looked for. However, it should be noted that some authors favor one of the themes identified more than others. The aim is to find a theory that covers most of them, provides a sound model of how the elements interact and allows capturing how this is practiced in interagency collaboration. An example is Agranoff (2006, p. 56) who focused on approaching collaboration from a network point of view in the past and states: "It is time to go beyond heralding the importance of networks as a form of collaborative public management and look inside their operations." In his work, he then explores management practices, e.g. how consensus was reached, and distinguishes between group discussion, political negotiation and others (Agranoff, 2006, p. 60). These are the theoretical approaches searched for, which are much more developed for public management than for international development.

At the same time, the approach has to be general to be applicable to different types of collaboration (Oliver, 1990, p. 241). Huxham and Vangen have been pioneers in that sense (more details of their theory will be introduced below). They also conceptualized in a general way when partnerships occur in the first place. For them, for a collaboration to happen requires collaborative advantage, i.e. "something is achieved which could not have been achieved without the collaboration". (Huxham & Vangen, 2002, pp. 273, emphasis removed) If there is no collaborative advantage, working together is not fruitful and collaborative inertia is observed (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 3). This represents an all-encompassing but simple solution under which more detailed reasons can still be discussed, e.g. Alter and Hage's (1993, p. 42) four factors: "the willingness to collaborate, the need for expertise, the need for funds, and the need for adaptive efficiency."[43] Theoretical models of this kind, comprising all different themes are called "multidimensional models" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 23). Looking at all different dimensions (or overarching themes) also accounts for the fact that there is no one-fits-all recipe in interagency collaboration. O'Leary and Vij (2012, pp. 512-514) propose a list of factors that have to be considered (similar to my themes idea): context, purpose of mission of collaboration, member selection and capacity building, motivation and commitment, governance and structure, power, accountability, communication, perceived legitimacy, trust and information technology.

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[43] Another example for a list of possible reasons is: access to resources, shared risk, efficiency, co-ordination and seamlessness, learning and moral imperative (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, pp. 5-7).

Giving an exhaustive overview of all dimensions or elements looked at by different multidimensional models is impossible and would go beyond the limitations of this work. To give an idea, however, three models from public sector collaboration are mentioned here.[44] Oliver (1990, pp. 242-246) looks at six parameters (which may interact with each other): necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy. Underlying these (as broader themes), she accepts the importance of resource scarcity and domain consensus as general drivers of collaboration, while she investigates the drivers important in each specific collaboration in terms of the six parameters (Oliver, 1990, pp. 249-250). This represents a big step as it proposes concrete linkages among the different elements of different themes. Hudson, Hardy, Henwood and Wistow (2002) go one step further as they rightly point out that the context may make some steps of pushing ahead collaboration more important than others – a sequencing of the different elements. They propose the following components to take this into account (Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 2002):

1. contextual factors, expectations and constraints;
2. recognition of need;
3. identification of a legitimate basis;
4. assessment of collaborative capacity[45];
5. articulation of purpose;
6. building trust;
7. ensuring wide organizational ownership;
8. nurturing relationships;
9. selection of an appropriate relationship; and
10. selection of a pathway.

While this is quite differentiated covering different elements and themes, they do not break this down to the level of how these components manifest themselves in the concrete interagency collaboration. On the contrary, Huxham and Vangen (within their theory of collaborative advantage), first list general aspects of managing partnerships (Huxham & Vangen, 2002, pp. 276-280): aims, language and culture and trust and power. Later, they provide concrete elements that are contained within the general aspects and have been found during empirical research such as 'social capital', 'risk' or 'leadership'. Others can be found in the original study (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 12). Vangen and Huxham (2010, p. 163) confirm that they have accumulated and added these elements over years of observation. The elements may overlap with each

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[44] An example for NGO collaboration can be found in Misener and Doherty (2013, pp. 136-137) who identify trust, constant and stable interaction, consistency, joint decision-making, involvement and ownership and investment as important dimensions for fostering collaboration. Loss of autonomy and power asymmetries are detrimental for collaboration.

[45] For the collaborative capacity, see the following paragraphs.

other and can be used as frameworks for reflective practice. That is the level and approach looked for, as it connects theory with practice based on empirical findings. Nevertheless, it does not provide a clear model that explains how exactly they connect. However it is to note in all these models that there is a focus on the direct outcome: increased, more effective or otherwise 'more' collaboration. That means a clear link to outcomes – the dependent variable (Polivka, Dresbach, Heimlich, & Elliott, 2001, p. 341). Only in that way, it is possible to move ahead with interagency collaboration theory in the future and actually try to construct quantifiable indicators for collaboration as some few authors have attempted to do. For instance, Thomson, Perry and Miller (2014, pp. 100-101) construct 17 indicators to measure collaboration empirically linking processes to outcomes.

It should be noted that most of these inquiries are based on interviews of some sort, unstructured, semi-structured or structured, conducted either in person, by phone or via e-mail (Misener & Doherty, 2013, p. 138). These should be geared towards capturing actual practices of collaboration and not only intentions to collaborate.[46] For example, Smith and Mogro-Wilson (2008, p. 19) found significant discrepancies between organizational policies on collaboration and the practice reported by the participants. The question is also whether questions are a sound method. The answers to questions only provide a partial view but the real insight from the groundwork of collaboration is missing. Huxham and Vangen (2005, pp. 32-33) found that much of the truth of interagency collaboration can only be revealed when one is able to observe and ask at the point of action. Moreover, they are usually focused on one side of the partnership, i.e. one partner is asked how the collaboration is working and advancing but no cross-check is applied to see if the counterpart agrees or differs (Misener & Doherty, 2013, pp. 145-146). Focusing on one side of the relationship may not provide an accurate picture without considering the views of the collaborating partners. An interesting remark in that sense comes from Klijn (2005, S. 276-277) noting that most of the empirical research so far only provides a static picture at a given time. However, interagency collaboration evolves dynamically over time, an aspect rarely covered.

One important aspect of the elaborations of these authors has already been mentioned: the notion of capacity. Capacity of interagency collaboration is an idea originally coming from the for-profit sector literature in the sense of organizational capacity (Misener & Doherty, 2013, p. 136). Different definitions exist such as "the ability to acquire and organize resources to deliver activity against purpose or task." (Cropper, 1996, p. 93) Another example is Hudson, Hardy, Henwood and Wistow (2002, p. 336) who propose collaborative capacity "refers to the level of activity or degree of change a collaborative relationship is able to sustain without any partner losing a sense of

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[46] See Thomson, Perry and Miller (2007, pp. 30-32) for an example.

security in the relationship." A common feature of these definitions, and the aspect recollected here, is that this capacity may be latent and does not necessarily have to be called upon (Cropper, 1996, p. 93).

The introduction of capacity comes along with the idea of processes that can push for more collaboration – a quite managerial conception of collaboration (Misener & Doherty, 2013). Some of the authors mentioned before incorporate a process view in their theories (e.g. Melaville & Blank, 1991, pp. 21-24). Some prefer to assign processes to a separate dimension in their theories (Hewitt, 2000, pp. 63-64), whereas others take a process view within all of the dimensions important for collaboration. Thomson and Perry (2006, p. 21) propose that collaboration needs to be seen holistically linked to its antecedents, its outcomes and the processes happening inside the dimensions of administration, governance, organizational autonomy, mutuality and norms of trust and reciprocity. Huxham (1996b, p. 141) also notes that if one wants to achieve collaborative advantage, attention has to be paid to the process. Likewise, taking a process view enables one to take into account that collaborations exhibit a development over time and can be associated with management practices (Gray, 1985, p. 913). In that way, processes may enable overcoming the snapshot view (Senge, 1994, p. 73). Ring and van de Ven (1994, p. 91) have provided a framework in this respect and believe that process is central to understanding inter-organizational relationships over time. They are of the opinion that these relationships are cyclical and not sequential and are linked to the emergence, evolution and dissolution of cooperative inter-organizational relationships (Ring & van de Ven, 1994, pp. 99-112). The relationships happen around negotiations, commitments and executions and exhibit institutional and personal (formal and informal) elements (Ring & van de Ven, 1994, p. 97). Based on this framework, Ariño and de la Torre (1998) have developed a model to measure evolution of collaboration. Relying on archival data and interviews, this is one of the few longitudinal studies in the field – although it was not conducted on public sector collaboration but on an international joint venture (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998, pp. 309, 312). Another approach of incorporating the evolution of collaboration into theories over time has been describing it in phases or stages – this is often handy to capture the activities and practices associated with it (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, pp. 10-13).

The perspective of processes conducive to collaboration provides an entry point for the individual as well. Several authors cited above (and in the literature of international development) have pointed out that working collaboratively happens through individuals (Huxham, 1996a, p. 1). Individuals can shape the processes in different ways but an important function is the translation of organizational goals into goals of the collaboration. This can introduce and mix with personal goals the individuals bring into the collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, pp. 62. 84-86). This may be

influenced by outsiders (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 86).[47] Yet, the literature does not sufficiently examine the individuals' impact and influence (O'Leary & Vij, 2012, pp. 514-515). These individuals have been named "boundary spanners" and are "individuals who engage in networking tasks and employ methods of coordination and task integration across organizational boundaries." (Alter & Hage, 1993, pp. 46, emphasis removed) Boundary-spanners are situated in boundary-spanning units and their personal characteristics are flexibility, extroversion, tolerance of ambiguity, self-assurance, need for visibility and savoir faire (Radin, 1996, p. 159). Other authors mention skills such as facilitation, steering, negotiation, communication, entrepreneurship and mediation (Ranade & Hudson, 2003, pp. 45-46). This may be more difficult to find in public officials than in the private sector where entrepreneurship is often part of the job (Sink, 1996, pp. 102-104). Entrepreneurialism receives much attention regarding these boundary-spanners. For instance, Page (2003, pp. 318-332) identified concrete, managerial strategies applied by interagency collaborators in Georgia and Vermont.[48] Again, the conclusion is that it depends on the individual in charge of collaborating (Page, 2003, p. 335). Future insight into boundary-spanners (notably on the governance and culture themes) may come from research such as Fligstein (2001), exploring the concept of social skills to better understand the role of actors in changing and framing social structures.

Concluding this section, it is stressed that in public management research some approaches have been brought forward to link theory and practice. However, more could be done to integrate all the different aspects (e.g. the boundary-spanner, capacity, the themes and the practices). As O'Leary and Vij (2012, p. 518) noted: "It is safe to say that the study and practice of collaborative public management is generally fragmented with a low level of consensus." The right approach would incorporate all theoretical ideas and enable them for empirical research filling them with managerial practices. In that respect, Vangen and Huxham (2010, p. 164) likewise fall short, as their theory "describes the issues that must be managed but without providing precise recipes for managerial action." It should be as concrete as practitioner guides of the kind of Melaville and Blank (1993), but all-encompassing to include all issues linking them to collaboration as the dependent variable. In that sense, Bingham, O'Leary and Carlson (2014, pp. 4, 6-15) summarize the path for the future: a better conceptualization of collaboration, a comprehensive view on going from inputs to outputs taking processes into account, a need to connect practice and structure, and an incorporation of findings from other disciplines. The next section makes a first attempt

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[47] Similarly to the idea that management innovation processes can be driven by internal and external change agents (Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol, 2008, p. 832).
[48] Page (2003, pp. 314-315) offers a comparison of the different single-agency and interagency collaboration leadership challenges as well.

at the latter, drawing on other management literature that pertains to my research interest in international development cooperation projects.

2.2.4 Other management insights with potential for interagency collaboration
Finishing my review of previous research, other management research which influenced my building a theory explaining management of interagency collaboration in international development is briefly elaborated on here.[49] Several reasons have caused this decision. Firstly, not enough insights in intercultural aspects of interagency collaboration were found – probably because examples from public management research usually do not involve cross-border collaboration. This requires a look into intercultural management. Secondly, while conducting research on interagency collaboration, related research on donor relationship management as well as managing joint ventures in the business world contained useful information. As these research streams provided new ideas, good research practice requires documenting the influences. Lastly, doing so is a start on Bingham, O'Leary and Carlson's (2014, pp. 6-15) call for incorporating more findings from other disciplines into interagency collaboration. While this cannot be exhaustive and these by no means are the only fields that have potential to provide valuable findings for collaboration management, it is a starting point and an invitation for other researchers to expand approaches like this.

2.2.4.1 Lessons learned from project management – relevant for collaboration in international development?
Before going into the findings of the research mentioned above, project management is briefly elaborated on. As development cooperation is done mostly through projects, this is just natural and prevents my research from criticism not to have done so. However, one has to be cautious since international development projects are not projects of the usual kind. They are not only projects of one organization with different departments involved. They are projects involving various organizations. While companies in a globalized world have projects across organizational boundaries as well, international development aid often happens with sovereign states (and their executive organs); this may exhibit other challenges than 'usual' project management.

Project management literature has accumulated mostly around engineering topics (large infrastructure, information technology and research and development are sample topics). This may be the reason why much literature is rather technical and focused

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[49] It is worth recalling that management can be described as a targeted influence of processes based on the division of labour expected to be successful before action and evaluated as successful afterwards (Schedler & Rüegg-Stürm, 2013, p. 13).

purely on delivery. In this respect, a project is defined as being a temporary endeavor that creates a unique product, service or result (Cobb, 2012, p. 4). That is an interesting point as development cooperation, despite working through projects, often has long-term perspectives and relationships with the beneficiaries. Therefore, it is doubtful if project management with a temporary point of view is able to take into account all the variables that development cooperation has to attend to.

The most important project parameters are scope, costs and time (Cobb, 2012, pp. 5-6). While projects can be of different size, project management deals mostly with complex projects to be delivered within the parameters to agreed-upon quality (Xu, Ming, Song, He, & Li, 2014, p. 146). To do so, project management has developed data and tools to enable forecasting, monitoring and evaluating the performance of projects (Vanhoucke, 2014, p. 3).[50] In this respect, an integrated approach harmonizes the product breakdown structure, the work breakdown structure and the organizational breakdown structure through systemic thinking (Xu, Ming, Song, He, & Li, 2014, pp. 142-143, 148). Usually, this requires a lot of project-based collaboration between team members of different departments or organizations (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley, & Marosszeky, 2002, p. 323). The members of the team may not have the same goals and the project manager has to create a hybrid team culture (Jones, 2008, p. 113). In order to do so, several challenges have to be faced (Jones, 2008, pp. 114-115): 1. building the team (from different organizational units), 2. equalizing the team (from different hierarchical models), 3. structuring the team (to work towards the common goal), and 4. tweaking the team (monitoring over time). In a larger context, not only the project team has to be managed but associated groups such as a strategic group and/or a management group as well (Allan, 2006, p. 252). That leaves project management in large parts subject to human behavior (Korhonen, Laine, & Martinsuo, 2014, p. 22). Moreover, all these tasks have to be performed in a context of uncertainty about the project, the portfolio of projects, the organization, the environment and the outcomes (Korhonen, Laine, & Martinsuo, 2014, p. 21). All these sources of uncertainty are equally important for the project manager and have to be addressed through a full management control package (Korhonen, Laine, & Martinsuo, 2014, p. 32). This is usually achieved through detailed contracts or rules of engagement among the parties involved – which requires a high degree of surveillance. Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley and Marosszeky (2002, pp. 318-319) propose an interesting alternative to that: reflexive self-control making external surveillance unnecessary. This was coined "governmentality" by Foucault and includes both the larger organizational governance perspective and the subject inside the organization. This can be achieved through decreasing conflicting rationalities of the people involved by giving them a new,

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[50] A full introduction of the key tools of project management can be found in Cobb (2012).

collective project logic including transparent performance indicators and monetary incentives (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley, & Marosszeky, 2002, p. 325).

In development cooperation projects, all these tasks are meant to be handled through one single tool (in all its different versions): the aforementioned logframe – with all its debates and power issues attached. However, it leaves open how the project managers in an IO should engage with their counterparts to create this common mission and culture referred to, e.g. by governmentality. One of the few articles on project management in development cooperation comes from Simović (2015, p. 173), who confirms that the ideas of performance and cost effectiveness are spill-overs from New Public Management. She outlines some of the particular challenges of project management in development aid (Simović, 2015, p. 175): 1. project goals are related to highly complex social change, 2. strong political context, 3. environment of high expectations, and 4. multiple stakeholders. Simović's findings suggest the hypothesis that a bureaucratic, rule-bound public sector may have a negative impact on project management compared to the private sector (Simović, 2015, p. 185).

Project management has paid attention to cross-cultural issues that may influence the management of projects. For example, Hofstede (1983, p. 41) states: "Management in general and project management in particular, can be related to differences in national cultures." Relating to his four-dimensional system,[51] he argues that project management is based on individualistic values and comes naturally to cultures with weak uncertainty avoidance and small power distance, as there are no hierarchies to resolve conflicts and participants are part of various hierarchies (Hofstede, 1983, pp. 46-47). Wang and Liu (2007, p. 61) support the idea that project management is based on certain values and beliefs. Applying this to a Chinese context, they find that the strong hierarchy, orientation on family and superiors in China may negatively impact the disposition for project management. They caution that extensive project management training empirically proves to reduce this cultural barrier (Wang & Liu, 2007, p. 69).

In conclusion, for the moment being, project management literature is only secondary for my research on interagency collaboration in international development. While development cooperation research should look more into detail into possible learnings from project management research, this is not the purpose of my work. Nevertheless, three lessons were learned from this quick review of project management research. Firstly, one has to pay attention to the fact that development aid projects are limited in time while the relationship with the beneficiaries may be long-term. Potential conflicts

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[51] Hofstede's (1983, p. 43) four dimensions of national culture are: individualism vs. collectivism, large vs. small power distance, strong vs. weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity vs. femininity.

and their management should be taken into account. Secondly, while managing projects requires integrated management tools, the public sector may not be the best to deploy them and their use in the field should be reviewed carefully. Lastly, the use of project management tools may be culturally sensitive and culturally different approaches to managing projects should be captured.

2.2.4.2 Non-Profit Organizations' donor relations as public relations management
A look into the research conducted on non-profit organizations (often NGOs) shows that one research concern has been the relationships of these organizations with their donors. As the funding sources can be quite diverse and may involve donations from the general public, one field of research on donor relations has developed under the hat of public relations – not always undebated (Swanger & Rogers, 2013, p. 567).[52] This is a quite specialized and distinct research stream compared to other research on public relations.[53] It is possible to detect a certain similarity in the relationship between non-profit organizations and their donors and relationships in interagency collaboration in international development – at least regarding the relationship between funding agencies and their beneficiaries.[54] Waters (2009b, pp. 113-115) structures the research field[55] around the following elements: 1. nonprofit-donor relationship, 2. stewardship, 3. reciprocity, 4. responsibility, 5. reporting, and 6. relationship nurturing. The interesting element here that is important for and underexplored in interagency collaboration is reciprocity. As noted in previous sections, interagency collaboration too often focuses only on one side of the collaboration and insights on reciprocity in this kind of relationships therefore seem beneficial to me.

Research on public relations for non-profit organizations suggests that symmetric relationships are perceived by participants to work best (Waters, 2009a, p. 144). This is interesting as well regarding the findings on power in the previous literature review. For the researcher, it is important to verify the perception from both ends of the relationship as perceptions may differ (Waters, 2009a, p. 145). The dimensions of relational quality that are looked at by Waters (2009a, p. 144) are trust, commitment, satisfaction, and controlling mutuality (power)[56] – quite comparable to some of the dimensions suggested by interagency collaboration theories. As in interagency collaboration research, different authors propagate different dimensions. Bruning,

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[52] This is mostly based on the excellence/symmetry theory and not its later refinement contingency theory (Swanger & Rogers, 2013, p. 567).
[53] As for example public relations research on small hotels (Milohnić, 2012).
[54] Horstman (2004, pp. 51-52), for instance, also refers to an example of a US community development organization to draw lessons for international development agencies.
[55] Research on non-profit organization's donors is, of course, vaster than the narrow field highlighted here – e.g. donor giving over time (Khodakarami, Petersen, & Venkatesan, 2015).
[56] Similar to Grunig (2002, pp. 1-2).

Dials and Shirka (2007, pp. 25-26) have compiled a list of commonly used dimensions: reciprocity, trust, credibility, mutual legitimacy, openness, mutual satisfaction, mutual understanding, involvement, investment, commitment, mutuality, satisfaction, affective intimacy, relationship termination cost, and reputation. The research is focused as well on the outcome that is alleged to be produced (Bruning, Dials, & Shirka, 2007, pp. 25-26). As researchers on collaboration stress that the individual is important in interagency collaboration, research on public relations emphasizes the role of the public relations manager (Falconi, White, Lorenzon, & Johnson, 2009). Moreover, it is crucial to manage a relationship well considering the stage it is in (emerging, maturity, etc., Naudé & Buttle, 2000, p. 360).

Furthermore, public relations research has already advanced much more on measuring relational quality (Bruning, Dials, & Shirka, 2007, pp. 25-26), which is still a call for further research in interagency collaboration (O'Leary & Vij, 2012, pp. 516-517). Hon and Grunig (1999) have been pioneering measuring public relations. One example is Waters' (2009a, p. 145) research employing a survey on a 9-point Hon-and-Grunig scale to measure the quality of relationships. This is comparable to the latest research on interagency collaborations, such as Thomson, Perry and Miller (2007) who develop a complex empirical model (based on a structural equation model). Similarly, they rely on a questionnaire of closed questions with answers on a Likert-like scale (Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007, p. 29). The work that has been done on public relations in this sense may become an important source for new ideas for interagency collaboration measurement.

For this research, the importance of reciprocity is retained in a general sense. This should include symmetry in the research design (inquiring about collaboration with all participants involved) as well as analyzing the data on what conclusions can be drawn regarding reciprocity in collaboration. Measuring and quantifying interagency collaboration is definitely the way forward. It is, however, too advanced for the research attempted here as my research is still on a conceptual level given that no theory of the kind looked for exists for international development cooperation.

2.2.4.3 Building strategic alliances – insights from joint ventures in the private sector
In the private sector, many forms of interagency collaboration (usually called inter-organizational relationships) can be found – and there is a lot more research on it. In the following section, the most important learnings from that literature regarding the cultural or internal logic theme identified above are briefly distilled, as the research

found on it for the public sector was not comprehensive.[57] The section is limited to a few insights drawn from the joint venture literature. The term 'joint venture' is hereby not used in any specific way.[58] The idea behind the term as used here is a relationship closer than collaboration – usually with joint ownership of the new structure. Recalling the definition of collaboration from Cropper (1996, p. 82) above that "collaboration implies a positive, purposive relationship between organizations that retain autonomy, integrity and distinct identity, and thus, the potential to withdraw from the relationship", my concept is that in joint ventures this retaining of autonomy ceases to exist. As these relationships are thus closer, the institutional logic or culture (and creating a common one) is more important and more literature should be found – which is indeed the case. Also, research on mergers and acquisitions has looked into the subject, only mentioned at the end of this section in brief. The idea of looking to private sector management for further conclusions in interagency collaboration is not new. In fact, it is the usual source. Huxham and Vangen (2005, pp. 14-29) who have looked at strategic alliances and joint ventures are just one example.

A joint culture or a common institutional logic shared by all parts involved in a joint venture allows capturing relational rents and competitive advantages. Differences may create tensions (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, pp. 332-333). In this regard, "institutional logics are the basis of taken-for-granted rules guiding behavior." (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, p. 333) The creation of a common culture happens through joint routines, notably in the area of knowledge sharing (Dyer & Singh, 1998, pp. 664-666). Aligned incentives as well as an appropriate governance structure are crucial for influencing these processes inside a joint venture (Dyer & Singh, 1998, pp. 666, 669). But external factors such as partner availability, indivisibility of resources, asset connectedness and institutional environment matter for the development of a joint culture, too (Dyer & Singh, 1998, pp. 672-674). As many joint ventures happen internationally, the literature differentiates between the impact of national and organizational cultures (Gómez-Miranda, Pérez-López, Argente-Linares, & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2015, p. 365). In that sense, national culture refers to different cultures due to the cross-border nature of a joint venture, while organizational culture refers to the culture or institutional logic to which is referred in the cultural theme (section 2.2.2). Nevertheless, the two are connected e.g. Tahir (2014), who proposes to count organizational cultural differences as the manifestation of national cultural differences. These insights may be of additional value for the context of this research given that one has to look into (cross-border) cultural differences in international

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[57] Literature on inter-organizational relationships in the private sector is of course much more extensive than that, e.g. Gulati and Higgins (2003) on inter-organizational relationships' impact on the success of initial public offerings.

[58] Some authors have their own, narrow concepts, e.g. Li, Zahng and Jing (2008, p. 90) defining joint ventures only as constructs including a foreign and a domestic partner.

development. Joint venture research has focused on (empirically) linking these cultural differences and their mitigation to firm performance (Gómez-Miranda, Pérez-López, Argente-Linares, & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2015). In order to be successful in overcoming the (national and organizational) cultural differences, communication, cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms are key (Damanpour, Devece, Chen, & Pothukuchi, 2012, p. 472). Trust is another crucial ingredient (Tahir, 2014).[59] Drawing on the mergers and acquisitions literature, and very much in line with my cultural theme, Damanpour, Devece, Chen and Pothukuchi (2012, p. 459) sum up that "in addition to task integration, successful mergers require social integration for resolving issues of power, identity, and culture." In the future, interesting insights may particularly derive from the research on public-private joint ventures (collaboration between the two sectors in one new organization, Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, p. 335). Competing logics in these joint ventures include, e.g. efficiency vs. legitimacy and total vs. limited internal control (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, pp. 339-340). Practices for managing these competing logics have been identified to be involving and communicating with stakeholders as well as creating mutual learning spaces (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, p. 344).

As finding a common culture gets more important, the closer the integration of the two firms gets (on the way to forming a new culture)[60], it is not surprising that mergers and acquisitions literature has dealt with it as well. This can be understood given that culture is ranked the top reason for post-deal failures (Teerikangas & Véry, 2012, p. 393), although different results have been reached by different studies (Teerikangas & Véry, 2012, pp. 397-401). Likewise, the literature employs the distinction of the national and organizational cultures and sometimes adds professional culture as a third form (Teerikangas & Véry, 2012, p. 394). Notwithstanding this, the understanding of national culture is not as nuanced as other research fields (e.g. sociology) and still requires the look into intercultural management research (Teerikangas & Véry, 2012, p. 395). The advice for (organizational) cultural change in mergers to overcome cultural differences can be summarized as the following: "Cultural change occurs and can be approached in phases. Best practices with regard to enabling cultural change revolve around attitudes conveying trust and safety, communications, dialogue, clarity of goals, and employee rotation." (Teerikangas & Véry, 2012, p. 411) This is similar to the findings on joint ventures. Again, the individual is particularly important as employee identification is at the heart of culture (Giessner, Ullrich, & van Dick, 2012).

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[59] That holds in cross-border joint ventures, too. Zutshi and Tan (2009) confirm in their study that trust is an important selection criterion for a joint venture partner in different national cultures as well.

[60] For example integrating performance management in a global organization (Lu & Ahmed, 2013).

For my research on interagency collaboration, it is important to underline the crucial role a common identity in the form of a shared culture and joint logic plays for outcomes and success. This was not so prominent in interagency collaboration research – although related public management research provides some good glimpses. What can be learned from joint venture and mergers and acquisitions research is that the process of creating the new collaboration structures requires a thoughtful process and, notably, good communication and skills that facilitate trust.

2.2.4.4 Intercultural management – important findings for development collaboration
Lastly, the implications of working cross-border in different cultures are elaborated on. While some issues of collaborating interculturally have already been mentioned in the previous section, one of the insights was that more details from intercultural management are needed. An important aspect of working on intercultural challenges in development cooperation is that they may occur in two instances. On the one hand, development professionals have to work on international projects with people from other cultures trying to achieve change in other societies. On the other hand, if posted overseas, they live in a foreign culture as well (although section 2.1.2 indicates that they may not get in touch much with local culture). The fundamental assumption is naturally that by not understanding culturally important issues "behavioral mistakes and misattribution can lead to dysfunctional relationships and can be a cause of poor organizational performance." (Bhawuk, Landis, & Munusamy, 2009, p. 7)

Culture is a complex concept and many competing definitions can be found – also depending on the field one looks at. Thus, culture can be defined in a general or contextual way and is learned through socialization (Gerring & Barresi, 2009, pp. 243-244, 249). A general definition encompasses that culture is social, ideational or symbolic, patterned and shared by members of a social group (Gerring & Barresi, 2009, pp. 248-251). In that sense, culture can be understood as the distribution of individual behaviors and the mean is called 'the culture of' (Bhawuk, Landis, & Munusamy, 2009, p. 8). Time, language, people and space (which does not necessarily coincide with the nation!) are important elements of culture and may change over time (Bhawuk, Landis, & Munusamy, 2009, pp. 12-14).[61] Characteristics of this kind have been used to compare cultures, two classic examples being Hall and Hofstede. Hall (1990, p. 6) distinguished high-context cultures which communicate most information implicitly through the person and low-context cultures where most information is explicit in the code. The idea is that this may lead to confusion in the business world when people from the two cultures meet and do not understand that other issues matter

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[61] Time, its perception and use are the most noted difference across cultures, see, e.g., elaborations by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997, pp. 120-140) or Wong (2009). Hall (1990, pp. 10-17) notes that time and space are related.

for the others, e.g. in communication (Hall, 1990, p. 9). Hofstede (1983, p. 43) developed four dimensions of national culture in an empirical study: 1. individualism vs. collectivism, 2. large vs. small power distance, 3. strong vs. weak uncertainty avoidance, and 4. masculinity vs. femininity. All these macro-level dimensions have received the criticism whether it is possible to derive macro-level categories from empirically studied individual behavior (McSweeney, n.d.). However, keeping their limitations in mind, these concepts serve (Hofstede, Neuijen, Daval Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990, p. 288) and at least provide variables one can use for cross-cultural management research (Leung, 2008, p. 60). Dimensional thinking is important for collaborators in international development to get a first, stereotype-like impression for the environment in which and for which they have to design a project. In that sense, studies have been conducted on cultural differences in negotiations (Brett & Crotty, 2008), culturally different approaches to leadership (Aycan, 2008)[62] or culture and innovation (McCabe, 2002)[63]. For the often cited culture shock for expatriates in a new culture, these dimensional descriptions of culture may also help (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 425-427).

However, the question remains how this translates to the micro level of collaboration and management. The nation level and the individual definitely interact while they have to be distinguished from each other, as inferences cannot necessarily be made (Smith, Peterson, & Thomas, 2008, pp. 7-8). While some authors advocate for values as the connection between the two levels (Smith, Peterson, & Thomas, 2008, p. 4),[64] Hofstede, Neuijen, Daval Ohayv and Sanders (1990, p. 312) showed that people with the same values may exhibit quite different practices in management while people demonstrating the same practices may have quite different values. This is where the national culture (in which Hofstede, Neuijen, Daval Ohayv and Sanders root values) and organizational culture as well as individual behavior connect. Values are at the heart but cannot be observed, whereas practices (in the sense of rituals or customs) can be observed (Hofstede, Neuijen, Daval Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990, pp. 291, 311). For a manager of an intercultural collaboration, values do not matter too much. He/she just has to ensure 'good' relationships in the sense that they allow continuing to collaborate effectively. Thus, it is more important for the manager to comprehend the practices and the script than the actual values. These management practices can be compared across enterprises and countries and lead to recommendations for intercultural management (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012). In this respect, a

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[62] Thorn (2012, p. 159) showed regional differences in importance attributed to leadership.

[63] Birkinshaw, Hamel and Mol (2008, p. 827) find an influence of traditions on management innovation.

[64] For example, Vandenabeele and Van de Walle (2008) compare public service and public service motivation across cultures. Also, Schedler and Proeller (2007, pp. 3-4) note that there is a link between the culture of a nation and public management arrangements. However, some authors doubt the relationship between public service culture and performance (Moynihan & Pandey, 2006, p. 132).

remarkable work comes from Smits (2013) examining the practices of collaboration in the extension of the Panama Canal. In her empirical study, she found six practices of intercultural mediation. Three manifest practices were conflicting conditions, seeking consent and crafting reciprocal relations and three concealed practices submarining, storytelling and synergizing (Smits, 2013, p. 246).

But how are practitioners and researchers able to understand practices from different cultures? Intercultural skills are often mentioned as crucial (Buckley, Glaister, & Husan, 2002).[65] But what does that mean? In my view, the most viable approach is through sensemaking. Sensemaking is an approach developed by organizational studies and is concerned with comprehending and theorizing about how people appropriate and enact their realities focusing on practical activities in concrete situations (Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015, p. 266).[66] There is no agreed-upon definition but elements of sensemaking include that it is a dynamic process, cues play a central role, it is social (thus in context), and the action taken to make sense also enacts the environment thought to be understood (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, pp. 62-67). However, it is debated whether it is an individual, collective or discursive process, whether it happens daily or only in crisis situations and if it is only retrospective or can be future-oriented (Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015, pp. 266-268).

Bird and Osland adapted sensemaking for the intercultural context to address their discontent with sophisticated stereotyping of the kind of Hofstede. Cultures are not that simple (Bird & Osland, 2005, pp. 118-119) and even long-term expatriates experience an evolution over time (Osland & Bird, 2000, pp. 66-68). In particular, they pointed out that cultural paradoxes may occur when individuals do not react as predicted by stereotypes (Osland & Bird, 2000, pp. 66-67). This has different reasons and can be due to outsiders' confusion about individual and group values, unresolved cultural issues, bipolar patterns, role differences, real vs. espoused values, or value trumping (Osland & Bird, 2000, p. 69). The last one is notably important as it indicates that, while cultures have certain preferences and characteristics, they are dependent on the context. In a concrete context, individuals have to agree on a script or schemas how to interact and collaborate – a practice (Bird & Osland, 2005, pp. 71, 123). That happens on the individual level but in an organizational and cultural context (Bird & Osland, 2005, pp. 129-130). This is a process that practitioners have to master and researchers are able to study and allows for the transition from etic approaches like Hofstede's to emic approaches (Osland & Bird, 2000, pp. 68-69). Three steps mark the

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[65] Although skills are hard to define, they usually circle around personal characteristics, behaviours and attitudes and exist for the personal and professional spheres (Buckley, Glaister, & Husan, 2002, p. 114).

[66] For a history of sensemaking see Maitlis and Christianson (2014, pp. 60-62).

process: 1. indexing context, 2. making attributions, and 3. selecting schema (the last step is reflecting cultural values and cultural history, Osland & Bird, 2000, pp. 70-71 and Bird & Osland, 2005, pp. 124-125). In my view, the sensemaking approach also allows the double challenge faced by development practitioners to disappear. No matter whether they have to settle in a new environment overseas or whether they have to make sense of partners in an interagency collaboration, both challenges require sensemaking of practices and can consequently be studied.

In summary, intercultural management provides important insights for my research. Cultures are different and complex, encompass different values and exhibit different behaviors which are important to understand in order to collaborate across cultures. While macro-level theories about cultures provide first insights through stereotyping and are a good guidance, practices displayed on an individual level may differ strongly. To take the interacting individuals into account, sensemaking is a promising concept that allows practitioners to act in a culturally aware way and the researcher to study practices on the ground.

2.2.4.5 Summary: management research with potential to refine interagency collaboration research
Although limited to only four fields of general management research in order to develop a more refined understanding of the issues in interagency collaboration, the insight in this section was valuable. A clear conclusion is that interagency collaboration research should review the latest findings of general management research and their implications more. Project management allowed recognizing a tension between temporary projects and long-term relationships with the beneficiaries in international development. It has to be reviewed carefully in the field how this is translated into project management tools, notably the logframe, taking into account cultural differences in the use of such tools. Culture in general was noted as an important aspect of collaboration. While already mentioned in section 2.2.2, creating a common organizational culture in a joint project is important for performance. Joint venture and mergers and acquisitions literature emphasizes that aspect much more than public management research. On a higher level, collaboration has to pay attention to differences in national cultures as well. While these differences can be described on a macro level, it is much more crucial for the development practitioner to understand differences in practices of collaboration. Sensemaking is an approach that can be used in practice that also allows the researcher to understand the script of collaboration. Lastly, I retrieved the importance of reciprocal relationships from public and donor relations research for non-profit organizations. Not only do relationships have to be assessed from both ends, field data has to be analyzed for patterns of reciprocity as well.

2.2.5 Summary: the way towards a sound concept of interagency collaboration

The earlier insights from development cooperation literature made it possible to refine the overarching question for the research to three guiding questions:

1. Which managerial elements are important for interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
2. How do these elements affect interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
3. How do these elements manifest themselves in the management of interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?

Looking for an answer to those questions, the review of public and other management literature has provided some valuable findings. These are relevant for international development cooperation, as it is part of public management (if conducted by public sector organizations). IOs, as I define them, are public sector agencies in that sense. The literature review of interagency collaboration research was structured around six overarching themes identified in previous research:

1. Environmental factors (often the pressure to collaborate);
2. Organizational system (management and communication of arrangements);
3. Resources (flow of resources of all kinds);
4. Power (defined wider than only power over resources);
5. Governance or steering (towards common goals); and
6. Culture or logic of the interagency collaboration.

Some authors in interagency collaboration bring all these themes together and connect them with empirical findings of practices encountered in the field. These concepts are quite close to what is looked for here, as they provide a theoretical link for how practices impact collaboration through processes. Notwithstanding this, they are still rather imprecise without enough explanation of how the different practices and themes interact with each other. Some of these concepts lead to noting that it is important to examine the capacity to collaborate rather than actual collaboration as well as to focus on the role of key individuals (boundary-spanners).

A quick review of management research provided further insight for the guiding questions. It emphasized the crucial role of culture – as organizational culture (one of the themes) as well as cross-boundary culture. Likewise, management research stressed that interagency collaboration is a two-way relationship which requires reciprocity to a certain extent.

2.3 Interagency collaboration and the theory of Eugene Bardach

This section concludes my literature review with the presentation of the interagency collaboration theory of Eugene Bardach. For several reasons which I will detail below, I identified this theory as the most comprehensive approach. It unites most of the findings outlined so far while it leaves enough room to incorporate what is missing. It also allows for a practical operationalization to serve as a research framework. The first section elaborates further on the general context and thoughts of Bardach's theory. Afterwards, I introduce the specific elements of the theory (operating system, resources, steering a course, culture and developmental dynamics – also each chapters in Bardach's book). As I will design my research based on Bardach's concept, I dedicate more space to that than to the rest of the literature review.

Bardach developed his conceptual framework for interagency collaboration in public administration in 1998. His diagnosis was that the literature did not pay sufficient attention to interagency collaboration. Bardach's interest in the matter rose as he was and is mostly interested in policy and implementation (Bardach, 1998, p. v), which also triggered his interest in how the organizations involved in policy creation and implementation work together.[67] In order to understand how effective policy-making and implementation is done, he needed to understand how interagency collaboration functions, as so much policy today cannot be made by one agency alone anymore.

Starting his theory development, he postulates two principal reasons for the raise in joint policy-making: the pluralism and the obsolescence problems (Bardach, 1998, pp. 11-17). The pluralism problem describes the phenomenon that differentiation in the public sector is often motivated by political reasons rather than technical considerations. The obsolescence problem refers to the delay in establishing public agencies. As the creation of new public agencies sometimes takes so long, their mandates and missions are not in line with the needs anymore once they are in place. In this way, Bardach's interest in understanding policy-making and implementation better leads to a public management theory on successful interagency collaboration, the so-called craftsmanship theory.

2.3.1 Understanding Bardach's craftsmanship theory

Eugene Bardach's principal idea was to understand how interagency collaboration in the public sector works. Interagency collaboration in that sense should be understood as more than simple cost sharing of projects and programs. It consists of joining efforts

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[67] E.g. Bardach's (2012) guide on how to do policy analysis, including the eight steps to follow which are, indeed, helpful not only for policy analysis but good reading for any social science research in the political environment (Bardach, 2012, pp. 1-78).

to reach a goal (Bardach, 1998, p. v).[68] As a consequence, Bardach's definition for interagency collaboration is rather broad to capture the different forms of interagency collaboration in the public sector.

> *"Any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase*
> *public value by their working together rather than separately."*
> (Bardach, 1998, p. 8)

It should be noted that 'public value' in this definition is based on the idea introduced by Moore (1995), that managerial achievement in the public sector is measured by the value added to the public in the short and long run through increasing efficiency, effectiveness or fairness.[69] It is important to note that there is in turn no measure for the forgone value if interagency collaboration is not realized (Bardach, 1996, p. 170).

The main problem for Bardach therein was that public management and administration did not provide a strong theoretical explanation for the purposiveness of managerial action (Bardach, 1998, pp. 6-7) – the "craftsmanship activity" (Bardach, 1998, p. vi). The best that could be found was practical advice. Particularly, as he observed that the mere decision to collaborate is not sufficient but rather that certain 'strategies' (that could range from bottom-up to top-down strategies) are required to make interagency collaboration happen (Bardach, 1998, p. 3). These noted 'strategies' are also the reason why the individuals involved are the focus of Bardach's analysis and attention – they are crucial to overcome difficulties and establish "an interpersonal culture of trust and pragmatism" (Bardach, 1998, p. 4). Consequently, conceptual tools for a causal analysis of what these "purposive practitioners" do should be developed (Bardach, 1998, p. 6). Research on that can be undertaken through two approaches: 1. cross case analysis; or 2. qualitative analysis of the ingredients – the latter being necessary for the former (Bardach, 1998, p. 19).

Every theory, however, requires a dependent variable that can be measured. In the case of Bardach's theory, the dependent variable of choice is:

> *"the state of affairs that craftsmanship is alleged to produce"*
> (Bardach, 1998, p. 19)

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[68] This can be seen as a condition for applying Bardach's theory to other cases as well.

[69] It should be added that the agency's intention to increase public value does not necessarily have to be inherited by the individual manager and/or civil servant. Public value may also increase as a byproduct of other motivations of the individual manager such as his or her own career considerations (Bardach, 1998, p. 9).

meaning success in developing collaboration capacity – or Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC) as Bardach calls it. Higher ICC is achieved through improvements in four elements that Bardach identified as crucial for collaboration: operating system, resources, steering a course and culture, comparable to the themes I identified. Bardach argues that the notion of capacity as a dependent variable is preferable because approaches which consider collaboration as a set of activities or acts have two weaknesses (Bardach, 1998, pp. 19-20): 1. they do not link to the desired product and 2. they do not respect that there are quality differences between different collaborative activities.[70] Sometimes, for example, a joint decision for non-collaboration is an important characteristic for the capacity to collaborate (as it shows, e.g. a great deal of mutual understanding of the public value to produce, see example provided in Bardach, 1996, p. 180). Many other approaches value too much what happens instead of looking into the potential of what could happen. These 'potentialities' are organized into a larger process with a more causal structure (Bardach, 1998, p. 323). These 'potentialities' are what Bardach calls the ICC. The problem of measuring success in an ICC, however, was and remained a long-term concern for Bardach. In an article published in 2001, he comes back to the matter and states that success in an ICC is a multidimensional idea. Possible dimensions are increasing productiveness, survival of the ICC, lowering costs and others. All of these, however, can only be benchmarked against other hypothetical processes and not measured (Bardach, 2001, pp. 160-161).

The ICC entails a subjective component and an objective component (Bardach, 1998, pp. 20-21). In the objective component, it includes the formal and more tangible assets such as formal agreements, personnel, budget and equipment. The subjective component comprises the intangible assets mainly based on the individuals involved in interagency collaboration, such as the (individual's) expectations of the other party's collaboration performance built around beliefs, trust and other psychological elements. Bardach (1998, p. 21) explicitly includes this subjective component as an important one but also recognizes the associated measurement problems. In fact, Bardach attributes a high value to the subjective component, as he argues that the objective component catches up with the subjective one if it lags behind (Bardach, 1998, p. 59). Collaboration, thus, is behavioral and process-oriented as can often be seen in reorganization efforts in public administration when people are moved but the 'informal' hierarchies continue to be the same (Bardach, 1998, p. 16).

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[70] Riccio (2001) has pointed out in his review that defining the ICC not based on action but rather the capacity for action is slightly confusing as Bardach's own definition of interagency collaboration includes joint action. I share the view that it is slightly confusing, but with attention to the fine differences, I believe, confusion can be avoided. And as the definition of interagency collaboration and ICC are not the same, there is as a matter of fact an important difference that should not be neglected. Thus, it is not a contradiction.

This also brings Bardach to define an agency professional who is

> *"A person 1. Whose work entails some serious risk to society if it is not performed well; 2. Who, because he or she cannot be monitored effectively by those who bear the consequences of his or her actions, must act with a sense of fiduciary responsibility; 3. Who uses specialized technical tools for doing his or her work; and 4. Who is employed by an agency that partially (but not completely) monitors his or her performance."*
>
> (Bardach, 1998, p. 130)

In explaining the success and failure of ICCs, Bardach (1998, pp. 29-45) mentions some of the influencing factors briefly before he elaborates on them in detail in the following five chapters of his book. One role is played by the quality of material (human, social) available to an ICC and another by critical skills and abilities (although Bardach focuses more on materials and practices, Bardach, 1998, p. 42). Also, the vulnerability of collaborative initiative is decisive. A central element is the efficacy of "smart practices" as he calls them.

A smart practice in that sense is what elsewhere often is called strategies (Bardach, 1998, p. 37):

> *"A **practice** is a specifiable method of interacting with a situation that is intended to produce some result; what makes a practice smart is that the method also involves taking advantage of some latent opportunity for creating value on the cheap."*
>
> (Bardach, 1998, p. 36 emphasis in original)[71]

This is based on his experience in policy analysis where a smart practice takes advantage of a latent potential for value creation and a mechanism for extracting that potential can be found (Bardach, 2012, p. 115). Possibilities to realize this potential, thus, include implementing features, supportive features and optional features (Bardach, 2012, pp. 115-116).[72] One should note that these smart practices need skilled public administration officials with sufficient room to maneuver from the political sphere. It captures the dynamic adaptations that people involved in

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[71] In his later work, Bardach (2008, pp. 130-131) provides another definition of smart practices: "By smart practice I mean a practice that takes advantage of some latent potentiality in the world in order to accomplish something in a relatively cost-effective manner." In his 2012 work, one can also find a definition for practice as such (Bardach, 2012, p. 110).

[72] Bardach provides an extensive list of these features in an article on best practice research for policy analysis (Bardach, 2004, pp. 209-216).

interagency collaboration have to make (Campbell, 2006, p. 11). This is the craftsmanship quality which skilled practitioners reveal (Bardach, 2006b, pp. 43-44).

In Bardach's own view, it is important to note that interagency collaboration is not only described as quantitative indicators but also in terms of the quality of collaboration (in the sense of quality management literature, Bardach, 1998, p. 307) and, as such, the causal role of qualitative potentialities (Bardach, 1998, p. 322). This permits focusing more on the output than on the scale of collaboration. He recognizes that this is empirically difficult to measure, especially the subjective component, which can rather be described as a "state of mind" (Bardach, 1998, p. 23). Other reasons for Bardach to postulate the concept of the ICC are: 1. it allows for changes over time, 2. it allows for generalizations while being flexible (Bardach, 1998, pp. 21-23), 3. the integration of purposiveness and creativity of the craftsman into the process, 4. the possibility of smart practices and, thus, insight into what often is called chance and, lastly, 5. it recognizes the causal importance of synergy between product and process (Bardach, 1998, pp. 320-322).[73]

Eugene Bardach developed the craftsmanship idea theoretically and with empirical data from the causal analysis of the qualities of different ICCs (Bardach, 1998, p. 48). He examined 19 cases in the United States' public administration and rated their success – and concludes that bureaucracies are not a primary example of good collaboration. His analysis is only theoretical (Bardach, 1998, p. 39). Only cases where at least some collaboration was going on or expected to go on were included. In Bardach's view, non-collaboration is over-determined (Bardach, 1998, p. 53).

His research method is interviews (by phone or in person, spending at least two days in each of the organizations, Bardach, 1998, p. 52). The results from the interviews that might be biased are balanced with his own experience and judgment, by comparing the interviews (listening to the exact words). In statistical terms, this leads to only modest reliability and validity but for his project of conceptualization it is sufficient (Bardach, 1998, pp. 54-55). Social-psychological factors only mattered as part of a bigger analysis of interagency collaboration (which according to him is more external and objective). In that sense, he considered his interview partners more than just a source of data, but rather partners in analysis (Bardach, 1998, p. 56).

In his rating of success, he faced multiple problems which he had to reconcile through judging on his own and based on a cross-case comparison (Bardach, 1998, pp. 58-63):

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[73] Bardach mentions another advantage which is that his theory permits "to understand authority in transorganizational systems" (1998, p. 22). This advantage is very much aiming towards a perceived research gap at the time Bardach's book was written.

1. Subjective states problem (everything depends on how people perceive it);
2. Appearances problem (people might be more positive to save face);
3. Baseline problem (question of starting point for measuring and how to discount costs, including social costs); and
4. Multi-branch problem (which agencies to include in the determination of an ICC and how to assign one ranking which means losing a lot of information).[74]

The following table shows the 19 cases. It shows not only the overall success rank but also one example from each of the four elements for which he provides specific assigned values later in his book (to be explained in detail in the following sections). It is important to note that the sub-rankings do not relate directly with the overall ranking. Bardach does not give any more explanation about this and why he selected those sub-categories for being presented with an explicit ranking whereas other important elements only deserve a narrative. I derive from this that the presentation of these sub-categories is only exemplary and other factors can be more important.

Table 1: Overview over Bardach's 19 case studies[a]

Case category	Case	Overall success rank	Technical clarity rank	Environmental demand rank[b]	Leadership rank[b]	Pragmatism rank[b]
School-linked services	Healthy Start (multiple sites in California)	M	H	H	H	N/A
	New Jersey School-based Youth Services	H	H	H	H	N/A
Children, family, and youth services	Coordinated Youth Services Council (Marin County, California)	L	L	M&L	N/A	N/A
	Maryland Systems Reform Initiative	H	L	H	H	N/A
	Tennessee Children's Plan	M	L	H	N/A	N/A
	Oregon Integrated Services	H	M	H	H	H
Community organizing	Del Paso Heights (Sacramento County, California)	M	L	H	N/A	N/A
	Prescott Project (Oakland, California)	L	L	M&L	L	L

Welfare-to-work programs	Riverside County (California)	M	M	M&L	H	N/A
	Oregon JOBS program	H	M	H	H	H
	Denver Family Opportunity	M	M	M&L	M	H
Anti-tobacco education	California	M	M	H	L	L
Preventing fires	East Bay hills (California)	H	H	H	M	N/A
Regulation	New York state contract administration	H	H	H	H	L
	Multimedia environmental enforcement	H	H	M&L	H	L
Natural resources and ecosystem management	Elkhorn Slough (California)	H	L	M&L	H	N/A
	Memorandum of Understanding on biodiversity (Pacific Northwest and Northern California)	M	L	H	H	N/A
Military base closure and reuse (national)	Economic redevelopment	L	H	H	L	L
	Environmental cleanup	H	H	H	H	N/A

Source: Author based on Bardach (1998, pp. 62-113, 134, 196, 225, 235).
[a] Note: All rankings reflect the rank attributed by Eugene Bardach in his original work. H = High, M = Medium, L = Low.
[b] Note: N/A is indicated in cases in which Bardach did not rank a case due to high fluctuations or inadequate evidence. M&L was attributed jointly by Bardach only in the environmental demand ranking.

At the end of his book, he also introduces a hypothetical memo to start off a lead paint abatement program as interagency collaboration based on his previous analysis (Bardach, 1998, pp. 310-319). This is a demonstration that he also meant for his framework to become an analytical tool for other researchers. Furthermore, it might signal that he thought the framework could be used as a (prescriptive!) example to start interagency collaboration. This might be because he believed that running an ICC in public organizations requires a new management style which is not the usual management style in public administration (Bardach, 1998, p. 307).

2.3.2 Operating system
The first element contributing to the ICC is the operating system for Bardach. The operating system transforms physical or symbolic material into something different,

usually more valuable (Bardach, 1998, p. 115). This could be, e.g., individuals, firms, property or anything else necessary for collaboration. Essentially this entails a process of "communicating in a certain way about the management of the cases" (Bardach, 1998, p. 115) and to make the best use of the resources available. There are five principal challenges for the operating system of an ICC (for the following see Bardach, 1998, pp. 115-161).

One important issue to think about when designing the operating system is flexibility of the managers involved in the ICC, as bureaucratic structures traditionally do not favor empowerment of lower-level staff. Collaboration, however, cannot work only by decision. The supervisory level can hurt programs, but it is the staff level that has to induce positive action and this is where teamwork and inspirers are needed (this is one of the areas where Bardach himself gained only few insights, 1998, p. 120). This implies a certain change of traditional control mechanisms. Sometimes, flexibility can be triggered by catalytic funds that become available for collaborating agencies (and represent a smart practice in that area, Bardach, 1998, p. 125).

Another important ingredient in the design of the operating system is motivation, especially of lower-level staff. The motivation does not necessarily have to be directly to increase public value. Sometimes, also purposes such as staff accelerating their own careers as civil servants or increasing the administrative turf of their own agency can contribute to a successful ICC. Bardach (1998, p. 34) herein distinguishes the careerist, bureaucratic and value-creating purposes.

Furthermore, trust and mutual understanding are crucial for the operating system of an ICC. Understanding the other agency's staff's world view is important and what contributes to a successful ICC is technical clarity of the collaborative tasks (Bardach, 1998, p. 134, finds a weak positive relationship). Bardach also recommends following human nature, as people often trust people with whom they work on a routine basis. This can not only be fostered by linking up socially but also simple professional regard may be enough (Bardach, 1998, p. 136). Moreover, self-awareness helps in the same way that the creation of a common identity might. Training of staff in interagency collaboration and staff rotation (especially between agencies) can also contribute to increase performance through mutual trust and understanding.

Fourthly, accountability is important for the operating system. Peer accountability as well as a focus on results can be important elements of that. Also, involving the consumer where this is feasible may improve a sense of accountability in an ICC.

Lastly, financial exchanges need to be addressed for a performing operating system. First and foremost, this includes a previously-mentioned requirement of education or

understanding of each other's needs. That may help to design adequate and acceptable payment schemes for all. In some cases, introducing competition may help to create a better-performing ICC.

2.3.3 Acquiring resources

Another fundamental element for effective collaboration is the acquisition of resources. According to Bardach, a simple variance analysis would just add up all forces favoring collaboration and subtract all forces against it. However, craftsmanship theory adds the effect of smart practices as well as a reminder for caution to keep subtle forces on both sides in mind (Bardach, 1998, p. 163).

There are six resources that are most important to acquire (Bardach, 1998, p. 164). Firstly, turf is "the domain of problems, opportunities, and actions over which an agency exercises legitimate authority."[75] Turf is fundamental as it justifies budgets, mandates and work programs (Bardach, 1998, pp. 178-179). Turf may display different advantages (Bardach, 1996, pp. 177-179). It is able to provide the individual with job security and career perspectives and gives the impression of professional expertise.[76] It can increase the policy impact of an agency and decrease the need to seek consensus. This provides an agency with a resource for negotiations. Autonomy, money and people (including all intangible resources people may contribute) are further valuable resources. Lastly, political standing and information are crucial resources an ICC has to acquire in order to function well.

Protectionism over the aforementioned resources by the agencies involved in collaboration is common. The reasons for this protectionism can be found in the underlying careerist, bureaucratic and value-oriented purposes (although the first two ones are often not communicated publicly and also often rationalized, Bardach, 1998, p. 165). This can be seen, for example, in the fact that money is a resource that is almost never contributed in cash to an ICC by public agencies. In-kind contributions of personnel, facilities, information or equipment are usually committed as resources. And even information about funds is usually withheld. The issue of funds is often improved once an agency receives its budget from different sources and is not dependent on one (Bardach, 1998, p. 181). Protectionism is further cemented by a

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[75] In an article from 1996, Bardach uses a slightly different definition of turf: "I use the term turf to refer to the exclusive domain of activities and resources over which an agency has the right, or prerogative, to exercise operational and/or policy responsibility." (Bardach, 1996, p. 177 emphasis removed) Turf issues occur at all levels.

[76] That also makes understandable why the individual is crucial in overcoming turf barriers. Another option to overcome turf issues is to create new turf through an ICC (Bardach, 1996, pp. 181-187). In some cases, even the unit responsible for coordinating an interagency collaboration may develop a turf feeling on interagency collaboration (Bardach, 1996, p. 186).

certain "ethnocentrism" commonly found in public administration, a certain "us-versus-them language" (Bardach, 1998, p. 183). Nevertheless, most of the time when such a language is encountered, actual incidents to prove this kind of statements cannot be named (Bardach, 1998, p. 183).

One effective contributor to overcome protectionism is an environmental demand on the agencies in charge of dealing with an issue (Bardach, 1998, p. 196). This environmental demand puts a kind of pressure on the administration that pushes it to resolve the matter conclusively and, thus, rendering collaboration more favorable.[77]

2.3.4 Steering a course

Keeping an ICC on track obviously is important for its success and it is different from implementing. It is more about setting a vision, a mission and goals. Notwithstanding, one has to recognize that there is a strong relationship between the two, as those who steer often also implement (Bardach, 1998, p. 199). In the context of ICCs, this is not only technical but rather political. The steering process may also be grounded in informal processes such a signaling that a goal is being accepted.

In order to reach sound and agreed-on goals, one should look at three dimensions: the quality of the chosen goal, an intelligently chosen course and a 'good' process. All this involves value elements besides technical elements (Bardach, 1998, p. 200). The quality should be evaluated in terms of the "public interest", which entails for Bardach firstly, a rough utilitarian calculus, secondly, the value citizens attribute to the ICC and, thirdly, an expert estimate of cost and benefit (Bardach, 1998, p. 201). The process should be evaluated as well, e.g. regarding elements such as inclusiveness, representativeness, fairness, openness and integrity (Bardach, 1998, p. 206).

One smart practice is "substituting 'Management' for 'Governance'" because governing is not equal to steering (Bardach, 1998, pp. 210-211). Therefore, good management might sometimes be better than good governance (Bardach, 1998, p. 212). This shift also implies a shift towards more orientation on the quality of the process (Bardach, 1998, p. 231). Another smart practice can be to limit the requirement for consensus only to 'sufficient for a particular purpose', meaning making decisions on an ad-hoc basis topic by topic (as otherwise it might be difficult, time-consuming and costly to achieve consensus, Bardach, 1998, p. 231).

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[77] However, one should note that in the table provided by Bardach (1998, p. 196), there are also many cases that were only ranked medium-level successfully overall but with a high rank on environmental demand. This means that environmental demand is not overly strong for the overall outcome of achievement of an ICC.

The form of steering should also be examined carefully. Bardach differentiates four forms of steering: 1. through a council (formal procedures such as voting exist if required), 2. by a board (steers but no formal authority over resources), 3. in the form of a forum (very light steering body), and 4. by an implementing network (operational level, focused on technical tasks but influences goals from time to time, Bardach, 1998, pp. 216-220). In establishing the form of steering, a smart practice is to establish form according to function.

Leadership is another ingredient for steering the course. It is a more personal element which can go beyond steering, but does not necessarily have to be an individual or one single person. Bardach's definition in this sense is functional: "It [leadership] is a set of focus-giving or unity-enhancing behaviors that would help some collectivity, in this case an ICC, accomplish useful work." (Bardach, 1998, p. 223) He subsequently provides an overview of the ranking of his studied cases by leadership effectiveness and the success of these ICCs (see Bardach, 1998, p. 225 and table 1). Also, top-down leadership in ICCs is not necessarily the best – "facilitative" leadership is often preferred (Bardach, 1998, p. 226). Another alternative may be consensus building "advocacy" style (which is in other literature sometimes called the champion role, Bardach, 1998, p. 228).

2.3.5 Culture of joint problem solving

The culture of an interagency collaboration has crucial influence on its success. It can contribute to or limit effectiveness, mainly through its problem-solving capacity rooted in three dimensions: culture of bureaucracy, the negotiation process and trust (Bardach, 1998, p. 232).

Virtually nothing in bureaucratic culture favors collaboration; the principles are hierarchy, stability, obedience and orientation towards procedures which are in sharp contrast to the values to be embraced in order to collaborate: equality, adaptability, discretion and results orientation (Bardach, 1998, p. 232). In this context, it may help an ICC to establish a culture of pragmatism (see table in Bardach, 1998, pp. 234-235). The absence of inhibiting conditions may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition.

Regarding negotiations, Bardach relies on the insights of the literature on private sector negotiations. Bardach states that two important sources of benefit are 'value creation' and 'value claiming'. But too often negotiations are focused on the latter (Bardach, 1998, p. 239). Showing joint concern (e.g. showing concern also for the other's matters) helps – which in the public sphere should also include the concerns of third parties not represented directly in the negotiations (although actors may misinterpret what third parties actually want, Bardach, 1998, p. 239). Negotiating

finance is one of the most difficult negotiations, especially when it comes to cost sharing agreements. Finance negotiations are often conducted with reference to normative frameworks (equality, justice) and many times the involved parties simply try to let the others pay (influenced by Olson's theory, Bardach, 1998, p. 242). Bardach, however, found five reference frameworks in his ICCs: affordability, mutualism based on professional identity, fiscal federalism, nonprofit versus public sector advantages and private sector commercial relations (Bardach, 1998, pp. 242-245). An aspect one has to keep in mind in public sector negotiations is that the involved representatives are often only delegates of their agencies. This means that they may have to check back with their organizations before decisions can be made – which takes time and offers vulnerability to manipulation and misunderstanding (Bardach, 1998, pp. 249-250).

Trust has been defined many times, but not adequately for Bardach's purposes. He prefers the idea that "trust is confidence that the trustworthiness of another party is adequate to justify remaining in a condition of vulnerability." (Bardach, 1998, p. 252) This is more general than the definitions commonly employed in social psychology. One should note that this definition is not based on the concept of 'trust in' but 'trust about' (Bardach, 1998, p. 253). Trust is composed of mainly four components: 1. assessing the trustworthiness of other individuals and organizations, 2. persuading others of own trustworthiness, 3. learning how to trust, and 4. taking collective measures for trust development (Bardach, 1998, p. 252).

The first issue, assessing the trustworthiness of others, often suffers from "attribution bias" to a specific person without considering that person in a particular situation (Bardach, 1998, p. 255). Two influences often involved in the process are the application of categorical knowledge and prior experience[78] as well as the bigger picture. The logic is simple. The more you know about a person the more contextual information you have about his or her trustworthiness (Bardach, 1998, pp. 255-260). It helps in this regard that only the trustworthiness of the particular ICC needs to be evaluated and the evaluation can be limited to the context of the ICC (Bardach, 1998, p. 260). On the second issue of persuading others of our own trustworthiness, the recipe is just the other way around. A strategy may be to tackle possible categorical knowledge, show a conduct as expected for trustworthiness and create emotional and political hostages. One of the difficulties is of course that ICC actors may not only be individuals but groups one has to deal with (Bardach, 1998, pp. 260-261). The distinction known in social psychology between knowledge-based and identification-based trust is less important for Bardach. He believes that all people involved in an ICC as professional bureaucrats are expected to have incompatible desires to some

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[78] Putnam (1993) called this "social capital".

degree (Bardach, 1998, p. 262). One smart practice may be to hire professional help and another smart practice is selecting the right representative for an ICC (Bardach, 1998, pp. 264-265). One crucial acknowledgement is that trust is usually people-based. Bardach (1998, p. 263) reports: "In my interviews, informants often told me something like, 'Collaboration is relationship-based. It is based on people. I'll trust Jones because I know him…'." And further: "The cutting edge of interagency collaboration is interpersonal collaboration." (Bardach, 1998, p. 268)

2.3.6 Developmental dynamics

While the previous considerations were of a static nature, Bardach recognizes that some elements of interagency collaboration are dynamic. In his last dimension, he introduces this dynamic element. There are two sub-processes in the dynamic element, on the one hand there is platforming (which is more focused on the operational capacity) and on the other hand momentum building (more oriented towards resources). Both of them are related in a complementary way. What is crucial is the sequencing of the sub-processes and their elements. ICC activists have to sequence them in a way that makes them move forward rather than in a random way or a way that is harming the initiative (Bardach, 1998, p. 270).

In the platforming sub-process, a major difficulty is to differentiate the natural flow of a sequence from smart practice. Therefore, Bardach's pragmatic but simplifying solution is to attribute smart practice to all activities that involve political processes and attributes all technical measures to the natural flow.

The two first big pillars develop rather separate from each other. Then, starting from the level of improved steering capacity, they are required both to advance at the same rate. Rather weak links between the platforms are omitted, as are reinforcing mechanisms in advanced capacities (Bardach, 1998, p. 274). The whole sequence may take long but can also happen in rather short periods of time – and in some cases may already be inherent in one person (Bardach, 1998, p. 274). The model is a theoretical construct and as such rather normative but it was also found in some of the cases in this way. Bardach does not claim that this is the only possible sequence to be found and to be efficient, but he believes that the proposed sequencing is superior to approaches based on 'phases' (Bardach, 1998, p. 275). Furthermore, he only claims a weak causal relationship rather to differentiate himself from random sequencing (Bardach, 1998, p. 276).

The following figure demonstrates platforming as Bardach himself depicted it. It has to be noted that the figure should be read from the bottom to the top.[79]

Figure 2: Platforming according to Bardach

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                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │   Continuous learning    │
                    └──────────────────────────┘
                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │    Operating subsystem    │
                    └──────────────────────────┘
                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │ Improved steering capacity│
                    └──────────────────────────┘

   ┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────┐
   │    Advocacy group    │        │  Communication network   │
   └──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────┐
   │ Implementation network│
   └──────────────────────┘        ┌──────────────────────────┐
                                    │  Acceptance of leadership │
   ┌──────────────────────┐        └──────────────────────────┘
   │  Intellectual capital │
   └──────────────────────┘
   ┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────┐
   │  Creative opportunity │        │          Trust           │
   └──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────┘
```

Source: Author based on Bardach (1998, p. 274).

The momentum sub-process is less structured and there are several ways of enhancing momentum. All of them are based on the fact that success creates opportunity for reinforcing effects (Bardach, 1998, p. 276). The possible ways are enthusiasm effects (about a successful ICC), bandwagon effects (being part steering a successful ICC), consensus effects (many people certify the success of an ICC), and trust effects (about the people involved). Again it is difficult to distinguish smart practice and natural flow as not even the individuals engaged in the process might know (Bardach, 1998, pp. 276-278).

A perceived crisis may offer an opportunity to advance with an interagency collaboration initiative, except for cases in which the attention increases the vulnerability of an ICC (Bardach, 1998, pp. 279-280). Vulnerability to setbacks may also occur but as the processes in an ICC are rather lengthy; these vulnerabilities may often be counted as delays in the schedule. Success can also be seen more important than vulnerabilities for two reasons. Firstly, success is psychologically reinforced through dissonance reduction and, secondly, opponents to an ICC do not build coalitions as strong as the supporters of an ICC do (Bardach, 1998, p. 292). One

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[79] An explanation on the specific meaning of each of the platforms is provided in Bardach's 2001 article on developmental dynamics only (Bardach, 2001, pp. 153-154).

source of vulnerability is the normal turnover of personnel, notably at higher hierarchy levels (Bardach, 1998, p. 296). One should keep in mind that ICCs are not permanent institutions but rather "virtual organizations" based on reciprocity and expectations (Bardach, 1998, pp. 301-302). Two other steering traps may be that early quick wins may impede long-term advancement and that there is a tendency to become cliquish over time (Bardach, 1998, p. 304). Another source of vulnerability is spending too much time on planning – particularly when working with legislators (Bardach, 1998, pp. 293, 299-300). However, this depends on each particular ICC. Time may be an enemy because it increases vulnerability, but at the same time, the normal advancement of ICCs is slow because it requires an evolutionary process (Bardach, 1998, p. 309). One has to choose wisely whether to follow a sound platforming process or to attempt to advance with all of them at once (e.g. through task forces), risking a possible rupture (Bardach, 1998, pp. 309-310).

2.3.7 Later development of Bardach's theory

Bardach paid much attention to the dynamic development of an ICC in later works, as he felt this was slightly underexplored in his first book. In this way, he explores the use of computer simulation to benchmark the development of an ICC against its possible development (Bardach, 2001). He believes that developmental dynamics (Bardach, 2001, p. 149):

1. Are multiple and interacting sub-processes,
2. Are recursive,
3. Are subject to external shocks, and
4. Can show confounding patterns through the intervention of the involved actors easily.

Simulation-based models would have to integrate two theories (Bardach, 2001, p. 151). On the one hand, this would include his craftsmanship theory (explaining the purposive intervention of actors). On the other hand, it would be comprised of insights into what he calls evolutionary theory (putting emergent properties at the center that are explicitly noncreative), as proposed by Axelrod (1984, 1997). Evolutionary theory mainly postulates three elements (Bardach, 2001, pp. 155-159). Firstly, momentum processes can be found in collaborations. These are quite similar to the momentum Bardach includes in his craftsmanship theory and include enthusiasm, bandwagon effects, consensus building and trust. Secondly, legitimacy of leadership is a required sub-process. Thirdly and lastly, commotion processes need to be taken into account.

In this 2001 article, Bardach again also recognizes the importance of the individual and his or her subjective perception. On the one hand, the individual is the crucial

actor in an ICC. On the other hand (and complimentary to that), individuals also perceive some elements of collaboration in a subjective way and act based on their perception. Therefore, he concludes that it is difficult to construct valid models as models aim to explain how terms of success are established. However, establishing terms is difficult, given that in interagency collaboration this is also taking place in people's minds. Therefore, two models would be needed: one accounting for risk-taking and compromise, and the other for perception and misperception (Bardach, 2001, p. 162). Craftsmanship, therefore, has the advantage of seeing collaboration as something many players do at the same time in their own right and, in turn and at the same time, serve as 'raw material' for the others (Bardach, 2001, p. 163). This is also the use of smart practices, as these react to changes in the environment and combine assets and skills in a skillful way. In a 2006 article, Bardach even distills a set of seven generic smart practices that can be employed and observed (Bardach, 2006b, pp. 31-41). These are: buying cooperation, peer accountability, using neutral parties, steering while keeping the overhead low, leadership, creating momentum and platforming.

In the 2008 article, Bardach (2008, pp. 115-117) revisits the original cases of his 1998 book.[80] He has to recognize that comparing results is not easy, as desired outcomes (policy or product) differ and success is often not precisely measurable and cannot be perfectly attributed to one of more of the factors (Bardach, 2008, pp. 121-122). He concludes that success very much depends on luck with a certain influence of the factors he proposed (e.g. personality, leadership, organizational factors). Generally, four outcomes were found in terms of success of the original initiatives: 1. thriving, 2. coping, 3. lurching, 4. dying (Bardach, 2008, pp. 116-120).

Different categories of challenges came up in the development of each of the initiatives (Bardach, 2008, pp. 124-129):

1. Static challenges, such as
    a. Technical issues (resources, operating system, communications network including trust and governance)
    b. Institutional and political challenges (pluralistic democracy, bureaucratic public sector and civil service nature)
2. Emergent threats and opportunities, such as

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[80] In this article, he examines interagency collaboration as a particular, complex subset of government innovation, involving many players and distinguishable sub-processes (Bardach, 2008, p. 113). Innovators must often learn to cooperate across organizational boundaries (Bardach, 2008, p. 114). This is also the link to innovation management literature. Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol (2008, p. 829) for example also emphasize human agency in management innovation, while keeping the contextual dynamics around it in mind. There are two groups that shape the innovation process: internal change agents and external change agents (Birkinshaw, Hamel, & Mol, 2008, p. 832).

a. Momentum (bandwagon, consensus, trust and distrust and enthusiasm)
   b. Sequencing
   c. Life-cycle vulnerabilities and attainments
   d. Prolonged environmental exposure
   e. Chance and entropy

His earlier article was more focused on the static explanations and challenges (e.g. technical nature of task, availability of good leadership and conditions fostering trust, Bardach, 2008, pp. 120-121). He recognized that more attention should be drawn to processes – although concrete comparisons cannot be made, as differences cannot be precisely measured nor compared. But smart practices may be developed (benchmark).

All this suggests that there is a 'right' way of sequencing interagency collaboration (which can be found in Bardach, 2008, p. 126). The most important issues are to develop smart practices, build momentum and sequence/platforms, prevent and buffer, and seize opportunities (Bardach, 2008, pp. 130-135). It should be noted that many of these skills emphasize the importance of the skills of the involved individuals. Bardach (2008, p. 130) himself states that this requires real entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are, according to Bardach, characterized by the adaptability that they possess. However, it is unclear how exactly this works. Empirical work has not been done according to Bardach.

In 2006, Bardach wrote an article on policy dynamics, which is also interesting for interagency collaboration. He is of the opinion that the emergence of interagency collaboration can be explained by taking a systemic view (Bardach, 2006a, p. 341). In this article, he states that it is crucial to understand change in order to understand dynamics. In his view, dynamics can only occur in systems (although not all systems are dynamic, Bardach, 2006a, pp. 336-337, 341). In that sense, only positive feedback loops are able to develop interagency collaboration. The feedback processes may consist of the following: momentum, selective retention, path-dependent shaping of policy options, trial-and-error learning, complex systems, chaos theory and qualities-based sequencing (Bardach, 2006a, pp. 346-357). The last possibility, qualities-based sequencing (Bardach, 2006a, pp. 356-357), leaves room for qualitative features. This is also the one he proposed for ICCs: platforming. The construction of these platforms is always a product of the observer's theoretical construction, but has to be grounded well empirically (Bardach, 2006a, p. 362).

2.3.8 Discussion of Bardach's theory: a concept with potential

While Bardach's theory may look like any other of the approaches introduced at first sight, it is, in my view, the framework most suitable for research on interagency collaboration in international development. First of all, it directly encompasses four of the overarching themes identified in the literature: the organizational system (which Bardach calls the operating system), resources, governance (Bardach calls it directly steering a course – the idea behind my governance theme) and culture (also rather targeting the internal logic of the collaboration). This is a good match. Bardach's elaborations on the reasons for entering into an interagency collaboration (the pluralism and obsolescence problems) can be seen as two elements of the environmental theme identified, the fifth match. While he only mentions two reasons, this can be expanded to a broader theory for interagency collaboration in international development. Some may argue that the power theme may be seen implicitly in the turf and autonomy elements in Bardach's resources dimension. However, power could also be added as another dimension besides the operating system, resources, steering a course and culture. The reason for this is that power is broader and requires a more nuanced view than only turf and autonomy. Nevertheless, the right solution should be found through empirical research as is done in the following. Likewise, a dimension of cross-border culture could also be added to Bardach's theory to take into account the findings from joint venture and intercultural management research. As Bardach's research was tuned to public sector collaboration in the US, this was not an issue. But in this research project, it has to be explored. As Bardach's theory provides the flexibility to add dimensions, it is perfectly suited for my needs. The flexibility also derives from the fact that Bardach draws from different macro-level theories, notably resource dependency and network theories in order to conceptualize a framework (Bardach, 1998, pp. 23-28). In that way, Bardach's framework allows adding further dimensions or themes according to research need without changing the overall logic of the model, as described. While the logic is implicitly present in his work, it needs to be spelled out more explicitly to operationalize it for my research (see section 3).

Nevertheless, Bardach does not stay on a macro level (part of the criticism of some of the theories about collaboration). He fills the dimensions with concrete elements of empirically found practices. This allows connecting the elements and dimensions with each other and taking feedback effects into account as well as ultimately explaining the impact on the dependent variable (in his words: "the state of affairs that craftsmanship is alleged to produce", Bardach, 1998, p. 19). In this regard, Bardach's framework goes further than the other theories of interagency collaboration of the kind of Huxham and others. While these authors only empirically state certain elements based on practices empirically found, Bardach connects them in a logical way while it leaves him with the advantage of being able to capture qualitative differences. His concept thus captures reciprocity and he records practices by all participants and their

impact on the collaborative effort. The task to design a research project that explores collaboration from both ends (one of the conditions in 2.2.4.2) depends on the researcher. It is a task that has to be accomplished in the research design in section 4.

Taking the micro level into account provides an opportunity to assign the individual a role as well. Bardach takes this opportunity (which is in fact one of his principal intensions) and develops the idea of the craftsman that drives collaboration. In this way, the concept of boundary-spanners as others have called it (section 2.2.3) is reflected as well.

Furthermore, Bardach provides an explanation of how this works over time – an element mentioned by some authors before but not incorporated holistically in existing theories. Taking into account that much of the research sees collaboration as composed of processes, he provides a theory of how these processes are ordered in a sequenced way while leaving room for dynamic influences occurring over time – an advantage that Bardach himself pointed out (Bardach, 1998, pp. 273-274). Relying on processes, Bardach similarly incorporates interagency collaboration findings on capacity. This was one of the main ideas as he found other approaches to be too behavioral.

Lastly, it may be beneficial for the purposes of the present research that Bardach's work was incentivized by his interest in policy and its implementation. While his theory of interagency collaboration is distinct from that as well as my research interest, it may help that the idea of developing the theory came from understanding policy implementation. In international development cooperation, many projects target policy change as well and the interest is thus a perfect match.

As a consequence, Bardach's theory was identified as the most suitable for the present purposes of providing a logical explanation about how interagency collaboration works. It incorporates most of the research findings while it leaves room to accommodate missing elements and adapt it to my interest in international development.

2.3.9 Summary: Bardach's theory as framework to explore interagency collaboration

Eugene Bardach developed a theory based on a set of cases on interagency collaboration in the US' public administration (although when revisiting the cases later he relativized some of his theory). His approach connects macro-level theories about collaboration with micro-level practices empirically observed. With that, he crafts a concept that explains how different practices of collaboration causally contribute to more interagency collaboration. These practices are used by what he calls craftsmen –

collaborators who are able to push interagency collaboration forward. He defined more collaboration as an increase in the dependent variable: the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC). The ICC includes objective and subjective components. The principal ingredients of his theory are four dimensions: operating system, resources, steering a course and culture. Inside the four dimensions, he identifies flexibility, motivation, trust and mutual understanding, accountability and financial exchange (operating system), trust, autonomy, money, people, political standing and information (resources), vision, forum and leadership (steering a course), and bureaucracy culture, negotiation processes and trust (culture). In addition to that, he emphasizes that these processes are staged in a sequential way by the craftsman while dynamic influences may contribute to the ICC as well. Bardach's theory was chosen as a basis for the theory presented here, as it provides the long-searched-for connection between macro-level theories and micro-level practices while encompassing the most important elements of interagency collaboration research. Furthermore, the theory is flexible which allows the incorporation of new elements to adapt it to the context of international development.

2.4 Conclusion: managing interagency collaboration in international development – research based on Eugene Bardach

Embarking on the quest to answer the overarching question, development literature was a first step. The main reasons for development aid providers to collaborate are avoidance of doubled efforts, cost savings and coherence. It was found that the historical circumstances of development cooperation led to particular issues that one has to take into account while researching the subject. These issues are distance, network, framing and flexibility in the management of development projects. Ultimately, they derive from a power difference between donors and recipients of development aid. Ownership is related to this and an issue that has received particular international attention. While macro- and micro-level theories for interagency collaboration exist in international development research, they are not connected. In order to manage interagency collaboration better, empirically found practices have to be linked through mechanisms to macro-level theories.

With this in mind, the overarching question was refined to a set of three questions to guide the review of public management and other management research. In public management, a vast body of literature exists on interagency collaboration. The theories encountered can be structured around six overarching themes: environmental factors, organizational system, resources, power, governance and organizational culture. Theories within these themes are often at macro level (comparable to international development research) but more authors have attempted to combine them with the micro level by incorporating empirically found practices. However, this has not

happened comprehensively for taking feedback effects into account and the way they contribute to more effective collaboration, the dependent variable.

In management research, inter-organizational relationships have likewise extensively been explored, notably by work on joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions. The insights for this project were, firstly, that culture is crucial to understand collaboration. In the current undertaking, culture promises to be important in two ways. Firstly, it is relevant in the sense of organizational culture, as the culture within an interagency collaboration project may impact its success. While this was reflected in the themes in public management research, joint venture research is much more developed in this field. Secondly, given the cross-culture nature of international development, differences in national cultures may impact practices and outcomes of interagency collaboration. Therefore, findings from intercultural management were also reviewed. Sensemaking was identified as an approach to understand practices across cultures. Secondly, reciprocity is stressed much more in management research for interagency collaboration and has to be taken into account for research on international development as well.

Lastly, Eugene Bardach's interagency collaboration theory for the public sector was identified as the most viable approach for my research interest. Based on four dimensions (operating system, resources, steering a course and culture), Bardach's theory incorporates macro-level theories from five of the themes and connects them with micro-level practices. It provides a comprehensive, conceptual framework explaining the mechanisms leading to more Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC). In this way, it factors in capacities to collaborate as well as pays attention to the role the individual – the craftsman – plays. The processes to reach ICC can be staged in a sequential way, while progress may also be influenced by other momentums. This framework is flexible and missing elements, themes and practices can be accommodated, therefore, it is ideal for my research project. The following chapter lays out my operationalized framework based on Bardach's theory.

3. Crafting a conceptual framework – refining the research questions

Though having reviewed the existing theoretical approaches and identified the conceptual framework intended to be employed in the present research, it is still not possible to go directly to the field. Having already defined development aid and IOs, the following section clarifies the theoretical concept I am seeking to construct. For this purpose, it elaborates on levels of theory, concept and operationalizes Bardach's theory to serve as a research framework. Likewise, the guiding questions are refined to the research questions this paper is going to explore.

3.1 Combining research and practice: crafting meso-level theory

After identifying a gap in current research of a theory of interagency collaboration in international development able to provide explanations connecting macro- and micro-level theories, more elaboration is required on how to describe and name the theory. Theory should answer the what, the how, the why and the when of a pressing concern (Whetten, 1989, pp. 490-492). However, there are different 'kinds' or 'levels' of theory. There are theories that are closer to a particular field and grounded in research. Glaser and Strauss (2008, pp. 79-99) call those substantive theories, whereas they attribute the term of formal theory to theory that integrates fields – a 'meta-theory' one could say. The theory required here is a substantive theory.

Nevertheless, there are different levels inside a substantive theory as well. On a macro level, theories exist that explain general principles but do not connect with the practice on the ground – which is important for management research (Weick, 1999, p. 135). The link between theory and practice has to cover the complexity of all the details of the cases (Weick, 1999, p. 139). This is the link between the macro level and the micro level referred to above. While it has to be emphasized that research problems and practical problems are distinct (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008, p. 53), theory should be applied to cases where it demonstrates to be meaningful. Van de Ven and Johnson (2006a) have distilled three ways of framing the discussion about the link of theory and practice:

1. It is seen as a problem of transferring theory into practice. That would mean that practical knowledge comes from theoretical knowledge (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006a, pp. 803-805);
2. It is seen as a problem of two distinct forms of knowledge (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006a, pp. 805-808); and
3. It is seen as a problem of knowledge production. That would mean that the two are genuinely needed in a complementary manner in to advance management research (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006a, pp. 808-810).

To harmonize the different points of view, they propose "engaged scholarship" (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006a, pp. 810-815).[81] "Engaged scholarship" consists of designing research projects in a way that they address real-life questions, provide collaborative space for researchers and practitioners, have a duration of an extended period of time and apply multiple theories to one problem to validate the findings. This is also the way as this research project is understood as it aims to craft a theoretical concept of interagency collaboration that encompasses different theories and develop it further through empirical field research. This is what is here called the 'meso-level theory' – sometimes also called medium-range theory.[82] At the same time, it is intended in this way to produce academic knowledge which is useful in management practice as well.[83]

Furthermore, research should focus more on innovative and exploratory contributions firm in scientific conditions (Abrahamson, 2008). In this respect, some authors believe that developing theory comes from induction while testing theory comes from deduction (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 3). The two are connected through a feedback process, irrespective of whether it is quantitative or qualitative research (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 7).[84] That is what this research project does: applying an existing theory to a new field and modifying it to contribute to conceptual work. On the one hand, it aims to explore which elements of Bardach's theory are present in the field and can be transferred to the context of international development cooperation. On the other hand, understanding how they causally lead to improved ICC is also part of my question.[85] The theory building process may be full of internal contradictions (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 372). In statistical terms, it only leads to modest reliability and validity but for conceptualization it is sufficient (Bardach, 1998, pp. 54-55). Consequently, the next section details how the process of conceptualization is conducted.

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[81] One should note that this proposal was not uncontested. McKelvey (2006) disagreed defending the status quo. He pointed out the resemblance to action research (McKelvey, 2006, p. 825). Van de Ven and Johnson (2006b) responded and defended their proposal. They advocate seeing theory and practice as complementary and not antithetical (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006b, S. 831).

[82] There is no consensus of the definition of meso-level theory; it also depends on academic discipline (Brent Smith, Schneider, & Dickson, 2006, pp. 149-150).

[83] That type of knowledge is sometimes called 'actionable knowledge' (David & Hatchuel, 2008). There are different typologies of knowledge as well. For example, Evans and Wamsley (1999, pp. 123-124) differentiate between theory-seeking, wisdom and ordinary knowledge. This is based on Bozeman (1993b, pp. 29-32).

[84] This is not necessarily shared by other scholars such as Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 25), who see qualitative studies associated with exploratory, hypothesis-generating studies.

[85] I believe this is possible. Mahoney (2001b, p. 578) would probably disagree as he does not agree with causality being part of meso-level theories.

3.2 Conceptualizing the theoretical framework

Conceptualizing and measuring is crucial for scientific inquiry (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010, p. 133). Notwithstanding this, the termini and understanding of key notions are not agreed upon or at least may be understood slightly differently by different researchers (Sutton & Staw, 1995).[86] In the following, a framework or concept of interagency collaboration is constructed in the sense of "an abstract idea that offers a point of view for understanding some aspect of our experience; an idea of a phenomenon formed by mentally combining its attributes; a mental image that, when operationalized, helps to organize the analysis of data." (Seawright & Collier, 2010, p. 319). In that sense, a concept functions like a (management) model providing the principles that govern action (David & Hatchuel, 2008, pp. 35, emphasis removed) – in particular as there is no agreement regarding whether model and theory can be distinguished (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 371).

The foundation is the theoretical framework provided by Bardach's theory. To this regard, the same definitions as employed by Bardach in his theory, notably regarding interagency collaboration and agency professional, are employed here (Section 3.4 demonstrates that these definitions can also be used for the context of international development). This is most practical as re-defining always changes the view (Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 430). Regarding the dependent variable some more thoughts are provided in the following section. As the concept of practices encountered in the field will serve as an indicator for the presence of Bardach's elements, it is key to the present research. It has to be stressed that Bardach's definition is likewise employed:

> *"A **practice** is a specifiable method of interacting with a situation that is intended to produce some result"*
> (Bardach, 1998, p. 36 emphasis in original)

This means that practice is about what one usually does with an underlying idea about how the actions that the practice comprises achieve the desired goal (Bardach, 2012, p. 110). This is a definition based on experienced practices rather than based on pre-defined attributes (Pasmore, Stymne, Rami Shani, Albers Mohrman, & Adler, 2008, p. 10).[87] This requires a thick description (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 167) which in turn

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[86] Some authors believe one should judge theories whether they are strong and not whether they contain all elements that usually feature in theory (Weick, 1995). For some basic definitions such as 'management' or 'research' see Pasmore, Stymne, Rami Shani, Albers Mohrman and Adler (2008).

[87] Defining practices based on pre-defined attributes would be another option, see Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012). However, different concepts of practice exist. Wagenaar and Cook (2003), for instance, provide a definition for practice in policy research. Research based on practices has been conducted on different topics, e.g. comparisons of management practices across countries (Bloom & van Reenen, 2007) or public management practices in Brazil (Barzelay & Shvets, 2006).

requires research techniques able to provide them (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 167). In interagency collaboration, this encompasses organizational routines and actions that have evolved over time and have become institutionalized (Damanpour, Devece, Chen, & Pothukuchi, 2012, p. 457), including traditions, norms and procedures (Whittington, 2006, p. 619).

Concepts require causal structures of the kind of Bardach's theory explaining how the different elements connect with the dependent variable (in his original theory mostly reflected in the developmental dynamics, 2.3.6). Bardach relies on a process approach to do that as many concepts do (Elster, 2007, p. 7). In causal relationships, there is a causal mechanism which acts like a chain: one thing leads to a second thing which in turn causes a third thing (Elster, 2007, p. 32). "Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences." (Elster, 2007, pp. 36, emphasis removed)[88] Mechanisms are needed to explain individual behavior (Elster, 2007, p. 36). They are closely related to process-based explanations (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008, p. 307).[89] They seek to explain what event causes the effect (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008, p. 309). The idea is to encounter patterns that can be generalized as mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008, p. 317). However, in order to use Bardach's theory for research and encounter patterns that confirm, disprove or add mechanisms to the ones comprised in his concept, the theory has to be operationalized. This is done in the coming section.

3.3 Manufacturing an operational craftsmanship theory

Eugene Bardach crafted his theory aiming to provide a conceptual framework to understand interagency collaboration. Thus, it can be implied that he crafted the framework to be employed in understanding the mechanisms how the different elements impact the dependent variable in different contexts. Necessarily, that will reveal which elements of the theory have to be revisited, refined or even revised. The last sentence of his book brings it to the point: "If future research using the craftsmanship conceptual framework is tested in domains in which it is analytically

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[88] McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2008, pp. 307, emphasis removed) have offered another definition of mechanism: "Delimited changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations." They advocate identifying and measuring the causal mechanisms rather than simple process explanations of the type 'a causes b'. For Mahoney (2001b, pp. 576, 580) mechanisms are "conceptualized (…) as unobserved relations or processes that generate outcomes". He also offers a list of different 'mechanism' definitions found in the literature (Mahoney, 2001b, pp. 579-580).

[89] In fact, Falleti and Lynch (2008, p. 333) argue that "social processes can generally be disaggregated into component causal mechanisms, and (…) we can begin to measure (and study!) processes." For them mechanisms are building blocks for processes (Falleti & Lynch, 2008, p. 334).

most suited, it will also illuminate problems and solutions relevant to public managers doing their most important public work." (Bardach, 1998, p. 323).

This is exactly what I want to do. Applying Eugene Bardach's craftsmanship theory in empirical research, however, is not easy. The original book is not very 'handy' and not easily employable for research.[90] Furthermore, the level of detail varies across the elements identified. Therefore, it requires a careful analysis and stringent argumentation regarding how the different elements described and identified by Bardach actually work together and how they could be observed in a research project. This will obviously need to strike a convincing balance between a broad and flexible operationalization applicable to different case studies and at the same time being specific enough to be meaningful and to enable me and other researchers to find sound explanations. For that reason, I will review each element of the craftsmanship theory in the following section and argumentatively operationalize it. It should be clear, however, that this means weighting the elements, relating them to each other and in some cases omitting elements that are considered less important.

Furthermore, it is stressed that the choice was made not to modify Bardach's theory from the outset by incorporating missing elements, e.g. power and cross-culture based on my theoretical elaborations above. Although this would have been possible, the modification should be based on the empirical findings in the field. Bardach's theory is flexible enough to accommodate new elements but doing so based on proven field data directly provides the associated practices as well as reflects the approach that he himself used to develop the concept. Nevertheless, some preliminary thoughts on potential modifications for the field of international development are provided in 3.4.

3.3.1 General operationalization

To begin with, I would see Bardach's theory as being comprised of three higher level elements. Firstly, there is a basis or a fundament from which interagency collaboration starts and which includes the whole political and institutional setup. Secondly, there are elements that are changing with a rather slow pace and are rather static, such as the operating system, resources, steering a course and culture.[91] Thirdly and lastly, there are developmental dynamics which are changing with a relatively higher velocity than the so-called static ones. This depends on the one hand on how the static elements are used by a craftsman, the sequencing or platforming, and on the other hand on external factors such as luck, crisis or other momentum. The static elements should not be

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[90] An opinion probably shared by Rouse (2002, p. 138).

[91] Rouse (2002, pp. 135-136) also structures his review around operating system, resources, steering a course, culture and developmental dynamics as the big themes. In the details for the steering challenge, however, he abstracts from the original a bit more (Rouse, 2002, p. 136).

thought of as unchangeable. Of course, resources, for example, can change but first of all they are relatively slower in pace of change than the developmental dynamics and secondly, they are much more tangible. That aspect also makes the development dynamics much more personalized than the static elements. The craftsman has to decide much more wisely on the sequencing or the reaction after a momentum event struck than on the operating system – which is also much more predictable and tangible and, thus, much easier to handle for a craftsman.

Figure 3: Overview of the operationalization of the craftsmanship theory

Source: Author.

Starting from the basis going over the static elements to the developmental dynamics, the ICC, thus, increases. Here, it is evident that the basis has to be at the bottom of the construct, as it is not changeable and the starting point of an interagency collaboration project. Building on the fundament, the four static elements represent four big pillars that need to be analyzed (operating system, resources, steering a course and culture) – and are relatively easier to analyze given their slower pace of change and their tangible nature. On top of that, one can set the 'roof' of interagency collaboration, the developmental dynamics. Firstly, the element of platforming comes in, as it uses ingredients of all four pillars in a determined and non-random fashion. In addition, the final element before impacting the dependent variable is momentum, which has to

make use of or avoid environmental factors of luck. All this increases (or decreases if one element is missing) the ICC and affects the dependent variable of Interagency Collaborative Capacity in a linear way. I show that graphically in the previous figure. The figure reads from bottom to top.

The individual elements are described in more detail in the following sections. But first, the function of another important element of Bardach's conceptualization has to be explained: Smart practices. Smart practices, as said, take advantage of an opportunity to achieve a lot as regards reaching the goal (increasing the ICC) while requiring little resources. That is mostly done when combining some of the existing givens in a smart way. In other words, usually smart practices require a good craftsman that uses the static elements in a smart way, so on the one hand giving them the right relative importance or strength and on the other hand combining them in a certain sequence in the development dynamics. The second element has also been explored by other authors: This means smart practices can 'absorb' these dynamics, as a craftsman can employ smart practices to react to dynamic changes (Campbell, 2006, p. 11) and adapt the platforming process or seek new momentum (Bardach, 2006b, pp. 37-40). But I would argue it is not only the sequence and dynamics that matter, it is also about which of the elements to emphasize at a given moment. Both are needed to be a good craftsman and to develop smart practices and they are characteristic for this entrepreneurialism or adaptiveness described by Bardach for craftsmen. Therefore, I would say smart practices need further exploration on a case-by-case basis, but indicatively I present here the smart practices described by Bardach in his work.

Table 2: Compilation of smart practices described by Bardach

Attract catalytic funds	Substitute management for governance
Build consensus sufficient for a particular purpose	Let form follow function in the selection of the steering forum
Hire professional help to build trust	Political processes for platforming
Select the right staff members to build trust	

Source: Author.

A final reflection has to be made on network theory and its relationship to interagency collaboration. In my view, the networks are already factored into the craftsmanship theory in different components.[92] The network of a person can be part of the resources an interagency collaboration initiative has. It could also be part of the culture of a collaboration attempt – because the people involved already trust each other due to

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[92] Notably the two main capacities of a network according to Bardach (1994, p. 4): organizing working relationships and transmitting information.

their own experience with the other collaborators in other networks or due to recommendations through trusted networks. In that sense, the network can be seen almost as an 'external' or pre-conditional factor that has to be dealt with from the beginning. It is of course more difficult to distinguish in the case of public agencies, as collaboration happens in a politicized environment (Bardach, 1994, p. 17) and the product is often policy. However, therefore, network theory does not contribute to solving the management problem of how to increase the ICC. It answers other questions. Consequently, I also disagree with Bardach who sees the network primarily depending on the role and not the person. I actually think role and person are so entangled that it is difficult to differentiate between them. Nevertheless, looking at it through the lens of the craftsmanship theory, this actually does not matter as the network only has to be taken into account as a structuring factor.

3.3.2 Political and institutional setup

The political and institutional setup forms the basis from which to start building an ICC. In my opinion, this is where investigating each individual agency participating in an interagency collaboration comes in (and Bardach's later 2008 re-visiting of the cases supports that). In the static elements and the developmental dynamics, one usually has to consider all of the agencies and the feedback processes between them (e.g. no one agency can develop the culture of an interagency collaboration, only all agencies together can). That is also the reason why Bardach stated that there can only be one ICC for each interagency collaboration activity. But to know the political and institutional setup one should look at the specific elements that matter for each of the agencies involved. That has to include the political context (political environment, etc.) of each agency and the institutional setup (mandates, etc.).

Figure 4: Political and institutional setup element

Political and institutional setup
Assets in the subjective and objective component

Source: Author.

In that sense, I believe it has to go further than simply reflecting on the pluralism and the obsolescence problem described by Bardach. I think some more thoughts are required on each individual agency's strengths and weaknesses, when it comes to the assets each agency is able to contribute to an ICC in the objective and subjective components.

3.3.3 Operating system

As outlined above, the operating system is the first of four pillars of equal importance among the static elements. It should be recalled that the operating system is the element where the group of interagency collaborators agrees on how to use the assets at their disposal to achieve the set goals. This necessarily requires a way of communication about the cases (what to do). Looking into Bardach's original text, I identified five main components that are important for an operating system to function in a way that increases the ICC.

To begin with, flexibility is important. In this sense, a researcher employing the theory should look for signs of a higher degree of flexibility in the collaboration to advance with the project and for staff members to make their own decisions. Since administration is usually based on the hierarchical principle, this is an important feature to increase the ICC. Furthermore, motivation to collaborate is crucial. Usually, motivation is linked to the desire to achieve a goal of which the achievement is facilitated by the collaboration. In that sense, I would not necessarily only look for the three categories identified by Bardach (motivation to create public value, bureaucratic motivation or careerist progression), but

Figure 5: Operating system element

Operating system
- Flexibility
- Motivation
- Mutual understanding
- Accountability
- Financial exchanges

Source: Author.

any sign of motivation that is linked to increasing the ICC. The third component is trust and mutual understanding (and I would say Bardach's focus in the operating system is more on understanding rather than trust, which is considered in the element of culture). In this component, I would also look for more general signs than the ones Bardach identified. Trust and understanding in my opinion can be rooted in the trust in and understanding for the other collaborating agencies and/or the other individuals. Sometimes, one may trust and understand the other agency since the two agencies have collaborated for a long time and, thus, there is also a face saving issue at stake. In other circumstances, one may have more trust in and understanding for the counterpart collaborator. Technical clarity may help but I would argue it ranks second after trust – if one trusts, technicalities can be discussed. In that sense, having worked together for a longer time, having good self-consciousness and training may help but the exact combination of factors differs case by case. Fourthly, the accountability structure needs to be looked into. In particular, one should understand to whom the members of an interagency collaboration feel accountable and how they ensure to meet the accountability requirements. Lastly, financial exchanges have to be paid attention to. This includes monitoring from where and to where they go and how this is seen by the collaborating individuals.

3.3.4 Resources

In the resource element, six components need to be explored: Turf, autonomy, money, people[93], political standing and information. I believe one has to examine which driving forces are impeding the ICC to increase and which forces are contributing to it for each one of these components. Special attention has to be devoted to understanding if there is a feeling of need to protect one of these resources in particular and the reasoning why. Furthermore, a close look is required at what kinds of resources are contributed by the different agencies to an interagency collaboration project. Moreover, it should be explored if information on the total of available resources is shared freely among the members of the interagency collaboration initiative. Finally, one has to pay attention to the language interagency collaborators employ and if pieces of ethnocentrism can be identified that state a superiority of the own agency or at least a significant difference compared to the other collaborating agency.

Figure 6: Resources element

Resources
- Turf
- Autonomy
- Money
- People
- Political standing
- Information

Source: Author.

3.3.5 Steering a course

The third static element is steering a course which concerns the question of where to go with an interagency collaboration. This includes first of all the design of a vision or mission. Once the goal is defined, the course to get there has to be decided on and the quality of the process of decision has to be considered. At best, the interagency collaborators refer to the public interest in the decision-making process in determining these three factors of this first component. In this regard, the organizational form of the decision-making forum matters. The management form should be taken into account. Bardach's four types of management form (council, board, forum and implementation network) can serve as guidance. Lastly, the leadership of an interagency collaboration and its impact on the ICC has to be analyzed. It is important to determine how the steering is done – is the leadership rather top-down or from bottom-up?

Figure 7: Steering a course element

Steering a course
- Vision / mission / goals (regarding quality / course / process)
- Form (council, board, forum, implementation network)
- Leadership

Source: Author.

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[93] Based on the above, it should be evident that I would root network considerations mainly in the people resource, as the network of a person is a resource from a management perspective. It does not matter in that regard whether the network is based on the function a person occupies or the individual's personal network.

3.3.6 Culture

The element of culture I would generally understand in a broader sense than Bardach seems to have intended. I would not only limit that to how problems are solved but include the general spirit of on interagency collaboration – its (organizational) culture. This enables a broader view on how issues are dealt with. The first component of the element is the level of bureaucratic culture that prevails in the collaboration. Given that bureaucratic culture does not usually favor collaborative processes, the degree of how the ICC increases and the level of pragmatism in resolving issues has to be researched. Moreover, negotiation processes

Figure 8: Culture element

Culture
- Bureaucracy culture
- Negotiation process
- Trust

Source: Author.

are important. In this regard, the focus is on determining if there is appreciation for the other agencies' issues, how value is created and how it is claimed. This includes negotiations about finances. A detail that has to be understood in the negotiation process is the fact that the agencies' staff members are most of the times only representatives and may have to get approval for decisions and concessions. The last point is trust (building and maintaining). This is people-centered but can be rooted in knowledge about the person or the organization and can consist of different measures. One should pay attention to any signs or actions that signal trust. That is of course much more complex when one has to deal with groups rather than single individuals.

3.3.7 Platforming

Platforming describes the sequencing in a non-random manner using the elements and components outlined above. Bardach proposed one sequence that seemed most logical to him and was also found in his case studies. However, he emphasized that this part is empirically weak and most importantly he wanted to make the point that the sequence is constructed by craftsman in a meaningful way as opposed to evolve randomly. Therefore, I will use the same sequencing as Bardach suggested for guidance.

I would like to stress in this regard that the most important issue during field research for me is the discovery of structured and planned platforming – as opposed to a random evolution (Bardach's later work also underlines that). Field research should then indicate if the steps are as proposed by Bardach or if some of the steps differ. I also do not make the distinction that political processes influencing the platforming process shall necessarily be attributed to smart practices. I think one has to understand how platforming works as a first step and one can proceed to identifying smart practices afterwards.

Figure 9: Platforming element

Source: Author based on Bardach (1998, p. 274).

3.3.8 Momentum

Momentum comes from either positive or negative events in the environment of an interagency collaboration. The positive events or changes help to move forward with the collaboration project as they create an opportunity to link the interagency collaboration to the positive events and make it fly. The opportunities that a positive event is able to create differ. Enthusiasm, bandwagon, consensus and trust effects may be observed.

Figure 10: Momentum element

Source: Author.

Conversely, negative events may impede the interagency collaboration to advance. Negative events can be particularly harmful to the ICC if the vulnerability of the interagency collaboration is high.

3.3.9 Dependent variable: ICC

The dependent variable stays as Bardach defined it "the state of affairs that craftsmanship is alleged to produce" (Bardach, 1998, p. 19). This means indications of the level of the ICC and the relative increase of the level of the ICC need to be collected and assessed in relation to the previous elements and processes.

Figure 11: Dependent variable

Dependent variable: ICC
"the state of affairs that craftsmanship is
alleged to produce"
(Bardach, 1998, p. 19)

Source: Author.

What counts as a higher Interagency Collaborative Capacity? Bardach refers to the public value in this regard but is also not comprehensive as to what that means. In my opinion, the public value lies in higher efficiency and effectiveness in achieving a goal in the public interest. That means achieving a goal of public interest faster, with fewer costs, in a better quality than alone or establishing new goals of public interest on the agenda (very important in the case of increasing ICC). This also includes extending collaboration to new partners if that will lead to a quicker, cheaper or higher quality achievement of goals of public interest in the end or to the establishing of new goals of public interest. The exact indicators for the dependent variable have to be, however, developed for each case.

3.3.10 Summary: full operationalization

As a last step, all these elements have to be integrated into the model described at the beginning of this sub-section. It is hereby important to note that, of course, relationships exist between the elements of the model, but these have been omitted not to confuse the overall structure.

Figure 12: Full operationalization of the craftsmanship theory

Source: Author.

3.4 Craftsmanship theory and international development aid

Although none of the elements that were theoretically identified as important for international development to Bardach's operationalized theory are added at this stage, some first thoughts are given to its application in the development assistance sector. First of all, it has to be noted that Bardach's definition of interagency collaboration in the public sector is applicable to the development assistance field. "Any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately" (Bardach, 1998, p. 8) can be applied to the collaboration between a development assistance agency and a government entity that collaborate in order to make development more efficient and effective. Development (in any sense and field) is the public value that is intended to be created. The agencies could work separately, but in certain circumstances working together increases public value (consisting of a better project fit, higher efficiency or other benefits). The same is true for Bardach's definition of an agency professional, which can be applied to development practitioners and staff of IOs. It should be recalled that Bardach in this regard explicitly excluded simple cost-sharing agreements – that also exist in the development aid sector. In fact, many different forms of working together exist in the development profession and many of them are called 'collaboration'. Therefore, one has to analyze the nature of the collaboration carefully. In some of the projects that comprise multiple countries it is not required that all the involved countries move forward at the same speed. In these cases the researcher has to judge whether the ICC should be assessed for one interagency collaboration or several collaborations.

I expect to find smart practices in the development aid sector as well. Agency professionals of today's organizations are usually highly trained and have experience with public management challenges. Their governmental counterparts are anyhow part of the public administration and covered by Bardach's theory. The entrepreneurial spirit to adapt quickly and find these smart practices should be distributed normally as in any other organization – some employees are craftsmen and some are not.

In the conceptualization of the craftsmanship theory, the first element is already quite important for the development aid business. It is crucial for development professionals to understand the political and institutional setup in which they are operating, as it determines the basis for collaborating (including subjective and objective components). Collaborating with the wrong ministry or directorate may not lead to the desired advancement in the project and even less in overall development. Also, the political standing or influence of a particular collaboration partner has to be understood well and assessed carefully. This is even more difficult for international development professionals who are outsiders and often also rotate from post to post so quickly that they cannot dedicate much time to getting acquainted with the political and institutional setup. The challenge becomes even more difficult when they have to

manage projects with multiple countries at the same time. Consequently, another issue mentioned by Bardach may actually be quite important for the development field: the matter of non-collaboration. Given that international development projects often come with some prestige for the country and new resources, a joint decision not to collaborate on a certain matter may be quite difficult to make. This is not only true for a country that is interested in taking advantage of the resources offered but also for a development agency that does not want to lose its footing in the country and often has the typical public management problem to spend its budget within a certain timeframe.

Regarding the operating system, I believe paying close attention to the cultural context will be important. The perception of trust and understanding are already highly contextual but also the meaning of flexibility, motivation and accountability depend on culture. Foreign countries have different concepts about the organization of their civil service. Also, development organizations develop their own structures. Harmonizing them and even first of all realizing the fine differences in a foreign system may not be easy – neither for development aid professionals nor for public service counterparts.

Obviously, the resources element will heavily depend on the overall development level of a partner country, most importantly in the money component (which will be linked to the country's income and public sector budget), but also in the other components such as the human resource quality that an entity is able to contribute. I also expect the same finding Bardach reported for his case studies: in-kind contributions of resources are most of the time the preferred contribution to an ICC and secrecy about available resources may prevail. The reason for this suspicion is that the control over resources and the information about them provides a power position that no agency likes to lose. The protectiveness about one's turf, however, may not matter too much, as development projects usually aim to not to take away the tasks and capacities from the country's counterpart organization. One rather tries to increase their capacities to do their tasks better. This is where the issue of ownership (discussed under 2.1.3) comes in. Although it still happens, at least consciousness about the problem has increased.

The steering a course element as a whole is going to be interesting, as it should be remembered that development professionals have to deal with sovereign countries. That means that there are on the one hand agreements and steering committees in these projects, but does this on the other hand really mean that a course can be set and followed? If a sovereign country decides to do things differently from what was agreed there is little a development agency can do. That may also be the reason that the agreements concluded are often vague and the forums seem to matter more. It should be noted that these forums often do not include the donor who at the end pays the bill. An important component, therefore, may be the quality of the process which should be monitored closely. The leadership is also going to be interesting to look at, as one can

often hear in the development aid sector that staff feel as if they were fighting alone for and in their projects, because projects are numerous and team work structures in a lot of development agencies are still weak. Also, development aid staff historically often emphasized the personal component of management as staff had to defend 'their' project in the budget allocation processes. That may also influence the leadership style to be rather bottom-up than top-down.

Culture is strongly linked to society's culture in general (this impacts the development of a bureaucratic culture, the expected negotiation processes and the nature of trust). This is linked to organizational and national culture as mentioned before.

In the dynamic elements, I would expect platforming to be much more difficult than in other projects, because distances between collaborating agencies can be large (distance as elaborated on under 2.1.2 as well as geographically). Consequently, platforming could be expected to take more time in general. The momentum element may be more political and may also depend on political events in the countries.

3.5 Refining guiding questions into research questions

As the concept used for this research has been defined as Bardach's operationalized theory with the key definitions and elements laid out, it now allows refining the guiding questions into actual research questions. Yin (2009, pp. 86-89) pointed out that there are different levels of questions during a research project from rather high-level, broader questions to research questions and later individual interview questions. As elaborated on in the introduction, this research project aims to understand interagency collaboration in international development. This was framed as the overarching question "How does interagency collaboration in international development cooperation work?" Due to the number of players in international development, this overarching question early had to be rendered more precisely to "How does interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development cooperation work?" This led to the guiding questions:

1. Which managerial elements are important for interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
2. How do these elements affect interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?
3. How do these elements manifest themselves in the management of interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development?

With Bardach's operationalized theory as conceptual framework and the findings of the literature review, it is now possible to refine these guiding questions into the research questions of my project. As Bardach's theory provides elements of importance for interagency collaboration and the operationalization makes it useful as a framework in the field, the first question can be revised to:

<u>Research question 1:</u>
Can Bardach's operationalized theory be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation?

However, research question one requires two sub-questions. Firstly, this research has to identify which of the existing elements Bardach found can be confirmed (which also determines the ones that cannot be confirmed and can consequently be deleted). Secondly, it is important to empirically identify which other elements have to be added. Thus, research question one is, more precisely:

<u>Research question 1:</u>
Can Bardach's operationalized theory be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation?
- o Which elements of the existing theory can be confirmed by empirical evidence?
- o Are there elements that are missing? If so, which?

The second guiding question can be translated into research question two:

<u>Research question 2:</u>
How do these elements impact the dependent variable – the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC)?

Lastly, the third guiding question reads with Bardach's operationalized concept as:

<u>Research question 3</u>
Which empirically found practices can be linked to which element(s) of the theory?

These research questions can be tested through empirical field research and provide answers to the questions this research project aims to explore about interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development.

3.6 Summary: Bardach enhanced – a conceptual framework to explore interagency collaboration in international development

In the previous section, the contribution of this research to interagency collaboration research with a meso-level theory for international development focusing on collaboration between IOs and other organizations was elaborated on. It was underlined that Bardach's definitions for key terms are employed. Operationalizing Bardach's theory, the three main elements are: the political and institutional setup at the basis followed by the static elements as the second level. The last level is developmental dynamics, as processes are crucial in Bardach's theory to influence the dependent variable, the ICC. This is also where causal linkages through mechanisms come in. The static elements have four pillars which are the operating system, resources, steering a course and culture. The elements captured within these four pillars are flexibility, motivation, mutual understanding, accountability, financial exchanges, turf, autonomy, money, people, political standing, information, vision, form, leadership, bureaucracy culture, negotiation process and trust. Within the developmental dynamics, two stages can be differentiated. The first one is platforming and basically reflects the idea of a somehow sequenced non-random use of the static elements. The second one is momentum, which accounts for the fact that unforeseen events can influence the ICC. For my application to international development, it is anticipated that some elements of the operationalized theory will become more and others less important than the theory suggests. However, this will be determined during empirical research.

With the theoretical concepts clear, the guiding questions have been revised to obtain the research questions to be explored. The research questions are the following:

1. Can Bardach's operationalized theory be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation?
   a. Which elements of the existing theory can be confirmed by empirical evidence?
   b. Are there elements that are missing? If so, which?
2. How do these elements impact the dependent variable – the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC)?
3. Which empirically found practices can be linked to which element(s) of the theory?

4. Research design: case study combining observation, documentation and interview techniques

The following section elaborates on the research design that I chose to answer the research questions, its methodology and the methods I use in order to gather data. The research design defines the attributes that are essential to the research topic and their empirical indicators, the units of analysis and research sample (Gobo, 2008, p. 69). In this respect, it is important that the research questions have already been introduced as methodology and methods have to be adequate to the questions that should be answered by them. It is impossible to discuss the research design until one has at least an idea about the research question (Gerring, 2007, p. 71).

4.1 Getting from theory to research methods – and vice versa

Starting the transition from theoretical and conceptual elaborations to actually applying them in the field, one faces the challenge of an almost infinite pool of possible methodological tools. Therefore, this section provides my reasoning for selecting case study research as the adequate methodology to explore the research questions in their associated context.

4.1.1 Methodology: the choice of mindset for the researcher

The methodology a researcher applies to explore the research questions fundamentally determines the possible range of findings the researcher is able to expect. In turn, the methodology is essentially based on the researcher's beliefs regarding the functioning of the world. Methodology is "a way of thinking about and studying social phenomena" (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 1) and is different from the methods, the "techniques and procedures for gathering and analyzing data." (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 1) Methodology in that sense is broader than methods. It describes the understanding of the cognitively possible outcomes of a research project whereas methods are simple tools inside that cognitive mode to be used to get results that enable the researcher to answer his or her questions (Gobo, 2008, p. 18). If I am not convinced, for example, of being able to find valid answers through observations,[94] I probably should not employ observation as a research method. Consequently, understanding the methodology I chose for exploring my research questions is important to understand the possible answers. The range of scientifically valid and acceptable methodologies to capture the (perceived) reality through research has changed over time, as it is rooted in the zeitgeist. There are different cycles during which sometimes a more empiric-positivist view is dominating and sometimes a more postmodernist-constructivist view, the extreme ends of a cognitive continuum.

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[94] Because I am, for example, convinced that our environment is only a construct of reality and, thus, I am unable to observe anything real.

My view is that the insight that reality is framed by the symbols we use to describe it, has added a lot to science. However, I believe at the same time that it is possible to conduct scientific inquiry and coming to valid, general and real conclusions. In that sense, I would situate myself in the middle of the two extremes of pure realism and pure constructivism. I think that understanding the local context is, indeed, important, particularly in management research. Consequently, I consider as sound Alvesson's (2003) proposal to adopt what he calls a localist view that allows looking at the local context while at the same time taking facts as reality. While this methodological approach determines the range of possible outcomes, it enables likewise a pluralism of methods which is necessary to investigate the research questions I proposed. Notably, it allows me to take advantage of observations that follow an ethnographic logic, which experienced new popularity with post-modernism (Denzin, 1997, p. xii).

The best way to employ this pluralism of methods is through case study research. This methodology offers the possibility to employ different methods in order to make valid and firm conclusions about the case. Eisenhardt (1989) is arguably one of the most known scholars regarding this methodology and how to build theories from it. Her approach reflects my understanding of research, which is able to reveal reality but takes context into account. One of her sources for conceptualizing case study research is Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534). Grounded theory is the discovery of theory from data (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, p. 1). In that sense, research to build theory should start as close as possible to data without hypothesis and pre-determined relationships between variables in mind (recognizing that this is impossible to achieve,[95] Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536). Therefore, Eisenhardt's case study research is comparable to hypothesis test research (a preferred technique in positivist research) but with its own features, e.g. that it is highly data-bound (and, thus, context-sensitive). Furthermore, case studies are particularly useful for new topics that require exploratory, conceptualizing research. They are directed at a single data point - a single case (Yin, 2009, p. 79). Another feature of case study research according to Goertz (2013, pp. 3, emphasis removed) is that "the central goal of a case study is to investigate causal mechanisms and make causal inferences within individual cases." Although I would not go so far as Goertz to say that all cases have to look for and employ causal mechanisms, I agree that case study research is useful to explore them. With its cross-disciplinary view, it facilitates causal analysis (Gerring, 2007, p. 9). This is part of the research project I am pursuing. Causation requires the constant presence of cause and effect, a change in effect when cause is modified and activities

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[95] Categories should fit and work but should not be forced onto the data (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, p. 2). Although Glaser and Strauss (2008, p. 6) recognize that generating a theory requires ideas that may come from other sources than data.

and processes that link cause and effect – mechanisms (Brady, 2008, p. 218).[96] According to these characteristics, "the qualitative logic (…) is a sufficient condition one." (Goertz, 2013, p. 20) But it is possible that the outcome of the effect may be observed without the cause, which is normal for qualitative scholars, as there are alternative ways to an outcome (Goertz, 2013, p. 9).

4.1.2 The tools to support the research process from findings to theory

The intellectual tools employed for the way between theory and methods depend on the research situation and the researcher as well as on the context. Nevertheless, most researchers agree that it is tied to 'getting involved with the paper'. Gobo (2008, pp. 208-213) suggests four kinds of notes as help for the researcher: 1. observational notes, 2. theoretical notes, 3. methodological notes, and 4. emotional notes. Although Gobo developed these classes of notes for ethnographic research (which my research project is not) I found these quite helpful and have employed the first three types. Also, memos and diagrams may derive from research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 117). These are no more than intermediate products to support the thinking process for conceptualization necessary to systemize the findings to aggregate theory.

4.2 Case study research

As I described above, research on conceptualizing collaboration in international development through a meso level theory is best done through case study research. Consequently, I present more details about the methodology in the coming section.

4.2.1 Case study methodology in management and public administration

Different methodologies are accepted in different ways in different disciplines and are adapted to the context of the respective research field. This generates legitimization within the field but decreases pluralism (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009, pp. 567-569). In management, the use of case study research is ample and accepted (if certain standards are followed). Piekkari, Welch and Paavilainen (2009, p. 577) find "exploratory, interview-based multiple case studies based on positivistic assumptions and conducted at a single point in time" the predominant case study research in international business. This is the positivist type of case study. The interpretativist and critical realist types of case studies are quasi-absent in management studies. That has an impact on how research is conducted in the field. Research in management studies tends to be variable- rather than case-oriented, looking for replication more than richness, seeking convergence but diversification, and use designed rather than emergent boundaries (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009, pp. 569-573).

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[96] Brady's (2008, p. 219) list is based on a summary of four approaches to causation.

In public administration, Perry and Kraemer (1986) conducted a review of methodologies employed in articles published in the Public Administration Review from 1975-1984.[97] They found that case study research is common in public administration. 37% of the articles they reviewed were case studies (Perry & Kraemer, 1986, pp. 217-218, 221). These were written on a range of topics, mostly on problem definition and descriptions, but little advanced research had been done (Perry & Kraemer, 1986, pp. 217-219). Stallings and Ferris (1988) repeat Perry and Kraemer's study with a much wider time span and come to the same conclusion. Public administration research produces mainly conceptual research (Stallings & Ferris, 1988, p. 582). The criticism that public administration research is not cumulative, of poor quality and not innovative is mostly rooted in the use of case study research (Jensen & Rodgers, 2001, p. 235). It is therefore important to use existing conceptual and theoretical frameworks as much as possible when starting a public administration research project. By adapting existing frameworks to the researcher's needs it is possible to explore new questions through commonly accepted approaches. In this way, public administration can embark on a way towards cumulative research.[98]

4.2.2 Criticism and advantages

On one level, case study research is criticized on the grounds of not following scientific standards such as validity, reliability and generalizability (Tight, 2010, p. 336)[99]. Nevertheless, there are techniques to overcome them (see section 4.2.6).[100] Most importantly rigor was a problem in the past, which leads to disregard of the case study compared to other research designs (Yin, 2009, p. 14). Systematic procedures as well as a fair presentation of all evidence are needed (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23608). This is not to say that the researcher cannot deviate from his framework but it should be made explicit (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23613). Likewise, case study research should not be confused with teaching cases (which do not have to be rigorous, Yin, 2009, pp. 4-5, 14). Jensen and Rodgers (2001, pp. 242-244) point out that criticism often fails to recognize that it is impossible to apply common judgment to all types of research if there is no agreement on quality criteria across different disciplines. Further they note that replicability of these

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[97] It is important to note that this review excluded articles discussing questions only relevant to one organization based on the argument that it is not study of administration but rather practice of administration (Perry & Kraemer, 1986, p. 215). I do not agree with that argument as it is also possible to derive concepts and theory from a single case study. Therefore this methodological choice, in my view, excludes an important group of case studies and may influence the results.

[98] Jensen and Rodgers (2001, pp. 239-240) propose a meta-analysis "comparable to a comprehensive literature review that is quantitative and systematic" to overcome the problem.

[99] For Tight (2010, pp. 330-331) the problem is more profound: for him 'case' is not specific enough as the social sciences treat 'case' sometimes as a research strategy and sometimes as research design.

[100] Flyvbjerg (2006) identified what he calls the five "misunderstandings" of case study research.

evaluations is limited. The evaluation criteria used frequently lack internal consistency as well as having limited external validity.

On another level, critics of case study research question their use for certain types of research. One of these voices is that case studies cannot establish causal relationships. But as mentioned earlier, some authors actually believe the contrary. Another misconception is that case studies can only be crafted with qualitative research methods (Yin, 2009, p. 19 or Gerring, 2007, p. 68). Case studies are able to unite different types of collection methods (participant observations, interviews, etc.) as well as different types of evidence (qualitative or quantitative, Yin, 1981, p. 58 and Jensen & Rodgers, 2001, p. 237).[101] Another concern voiced is that case studies result in huge documents with little use. This can be circumvented by a good presentation.

There are also recognized advantages of case study research. "As a research strategy, *the distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it attempts to examine*: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." (Yin, 1981, p. 59 emphasis in original) Thus, case studies are the right choice when one wants to define a topic broadly, the context matters and multiple sources of evidence should be included (Yin, 1993, pp. xi, 31).[102] The inclusion of the context is the reason for several challenges (Yin, 1993, p. 3): 1. richness resulting in more variables than data points; 2. need for multiple sources of evidence; and 3. necessity of distinct research design and analysis strategies. Case studies in this sense function well with causal explanations, as one can take advantage of pattern-matching techniques (Yin, 1993, pp. 18-19). Yin (2009, p. 8) gives an overview comparing the case study to other research strategies (experiment, survey, archival analysis and historical research). This shows that case study design is the choice to answer research questions that are about the how and why with no control over behavior and focusing on contemporary events. As such case studies may be useful for exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research alike (Yin, 2009, p. 6). Case study research is able to take advantage of the full range of evidence (interviews, histories, documents, artifacts, observations, etc., Yin, 2009, p. 11). What is important is that research design follows the research question which determines the strategy.

Consequently, case studies of this nature lead to theoretical generalizable propositions and cannot be – nor are they intending to be – a sample of a population. That is called "analytic generalization" as opposed to "statistical generalization" (Yin, 2009, p. 15). Case study research does not aim towards statistical generalization but rather the transfer of concepts and theories (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23608).

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[101] For differences between qualitative and quantitative research see, e.g., Gobo (2008, pp. 85-86).
[102] Case study research can also serve as an evaluation tool (Yin, 1993, pp. 55-76).

However, it should be recognized that much of these advantages and criticisms have been raised mainly for the positivist case study research type.[103]

4.2.3 Case study definition

Case studies have been defined in various different ways. As this is my selected research design, some of them are provided as an example.[104] Given that my study does not intend to give a methodological review no further discussion is provided.

In 1993, Yin (1993, p. 59) gave as a first definition the following:

> *A case study "is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, addresses a situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and uses multiple sources of evidence."*

He later refined it into a twofold definition of case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 18):

> *"1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that*
> *- investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when*
> *- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.*
> *2. The case study inquiry*
> *- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result*
> *- relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result*
> *- benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis."*

Gerring (2007, p. 19 emphasis removed) states:

> *"Case connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time."*

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[103] Hyett, Kenny and Dickson-Swift (2014, p. 23606) identify two streams: 1. social constructivist (e.g. Stake and Merriam) and 2. post-positivist (e.g. Yin, Flyvbjerg and Eisenhard). Tight (2010, pp. 331-332), however, would attribute to Stake and Yin only the status of general qualitative research guidance.

[104] Also to avoid Tight's (2010, p. 329) criticism that much research has been labelled case study but few makes reference to methodological literature on it.

And continues (Gerring, 2007, p. 20 emphasis removed):

> *"A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is - at least in part - to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)."*

For me, it is important to capture that a case study can be a single case at one point in time investigating a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context with unclear boundaries relying on multiple sources of evidence.

4.2.4 Case study production

Since case studies are not only a sub-set of other research methods, writing a case study requires particular skills and has to follow certain steps in order to make sure it complies with the criteria for good research (Yin, 2009, p. 25). Some of the skills for the good case study investigator are (Yin, 2009, pp. 69-73): 1. to ask good questions, 2. to be able to 'listen' to the data, 3. to be adaptive and flexible, 4. to have an understanding of the issues that are studied and 5. not to have preconceived ideas.

There are different 'handbooks' on how to write case studies.[105] Eisenhardt (1989, p. 533) for example divides the steps into: getting started; selecting cases; crafting instruments and protocols; entering the field; analyzing data; shaping hypotheses; enfolding literature; and reaching closure. Yin refined the steps he proposes over years of research and recommends five components (Yin, 2009, pp. 27-28): study questions, propositions (possible explanations to answer the question), unit(s) of analysis, logical linking of data to propositions, criteria for interpretation of the findings.[106] The basic idea is always that the researcher should firstly disclose which questions he tries to answer, secondly the possible answers and how he is going to identify the correct one and lastly how he ensures following scientific standards. I have already proposed the research questions I am trying to answer as well as the theoretical framework and the methodology determining the range of possible answers. Consequently, I still have to explain how I analyze the data and how this corresponds to scientific criteria.[107]

A first step has to be to establish the boundaries of the case – "spatial, temporal, and other concrete boundaries." (Yin, 2009, p. 32) In my study, the boundaries are defined by the collaboration between the IO and all other agencies involved. The time they

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[105] These differences in research methodology may lead to a problem for common understanding, research practices and rigor (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23606).

[106] Compare to Yin (1993, pp. 90-92).

[107] Therefore, the whole research document is, in my opinion, an extensive version of the case study protocol and vice versa (see Yin, 2009, pp. 79-82).

collaborate and the people and events involved in the collaboration will delimit the case (it is important to note that, consequently, it is not necessarily the organizational boundaries that matter). All events directly related to the management of the interagency collaboration should be examined.

Another important consideration is the unit of analysis to research the case. According to Yin (2009, p. 46) there are four possibilities that are shown in the following table.

Table 3: Possible combinations for the unit of analysis

	Single case study	**Multiple case study[108]**
Holistic	The researcher focuses on only one case and that case is equal to the unit of analysis.	The researcher looks at multiple cases but each of these cases is equal to the unit of analysis.
Embedded	The researcher focuses on only one case but that case has several sub-units of analysis.	The researcher looks at multiple cases and these cases each have several sub-units of analysis.

Source: Author based on Yin (2009, pp. 46, 50).

It should be noted that care is needed to make sure that the sub-units in embedded research designs are actually sub-units of one case and not hidden multiple cases (Yin, 2009, p. 52). The definition of the unit of analysis poses a challenging question for my research. It seems clear that one unit of analysis has to be the collaboration between each country's agencies and the international organization (with related other organizations) – to determine the 'bilateral' ICC. But the question is if all these 'bilateral' collaborations are sub-units of analysis for one case of a holistic ICC or if they constitute in fact multiple case studies for multiple ICCs. Bardach was clear in his theory that there can only be one ICC for an interagency collaboration. But that was a theory developed for the public sector in the US. There might be differences when it goes to an interagency collaboration in an international development project – in the end all the agencies involved enjoy a certain degree of sovereignty and freedom.

My approach to solving this dilemma is that in my research, I look at both: the ICC between each country's agency and the international development agencies as well as the overall ICC. Given that it is the first study in this field, the research should determine if it is actually one case study of one ICC (and the 'bilateral' relationships are consequently sub-units of analysis) or if it is rather appropriate to talk about several ICCs (and it is consequently a study with multiple cases that are each holistic).

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[108] One rational for multiple case designs is to have literal and theoretical replication possibility (Yin, 2009, p. 59). For cross-case analysis there are two techniques (Yin, 1981, pp. 62-64): case survey or case comparison.

My theoretical disposition before going to the field, however, is to follow Bardach and assume one ICC for the whole interagency collaboration with the bilateral relationships as sub-units of analysis.

For selecting the case study, the most important criterion for me is the concept-building intention behind my research. For that reason, I opt for a single case study design looking at one interagency collaboration project in international development. Another important factor is the accessibility, as getting inside an interagency collaboration needs time to gain the trust of all and to study it. This is a legitimate factor of selection, although it naturally comes with limitations in comparability and a certain arbitrage in selection (Yin, 2009, p. 91). Nevertheless, the single case should also be a typical case (Yin, 2009, pp. 47-50).[109] In other words, it should be a case where I can see the causal mechanisms working (Goertz, 2013, p. 6).[110]

Evidence for case studies can come from different sources and the choice of method is based on the researcher's intuition (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23607). Documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical artifacts are all possible (Yin, 2009, pp. 101-113). I use a combination of three of them. Firstly, documentation about the collaboration effort – which has the advantage that it is stable and can be reviewed without intrusion. It is exact and covers different time spans (Yin, 2009, p. 102). It most likely offers a rather formal view on the interagency collaboration as people involved in the collaborative effort are probably careful about what to put on paper. So agendas, agreements and presentations will reflect to a high degree what the 'official' part of the collaboration is. This is complemented in a second step by participant observation which gathers real-time contextual evidence and intends to reveal (interpersonal) behavior and motives (Yin, 2009, p. 102). It is able to offer a view on some of the informalities of collaboration and may be combined with small informal interviews ('chats') during observation. Finally, fully fledged semi-structured interviews are conducted to target the remaining questions and the (pronounced) opinion of the subject (Yin, 2009, p. 102). This extends almost to a form of cooperative enquiry. The intention of the use of

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[109] There are different types of cases. Yin (2009, pp. 47-50) lists: 1. critical case, 2. extreme or unique case, 3. representative or typical case, 4. revelatory case which was previously inaccessible, or 5. longitudinal case study. This also leads to different typologies of case studies. Jensen and Rodgers (2001, pp. 237-239) for example classify case studies in snapshop, longitudinal, pre-post, patchwork and comparative. Gerring (2007, pp. 89-144) provides techniques of case selection: 1.typical, 2. diverse, 3. extreme, 4. deviant, 5. influential, 6. crucial, 7. pathway, 8. most-similar, 9. most different.
[110] It is, therefore, incorrect to say that qualitative research selects on the dependent variable. It selects cases where one can see the causal mechanism in place (Goertz, 2013, p. 6).

these three evidence sources is triangulation of data sources.[111] One hopes triangulation leads to the evidence gathered ultimately converging to draw the same conclusions (Yin, 2009, p. 117 and Yin, 1993, p. 69).

There are three principles of data collection according to Yin (2009, pp. 114-124): 1. the use of multiple sources of evidence, 2. the creation of a case study database, and 3. the maintenance of a chain of evidence. With the selection of documentation, participant observation and interviews, my study complies with the first one, the use of multiple sources (Yin, 2009, pp. 114-118). A case study data base has naturally been created although it has to remain confidential and is only accessible to the reviewers of my thesis. The notes taken during observation as well as the interviews were gathered under the assurance of confidentiality to be able to discover informal collaboration processes. In that, I have followed the advice to separate the data/evidence and the report/narrative of the investigator (Yin, 2009, p. 119). I also maintain this structure in this document as I first present the evidence as it was found in the field and clearly separate my narrative from it. The intention is to increase reliability as well as to maintain the chain of evidence by displaying close links between the case study report, the evidence and the research questions (Yin, 2009, p. 123).

4.2.5 Case analysis, interpretation and presentation

Analyzing the case study data is the most important and most difficult part but also the one for which there is the least guidance (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 539-540). The reason is that all data requires interpretation (Gerring, 2007, p. 69).[112] In that sense, Yin (2009, pp. 160-161) names four principles of good research: firstly, good research has to demonstrate that all evidence has been included. Secondly, it should cover all important rival interpretations. Thirdly, it has to address the most significant aspects of the case study and, lastly, should show the use of expert knowledge.

To achieve these principles, there are different strategies (Yin, 2009, pp. 130-135):

1. Relying on theoretical propositions;
2. Developing a case description;
3. Using both qualitative and quantitative data; and

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[111] There are different possibilities to triangulate. Yin (2009) proposes four types: 1. data sources (data triangulation), 2. different evaluators (investigator triangulation), 3. perspectives to the data set (theory triangulation), 4. methods (methodological triangulation).

[112] I would agree to Gerring that all data requires interpretation in the sense that all data found need to be interpreted where it fits with regard to the research questions. However, I would not go so far as Gerring that consequently all research only focuses on the subjective meaning of the data. In my opinion this reflects another, very particular understanding of 'interpretation'.

4. Examining rival explanations.

In addition there are five analytic techniques available (Yin, 2009, pp. 136-160):

1. Pattern matching;[113]
2. Explanation building;[114]
3. Time-series analysis;[115]
4. Logic models;[116] and
5. Cross-case synthesis.[117]

"These strategies or techniques are not mutually exclusive." (Yin, 2009, p. 130). They should go hand in hand to produce results that demonstrate internal and external validity. But, of course, not all techniques have to be applied to each case study. I will rely heavily on my theoretical propositions in this regard, drawing on Bardach's theory to answer research question one – which can almost be read as testing a null hypothesis (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 13). This requires pattern matching. Later, to research the additions and relative importance of elements, the case description is required as well as the examination of rival explanations in order to build explanations. The intention is to show why one explanation is correct and another is probably not.

To analyze the data gathered, I use the following steps. I start with recording the data. Then I transcribe it while synthesizing it (in case of the interviews combined with translation). Afterwards, I group the evidence into patterns which I try to match with the elements of Bardach's operationalized theory. Lastly, I provide the case study report in a summarized manner – due to confidentiality only the last step is apt to be presented publicly. In the first step (recording data), I consequently end up with field notes, relevant documents and interview recordings which I bring to a common written form in English (second step, transcription). In the transcription, I search for patterns around Bardach's elements and compile a list like the hypothetical one below:

Table 4: Example for pattern matching data analysis in the case study

Operating system / Flexibility	Operating system / Motivation
Observation: Deadlines are flexibly adapted if delays occur	Observation: When meetings are held in attractive holiday destinations, much better products are delivered on time

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[113] See Yin (2009, pp. 136-141), notably to increase internal validity.
[114] See Yin (2009, pp. 141-144), an iterative process particularly important to explain causal links.
[115] See Yin (2009, pp. 144-149).
[116] See Yin (2009, pp. 149-156).
[117] See Yin (2009, pp. 156-160).

Document: E-mail from donor representative to country A agreeing not to submit a final report	Interview: Political focal point of country C states that his motivation to conduct the project is professional growth
Interview: Technical focal point of country B requests to adapt the project product to better fit country's needs which are the real motivation for the agency to be engaged in the project	Interview: Technical focal point of country B requests to adapt the project product to better fit country's needs which are the real motivation for the agency to be engaged in the project

Source: Author.

At the end of the matching exercise, I possess the evidence matched to Bardach's elements. Patterns I am unable to match to any of them are reported under a separate heading. Some of the data which is evidence for multiple elements may be recorded multiple times under different elements – as shown in the hypothetical example.[118]

The evidence (practices found in the field) matched to the respective element of Bardach's operationalized theory serve as the indicator for the presence of the element. The more of these practices can be matched to one element and the more importance the people involved in the collaboration attribute to it, the stronger an element (or other patterns) is confirmed for the theory. This determines its impact on the dependent variable and functions like a score for the relative strengths of an element. This is not a minor step as indicators are crucial for the theoretical concept to be correctly reflected. General requirements for these indicators are that they capture the data as closely as possible (Grunig, 2002, p. 6), help to leave standard ways of thinking (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 67) and are sharp (Goertz, 2005, p. 95). Another important and complex aspect is, however, that the indicators actually measure the theoretical concept they are desired to measure. This requires indicators close to the original concept (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 109-112) and is distinct (although related) from internal and external validity (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 529). Valid is a measurement when the scores given for each indicator reflect the ideas of the original concept (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 530). I have shown this in the following figure simplifying the graphic provided by Adcock and Collier.

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[118] Through this technique, I think, it is possible to avoid false conclusions which Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 540-541) sees only possible using cross-case analysis.

Figure 13: Levels of measurement

Source: Author based on Adcock and Collier (2001, p. 531).

One can see that this includes a feedback process upwards to revise and modify or add something to the concept (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 533). That occurs when the field data require the revision of the theory as new mechanisms have been discovered (induction). That means that two different levels of questions have to be answered in order to assess the validity of a measurement (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 533). One is to ask whether the scoring was done right to obtain an indicator, the other if the (systematized) concept reflects the background concept. It is important to note that indicators do not only refer to quantitative indicators but to all "classification procedures employed in qualitative research." (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 530)

The analysis is concluded once theoretical saturation is reached. Theoretical saturation "means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category." (Glaser & Strauss, 2008, p. 61).[119] That is the moment when the composition can start which has to adhere to the standards of good scientific writing,[120] My case study follows the linear-analytical, 'academic' style (Yin, 2009, p. 176) structured around the framework provided by my operationalization of Bardach's

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[119] Theoretically, saturation is the point to stop iteration and adding cases. In practice pragmatic issues also play a role (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545). Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 143) note: "Saturation is usually explained in terms of 'when no new data are emerging'. But saturation is more than a matter of no new data. It also denotes the development of categories in terms of their properties and dimensions, including variation, and if theory building, the delineating of relationships between concepts."

[120] Booth, Colomb and Williams (2008, pp. 108-118) for example provide guidance on making a good argument, notably on making a claim (reason, evidence, warrant, acknowledgement and response). They also provide writing and revision principles (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008, pp. 251-267). For guidance on the important elements of an introduction see Beer and Fischer (2009). Even Bardach (2012, pp. 73-78) himself provides useful advice on how to present research.

theory. The intention is to include all ingredients of an exemplary case study: 1. significance, 2. completeness, 3. consideration of alternative perspectives, 4. display of sufficient evidence, 5. composition in an engaging way (Yin, 2009, pp. 185-190). To achieve that, I differentiate narrative writing from explanations (Yin, 1981, pp. 59-62).

4.2.6 Case study validity

The result of a case study is an empirically valid theory as it has already been measured and tested. However, a careful evaluation is required to ensure that the case study is not too complex and only of short reach (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547). Numerous quality criteria to address this issue exist.[121] I will use the most common four elements for scientific research – handily summarized and linked to case study research by Yin (2009, pp. 40-41). I believe that these kind of epistemic quality criteria are important and not only rhetorical criteria as advocated for by Sandelowski and Barroso (2002). I do agree, however, that the actual research should be evaluated and not only the research report (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2002, p. 78). Yin (2009, p. 41) explains that construct validity has to show that the theory correctly measures what it states to measure. Internal validity establishes the (causal) relationship between the theory's elements and external validity describes to which degree the theory can be generalized. Lastly, reliability ensures that the procedures and operations used during research can be repeated with achieving the same results (of course only in the same case). For case studies, this can be ensured using the following tactics.

Table 5: Evaluation criteria of validity

Test	Tactic in case study
Construct validity	- Multiple sources of evidence - Chain of evidence - Review draft of case study report by key informants
Internal validity	- Pattern matching - Explanation building - Rival explanations discussed - Logic models used
External validity	- Theory in single case studies - Replication in multiple case studies
Reliability	- Case study protocol - Case study database

Source: Author based on Yin (2009, p. 41).

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[121] Hyett, Kenny and Dickson-Swift (2014, pp. 23610-23612) find in their study that there are big differences in methodological detail of published research employing case study design. They propose a checklist of specific case study research criteria (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014, p. 23609).

Each of these tactics is applicable in different phases of the research which I have followed and applied. Another interesting option is the review of the case studies by (some of the) subjects and informants to increase construct validity (Yin, 2009, p. 183) which I adhere to by sending the interviewees the case study for review. I also openly present assumptions and limitations to clearly communicate the generalizability of the case study in order to address the fact that case study research is weaker on external than internal validity (Gerring, 2007, p. 43). For the evaluation of the overall research, I find Eisenhardt's (1989, p. 548) criteria still pertinent: it should be "parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent", based on evidence and innovative.

4.2.7: Summary: case study with documents, observation and interviews

Case study research is a common methodology in public management research if systematic procedures for validity are followed. The advantage of case study research is that it can be applied to real-life phenomena that have unclear boundaries with the context. This applies to my research project as the boundaries are defined by the boundaries of the interagency collaboration studied. The unit of analysis is important but complex matter in case study research. For my research, the field data has to determine whether my research qualifies as a single case with embedded sub-units of analysis or multiple cases with each displaying holistic units of analysis. Different sources of data can be employed in case studies. I chose documentation analysis and observation combined with interviews. The observations also provide an opportunity for short, informal interviews during the observation phase. To analyze the data obtained, I rely on pattern matching techniques, matching the encountered practices to the elements of Bardach's operationalized theory, as well as explanation building. All practices that do not correspond to any of the elements are recorded separately to find potential additional patterns and mechanisms.

4.3 Documentation analysis and participant observation: the first step towards understanding interagency collaboration

At the first stage of the case study, my method of choice for data collection is document analysis as well as observation relevant to the interagency collaboration I research. Empirical research in management often uses this combination. For example, Mintzberg (1971) studied the management of chief executives using structured observation (Mintzberg, 1971, p. 98). He developed a technique to combine the flexibility of observation with the need to generate data that is at least loosely structured (Mintzberg, 1970, pp. 89-90). The innovation was that categories for structure were developed during observation (almost like ethnographies, Mintzberg, 1970, p. 90).[122] For public administration, Peabody, Webb Hammond, Torcom,

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[122] He found coding difficult, a common problem in observation research (Mintzberg, 1970, p. 101).

Brown, Thompson and Kolodny (1990, p. 452) believe that interviews combined with participant observation have high potential. Empirical research designs of this kind are common in public administration (e.g., Alter & Hage, 1993) and participant observation is employed (e.g. Döring & Schreiner, 2012). As shown in section 2.1, observation, interviews and other empirical research designs are likewise employed in development research (e.g. Arvidson, 2004, p. 230 or Gould, 2004b, p. 264).

The idea behind observation and document analysis is to see, report and understand what really happens in interagency collaboration (behavior rooted in organizational and social norms, values and the like). It is the objective or formal side of the collaboration that can be found in actions and documents. Also one can get insights into the context of this data. For documents, it might be stated in the document itself or one can enquire into the context when the facet was produced. For observation, one has to record the context of the actions and circumstances as "situations, in short, do not exist in vacuums." (Ferreira & Burges, 1976, p. 10) Documents are often encountered (and can be recorded) at the occasion of observations. This is the reason why I chose to treat documentation analysis and observations together in the following parts. Many documents have been gathered during observation or can directly be related to events that have been observed which also provide the context for their existence. All the discovered data is thus context-specific. Nevertheless, the interpretation of both has to aim for (conceptual or theoretical) generalization.

4.3.1 Observation techniques

There are different ways of observing. Researchers can only observe and remain outsiders (as in experiments for example) or immerse themselves into the group and actively participate – participant observation.[123] But it is seldom one of the extremes – it is usually a continuum (Genzuk, 2003, pp. 2-3). This depends on the research setting. It is important to keep one's distance as a researcher in order to not to be overly involved, "to be a participant in a 'culture' implies an immersion of the researcher's self into the everyday rhythms and routines" (Cook & Crang, 1995, p. 21).

There are advantages and disadvantages to everything. Participant observation is useful to collect evidence on behavior through different data sources and learn about people's priorities and their life (Kawulich, 2005). It is able to capture the what and the how as well as why things are happening (Ferreira & Burges, 1976, p. 8). This makes it a good choice to increase the validity of new hypotheses such as mine (Kawulich, 2005). On the downside, however, participant observation raises questions

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[123] There are different definitions of participant observation; some include interviews and other collection methods (Kawulich, 2005). A short history of participant observation is provided by Kawulich (2005).

about representation: Is the researcher correctly interpreting the situations observed or is he misinterpreting them in his or her own mind and value set (Kawulich, 2005)? Furthermore, the presence of the researcher may influence the observed results (Mintzberg, 1970, p. 103).

At least three types of participant observation can be distinguished: covert, semi-overt and overt participant observation (Gobo, 2008, pp. 107-109). My motivation to opt for overt participant observation is my interest in finding previously undiscovered data when the subjects give me access to new situations and places. This requires the building of trust (Kawulich, 2005). Kawulich (2005) describes the stages to do that as 1. introduction and learning, 2. acquaintance, and 3. intimacy. The possibility to have short chats to clarify what is observed and gain first insight into the importance the actors attribute to it is an added advantage.[124] Nevertheless, the trust built should not be abused. Therefore, I disclose my research activity to the subjects – "participant as observer" in Kawulich's (2005) typology.

For the concrete interagency collaboration that means that I have to be part of events of interaction between the agencies' representatives. The observational units (Gobo, 2008, p. 99) are practices of collaboration that can be observed in incidents (actions or documents) that occur in settings aiming for interagency collaboration (events, meetings, field visits, phone calls and collaboration-related documents). The settings are sampled in an opportunistic but theory-based way (Gobo, 2008, pp. 101-104). It is important to note in this respect that not only direct actions by individuals should be captured but also organizational factors that impact the relationship (e.g. organizational rules, etc.). This makes access crucial. Notes of the observations should always be taken as soon as possible (Dexter, 1970, p. 56). I usually record my observations during or immediately after writing them by hand and after some time I transcribe, summarize and digitalize them. This includes translation (e.g. because the meeting was in another language). These digitalized summaries then serve as the basis for analysis.

4.3.2 Challenges and remedies in observational research and documentation analysis

Several challenges derive from observation and the analysis of documents. First of all, it is important to remember who reads the documents and for which purpose they are read. The researcher is able to elect to study content, accomplishment or medium

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[124] These short interviews or 'chats' are different from conventional discursive interviews (Gobo, 2008, p. 191): 1. the interviewer and interviewee know each other already, 2. the interview is not scheduled but happens during observation, 3. the interview is focused on specific topics, and 4. the interviewer does not intend to obtain all information with one interview.

(Gobo, 2008, p. 130). In international development, this can be, e.g. the content of a document changing the project focus, a document leading to strong community resistance or a manager terminating a project simply by e-mail. In that sense, interesting documents can come in all sorts of forms: budgets, advertisements, logframes and others (Genzuk, 2003, p. 8).[125] In an international development project, this is even more important as they have their particular language (logical framework, program theory, etc., Gasper, 2004, p. 46).[126]

Furthermore, as behavior is supposed to be a sign of the subject's intentions in a given context in observations (Gobo, 2008, p. 81), researchers have to be aware of their own attributes (gender, age, etc., Kawulich, 2005). The researchers' own attributes may influence the field in a way that the results of the observation change. In international development this has to be considered even more carefully as a challenge known from cross-cultural research teams comes in: while more diversity (cultural backgrounds and contexts involved) may lead to richer insights, the challenge of correctly interpreting the observations and comparing them increases (Troman & Jeffrey, 2007, p. 512). Troman and Jeffrey (2007, pp. 520-522) therefore propose a method for cross-cultural research teams whereby individual data and case reports are subjected to a synthesis developed by a non-involved researcher. This then serves as basis for analysis. I hope to achieve a similar outcome with my technique to first take hand-written field notes which are later transcribed, translated and summarized as described.

Likewise, the international context of a development project brings back the question of the case's limitations and settings. Regarding the boundaries of what to observe and take into account, it is problematic that aid projects exist on various levels in different places (Gould, 2004a, pp. 2-3). An example is Arvidson's (2004) article, in which he realizes that he has to consider the context of larger international donor-financed programs to understand motivation and performance of local NGOs. What matters are not only the physical place but also the social agency and identity of the researcher (Gould, 2004a, pp. 10-11).[127] A focus on the "new architecture of aid" may for instance mean a focus on policy reform and adopting a neoliberal view of institutionalism (Mosse, 2005, pp. 3-4). But with this focus, two questions to answer

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[125] Mosse (2005, p. 2), for example, traces in his article paper trails, protocols and practices.

[126] Marsden (2004, pp. 97-98), for example, believes that attention should be paid to the form of the project document as the logframe imposed by donors on partners may influence the relationship. Gasper (2004, pp. 66-74) proposes techniques for analyzing texts in the aid environment.

[127] Gould (2004b, p. 263) for that reason proposes establishing "aidnography" as a special intellectual enterprise with the methodological problem of being multi-level and multi-sited. He finds it difficult to critically engage with a field that claims moral virtue but also reproduces the existing asymmetries.

are concerned with positionality and scale (Gould, 2004a, p. 11).[128] Positionality is a concept referring to the way of situating oneself in the field (Gould, 2004b, pp. 269-282). For Gould, it includes spatial positionality (the flows and hierarchy level of aid), social positionality (access and the border between practitioners, beneficiaries and researchers) and normative positionality (development discourse is often normative). As I conduct my research project embedded in an international development agency, I have to pay attention to my positionality. I need to examine if I am capturing reality well or if my spatial position in a unit of an international organization impedes my seeing the full picture. I also constantly have to monitor the interaction between myself and the individuals involved regarding my social positionality. Lastly, I should try to discern the normative discourse about development and focus on facts and conclusions deriving from the evidence and theory. Scale is linked to positionality but is not the same (Gould, 2004b, pp. 282-286) and comes back to intercultural implications. Language, rhetoric and rationale may be perceived differently at different levels and in different cultures. This matters for projects that are managed on different levels (headquarters, field office, community) by different agencies in different countries. I have circumvented this by focusing on the practices of collaboration in the framework of Bardach's operationalized theory. The framework and the notion of practices exactly aim towards capturing differences on different levels and integrate the different elements into one intellectual construct. In my view, this also protects my research from the fact that the practices observed could be rooted in differences between people, between organizations or between cultures as the practices inside the Bardach framework try to capture all of these as elements.

In order to conduct good observation, much can be learned about observational practices from ethnographers,[129] although not every observational research is ethnography.[130] As for ethnography the pivotal cognitive mode is observation, a lot of thinking has been dedicated to this collection method. In fact, ethnography is based on the idea that statements may differ from actions. Consequently, actions have to be observed to draw conclusions about values and beliefs in a given context, especially when the subject is not yet well known. The main differences between a pure ethnography and case study research are that case study research defines its study questions ahead of time, is based on rival hypotheses and carries out fieldwork in a targeted manner (Yin, 1993, p. 46). Like an ethnographer, I have to be

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[128] Locality in that sense is still important but it requires that theoretical delimitation is based on research context as opposed to mere physical location (Gould, 2004b, p. 266).

[129] For a short history of ethnography see Gobo (2008, pp. 34-47) or Denzin (1997, pp. xi, 14-19). On the even more particular study of ethnology see Beer and Fischer (2009).

[130] I see ethnography in this sense as a method. Gobo disagrees with that view as for him ethnography is "a global style of thinking" (Gobo, 2008, p. 18). For him it is a methodology. Interestingly however, he does not offer a definition.

"simultaneously, or intermittently, 'inside' and 'outside' the cultural code" in my research project (Gobo, 2008, p. 7). In order to achieve that, good access is crucial. For me, it is crucial to identify a good gatekeeper that allows me to observe the interagency collaboration (Gobo, 2008, pp. 120-122 and Cook & Crang, 1995, p. 14). As stated above, this requires careful considerations of my positionality.

The main quality criterion for participant observation is plausibility (Ferreira & Burges, 1976, p. 8). It has to be internally consistent which is closely related to its credibility (Troman & Jeffrey, 2007, p. 523). Therefore, a detailed description of the findings in the field combined with a sound link to theory is crucial.

4.4 Participatory research, cooperative enquiry and action learning

A note should be included here on participatory research techniques. Although they represent their own method, they are closely related to the established research techniques. Notably, I would say, participant observation almost cannot avoid to be participatory to a certain extent – at least not if sound ethical standards are followed and the researcher's presence and interest is openly communicated. Ferreira and Burges (1976, pp. 7-8) voice a similar thought as they almost equate action research and participant observation in describing it as the principal citizen fact-finding tool.

Participatory research is not fundamentally different from other empirical research methods, particularly qualitative research methods (Berghold & Thomas, 2012, p. 192). The principle idea is that the research subjects of other research methods (e.g. the observed in observations or the interviewees in interviews) can be elevated to be co-researchers. Together with the researcher, they explore the research questions but also gain power over how to explore and answer the research question and even add new ones. Consequently, the researcher loses some of his grip of steering his own research. This, of course, depends on the type of participatory research as many streams blossom and all emphasize some aspects more, some less and follow their own principles (Berghold & Thomas, 2012, pp. 193-194).

Heron, for example, has developed co-operative inquiry as a research method. He states that co-operative inquiry overlaps with other forms of participatory research (Heron, 1996, pp. 7-9).[131] Reason and Bradbury (2001) are prominent for action research, a "participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory

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[131] He thus implies that it is one stream or sub-group of participatory research. I would rather say it the other way around as I find co-operative inquiry is a good notion for all the others. Because I also fail to see how co-operative inquiry as described by him (Heron, 1996, pp. 36-61) is so different.

worldview (…)."[132] It is particularly popular in management. Action research thus unites both action and reflection by the research subjects as well as theory and practice based on a participatory approach – as in co-operative inquiry. It targets, however, action by the co-researchers based on their learning and subsequently a new learning or reflection experience followed by new action. Learning in that sense is a product of programmed knowledge and the questioning insight (Revans, 2011).[133] These cycles of action and research (observation, provisional hypothesis, trail, audit and review) are called the scientific method (Revans, 2011, pp. 11, 13-14). Different approaches exist inside action research but five shared features can be identified (Reason & Bradbury, 2001):[134]

1. The research should be useful in everyday life;
2. The inquiry creates new forms of understanding,
3. It is participative research (with, for and by persons or communities, involving all stakeholders, informing research and action);
4. The cycle develops living knowledge; and
5. Is emancipatory and cannot be defined in hard methods.

Differences between action research and participatory research are that the first aims for action, whereas the second aims to improve the inquiry from the researcher (Bell, et al., 2004). But they are all participatory and open-ended (Bell, et al., 2004). The idea of action research is, ultimately, the base for Eyben's (2009, p. 72) proposal of researching development through reflective practice to stimulate organizational learning. It is meant for anthropologists that do not only want to interpret but also change. The proposed approach is based on two elements: on one side the concept of reflectivity (well-established in anthropological research, Eyben, 2009, p. 80), on the other side organizational learning through the shared construction of meaning (Eyben, 2009, pp. 82-84) – double-loop instead of single-loop learning.

The reason why the techniques of participatory research are important to me is that I necessarily engage with the subjects during observation. As I am immersed in the project and have informal interviews (chats) with them, the subjects start to reflect as well and provide feedback on the research. As a result, I may be influenced by their views perhaps leading to adapting my research. This is then quite close to participatory research – besides not adhering to the same strict principles. To directly take advantage of this, I ask for the opinion of the subjects openly while being a participant

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[132] In Reason and Bradbury (2001) one can also find a short history of action research.

[133] For more on the definitions of learning see Bodenmann, Perrez and Schär (2011, pp. 14-16). Also the conditions of learning can be found here (Bodenmann, Perrez, & Schär, 2011, p. 24).

[134] Action researchers therefore agree that objective knowledge is not possible. It is necessarily "situated and reflexive" (Reason & Bradbury, 2001).

observer. This is even more extensive during the interview stage. This allows me to re-confirm the elements of the theory that I have identified jointly with the participants. The important matter is to get the right balance between what is observed (what happens, how and in which context) and their opinions in the (informal and formal) interviews (why something happens, how relevant it is, and their opinion about it). After the interviews, the draft findings of the whole study are sent to the participants for feedback and comments. In that sense that is a way of cross-checking or triangulating the research's findings. It is obvious that this is not fully-fledged participatory research, as I do not give much power to the subjects/co-researchers.[135] This violates a fundamental principle of participatory research (Berghold & Thomas, 2012, pp. 195-200).[136] But I let the subjects guide me to a certain extent and one can learn how to craft the researcher-subjects/co-researchers relationship in a more participatory way.

Another advantage of this approach is that getting the subjects on board as co-researchers permits circumventing ethical questions (Eyben, 2014). As the co-researchers receive full information about the research (in the form of written notes as well as from the researcher on site), they can decide whether they want to become co-researchers. However, a disadvantage is that smart co-researchers may influence the researcher in their own interest regarding where and what to research. This type of bias can be avoided to a certain extent by a sound triangulation.

4.5 Interviews to complete the picture

Interviews are common in management and public administration research. The research community has been applying them to many subjects, such as career development (Cohen & Mallon, 2001). In management research, interviews may be a particular good fit as research suggests that managers prefer verbal communication (Hummel, 1991, p. 32). The interview provides them with a possibility to share reasons and perceptions with the interviewer (Hummel, 1991, pp. 32-33). The methodologies employed in management research were initially drawn from other existing disciplines such as sociology (Ryan & Neumann, 2013, p. 194). The researcher's choice should be guided by his or her research purpose (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 673). Ryan and Neumann (2013, p. 197) chose semi-structured

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[135] But this also protects my research from criticisms against participatory research, such as that there are no hypotheses formulated, that it is not possible to distinguish between researcher's and co-researchers' contributions, that planning is not possible and that by classical criteria participatory research is neither objective nor reliable nor valid (Berghold & Thomas, 2012, pp. 210-211).

[136] I also do not have the common problem of participatory research that the co-researchers might be so marginalized that they lack the fundamental competencies to make decisions (Berghold & Thomas, 2012, pp. 201-205) as I am working with competent professionals – as in action research for example.

interviews for their research on graduate education, Chinyamurindi (2012, p. 152) used unstructured interviews to study career change. It is also a potentially strong method for public administration research – e.g. Küsters (2009, p. 177) for power structures. Mosse (2005, pp. 17, 24) uses it to research relationships of the small aid networks. Hummel (1991) sees particular potential for research on public administration with narrative interviews.[137]

4.5.1 Use of interviews as a research method

"Interviewing is often important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do." (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 673) This probably captures best the main use of the interview as a research method. It is, obviously, also possible to use interviews for factual knowledge but it is often employed to explore the meaning and sense-making – which is challenging to capture otherwise (Mikėnė, Gaižauskaitė, & Valavičienė, 2013, p. 50). For that same reason, interviews are often part of multi-method-studies as they are able to add 'micro-foundations' (Lynch, 2013, p. 37). There are, of course, limitations as the assumption is that the subject interviewed is telling the truth (Alvesson, 2003, p. 14). The interviewees, however, may have to talk about information that is sensitive or emotional for them. That is why interviewing needs to be conducted carefully and interviewers have to be aware that some questions may intimidate the interviewee (Yin, 2009, p. 106).

One interesting type of interview is story-telling. Stories can be considered as the way human beings make sense of their environment and reflect complex, multiple realities (Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 430). The sense-making is not limited only to the content of what has been said but encompasses who is involved, rhetoric and other aspects (Barry & Elmes, 1997, pp. 430-431). Story-telling is thus a possibility for a narrative interview. The narrative interview is an interview in which the respondent is not limited to short answers but able to tell the interviewer what he believes to be the most important aspects of a subject. In other words, the narrative view explores "how language is used to construct meaning" (Barry & Elmes, 1997, p. 432).[138] In the management and administration context, this means that the narrative interview is able to take into account that managers are always part of an existing context (Hummel, 1991, p. 34 and Chinyamurindi, 2012, p. 151). The purpose of narrative inquiry is to include the inside view of practitioners (Hancock & Epston, 2008, p. 485) and to

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[137] Küsters (2009, p. 187) argues that the narrative interview is particularly strong in the German research culture.

[138] For that reason, Küsters (2009, p. 30) cautions that it is virtually impossible to conduct narrative interviews on daily routine actions as it requires conscious actions for inquiry. I do not agree with that – they have been applied in management studies to study management routines.

discover subjectivity, inter-relationships of actions and social construction (Chinyamurindi, 2012, p. 152). It tries to do so by relying on a collaborative, transparent and reflexive practice (Hancock & Epston, 2008, p. 486) and may lead to unexpected new perspectives which can subsequently be explored (Cohen & Mallon, 2001, p. 54). The interviewer may, however, be confronted with the problem that the interviewee does not react to the stimulus from the interviewer and the supposed narrative turns into a question and answer interview (Küsters, 2009, pp. 66-67).

I chose interviews as one source of data for my case study, because I want to make use of the method's possibility to make the tacit knowledge of practitioners crafting interagency collaboration explicit (Hancock & Epston, 2008, p. 496). I also chose a narrative style of interviewing without a questionnaire but rather based around topics or issues that I want to cover during the interview. This 'issue guide' can be found in annex III. The guide is not disclosed to the interviewees before or during the interview in order not to influence their responses (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). After the interview, I explain my theory, circumstances permitting, and comments from the interviewees are recorded (also during observation and sending the draft of this study to the interviewees for comments). This is my attempt to include the subjects not only as subjects but also as co-researchers. It is clear that with such a large and detailed 'issue guide' as aide-memoire for the interviewer my interview style would probably not count as a narrative interview in the strict definition of sociological research. But the idea and concept are the same. At the start of the interviews, the interviewees are invited to talk about anything they would like with respect to collaboration in the selected case. Later, if some issues are not covered, I follow up (e.g. "Would you see resources as important for collaboration?"). This type of category-guided narrative interview has been employed by Küsters (2009, p. 180).

It is important to note that the interview is conducted in a certain context. Therefore, interview style and questions also depend on the context (Dexter, 1970, pp. 24-28). This is relevant for my study as I interview professionals in an on-going interagency collaboration. It is possible that in the given context, they are not able to present their stories in the same way as they would if the circumstances had been different, e.g. the collaboration had already finished, if they had been interviewed by another person, etc.[139] Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that sense-making is retrospective in this approach – and recollection may not always reflect what actually happened (Cohen & Mallon, 2001, pp. 59-61). These stories are true as experience – which may be different from facts (Cohen & Mallon, 2001, p. 61). This is a point that may be even more important in the inter-cultural context of my inquiry as even the approach of

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[139] Adopting the view that the interview is context-dependent may imply that different interviewers come to different results (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 247).

narrative interviews may be more familiar in some cultural contexts than in others. As a consequence, the results from an interview may be misinterpreted in a certain way only because the story was told by an interviewee who is not used to passing on knowledge verbally.

The view that interviews have to be interpreted in the context that they were given (as well as the events and emotions that are described) is intellectually rooted in a view that Qu and Dumay define as a 'localist' view. Based on Alvesson (2003), they differentiate the views of (neo)positivism and romanticism. Positivists, on the one hand, can be exemplified as the data miners, whereas romanticists, on the other hand, are travelers that make a journey with the interviewee through the interview (Qu & Dumay, 2011, pp. 240-241). But between the two extremes, they see a third view as possible: the 'localist' that tries to mine data but is aware that interviews happen in a social context (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 242).[140] That means that attention has to be paid to the interview process. In my case study, I have to particularly keep in mind that I approach the interviewees through an international development organization. That means that some interviewees may see the researcher as part of the organization which in turn might incentivize strategic answers. Also having had before a time of participant observation and, thus, certain knowledge of the interviewees about the research interest of the researcher may cause flawed responses (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 253). To counterbalance this possibility, I have to reflect on the influence of the context on me as the researcher, be aware of the influence of the context on the interviewees and react flexibly during the interview to be able to adapt the questioning process to the context (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 256).[141] This is similar to Gould's concept of positionality (see section 4.3.2, Gould, 2004a and 2004b). Hampshire, Iqbal, Blell and Simpson (2014, pp. 218-219) phrase it in the way that it is important to understand the identity of the researcher.

4.5.2 How to conduct an interview

The process of interviewing starts with the selection of a good sample. This, as any other part of the research design, has to be according to the research goal. Options include random sampling and non-random sampling and within the latter requiring an argued choice for a purposive sample, a convenience sample, a snowball sample[142] and an interstitial sample[143] (Lynch, 2013, pp. 39-42). As I conduct a single case study on interagency collaboration, the number of individuals involved should be fairly limited

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[140] An overview of all three views is found in Qu and Dumay (2011, p. 241) or Alvesson (2003, p. 15).

[141] Alvesson (2003, pp. 18-24) has developed eight "metaphors" that intend to help the researcher overcome these challenges. Reflexivity is the essence (Alvesson, 2003, pp. 24-25).

[142] Following recommendations from previous interviewees.

[143] Random people that start talking to the researcher.

and I thus aim to contact all the people directly involved in the interagency collaboration. As a result, not much sampling is required. I do, however, employ the snowball technique by adding interviewees if and when that is suggested to me during previous interviews. I see that as a technique borrowed from the co-operative inquiry research method. Having already conducted participant observation through an introduction of the international organization, it is not a challenge to request an interview on that occasion. That is as an introduction from a trusted source (Dexter, 1970, p. 30) and is promising for the interviewees as the research findings may actually be useful to them for interagency collaboration (Dexter, 1970, pp. 36-39). It minimizes the chances of getting denied an interview.[144] Getting denied an interview also depends on the availability of the person asked for an interview. The higher up the hierarchy, the more likely it is that people get too busy for an interview. Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p. 673) found that this correlates with the political level as top-level bureaucrats are not interviewed often, but high-level politicians are. Studying interagency collaboration, this may be experienced as interviews are conducted on the political and non-political levels. One ingredient to increase the number of interviews granted is to adapt flexibly to the schedule of the interviewees (Mikėnė, Gaižauskaitė, & Valavičienė, 2013, p. 53).

To start off an interview well, a comfortable, quiet and private setting is recommended but not always possible (Mikėnė, Gaižauskaitė, & Valavičienė, 2013, p. 55). In my interviews, my first choice is to interview in the interviewee's office with at least one hour time for it. In international development projects that may be difficult to achieve as the interview partners will be dispersed across the globe. Therefore, my second-best choice is to let the interview coincide with a meeting which both the interviewer and the respondent are attending. This may come with the need to make compromises in the setting (although I will still try to request at least enough time for the interview to avoid having to rush through the interview). The third-best option is to conduct the interview by phone in case a personal interview is not possible. That has the major drawback of being unable to observe the bodily reactions and emotions of the interviewees. That has to be taken into account regarding the very different context of the interview in comparison to a personal interview from a 'localist' point of view. However, it is better than not having the interview at all.

A short introduction and small talk help to warm up for the interview and the interviewer has to think well about which questions to ask and when and how to ask them (Qu & Dumay, 2011, pp. 249-252). Different guidance is available on how to conduct interviews, e.g. Peabody, Webb Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson and

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[144] Mikėnė, Gaižauskaitė and Valavičienė (2013) identified four types of interview refusal: 1. objective reasons, 2. unwillingness, 3. disappearance, and 4. influence of third parties.

Kolodny (1990, pp. 452-454) who provide advice on how to interview political elites.[145] A good question is one that is irresistible for the interviewee to answer (Hancock & Epston, 2008, p. 489). Starting with a rather open, general question on the subject is recommended (Grunig, 2002, pp. 3-4). Employing a recorder during the interview has to be evaluated carefully. There are advantages as one can go back to the recordings and may be able to capture more details, but it also may be seen as intrusion by the interviewee. Yin (2009, p. 109) recommends not using a recorder only if: 1. the interviewee does not consent or is uncomfortable, 2. there is no intention to transcribe or systematically listen to the interviews, 3. the interviewer is not technically skilled and it creates distraction, 4. the investigator substitutes listening by recording. I opted for using a recorder mainly due to having to interview in a foreign language. As I did not want to miss any part of the interview because the interviewee was speaking too fast or I did not know a particular word, I recorded the interviews if the respondents agreed to it. However, I did not transcribe the interviews word by word. For my purposes, it was sufficient to listen systematically to them afterwards and transcribe a summary clustered around the relevant elements of Bardach's operationalized theory (level of transcription, Küsters, 2009, p. 74). Conducting the interviews and analysis goes side by side with refining the theory but it is also useful to refine the questions (Küsters, 2009, p. 53). Dexter (1970, p. 43) even calls the first interviews "exploratory interview" or "preliminary interview" to indicate that the research process is a continuous learning opportunity. In one interview the researcher may learn of new issues that make a change in subsequent interviews necessary.[146] I refine my interviewing throughout the process as well, but do not formally differentiate "preliminary interviews" – it is continuous learning and revision/adaptation. I do, however, purposefully start with lower hierarchy levels first to train my interviewing skills before reaching higher political levels, where it is more difficult to ask for a second interview in case something has to be followed up on.[147]

Different interview types are available: structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews (an overview can be found in Qu & Dumay, 2011, pp. 244-247).[148] For my purposes, I selected semi-structured interviews to be able to explore the different elements of Bardach's theory, identify new elements and assess relative importance.[149]

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[145] For guidance on emotional reactions of the researcher in interviews see Cain (2012).

[146] Dexter (1970, pp. 49-50) therefore recommends to be as imprecise as possible in advance about the interview and not to share questions in advance.

[147] It is recommended to have hypotheses to explore before analyzing the interview – although one has to be open to new ideas while conducting the interview (Peabody, Webb Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson, & Kolodny, 1990, p. 454).

[148] There are different definitions of unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews. Donalek (2005, p. 124), for instance, states that unstructured interviews have only one single opening question.

[149] According to Qu and Dumay (2011, p. 243) semi-structured interviews also related best to a 'localist' point of view.

This is the advantage of semi-structured interviews as they "allow for the exploration of lived experience as narrated in the interview in relation to theoretical variables of interest." (Galletta, 2013, p. 9) It is sufficiently focused to address topics but leaves enough space to provide new directions to study (Galletta, 2013, p. 24). For example, Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p. 674) used a similar approach and employed semi-structured interviews to have open-ended questions while at the same time probing a framework theoretically developed before. They likewise recognize that it may not be the perfect solution but better than the alternative of a rigid structure inhibiting the conversation flow. They argue that this is mostly dependent on the degree of prior research (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). In this view, the semi-structured interview is more suitable for exploratory topics in order to achieve higher validity and receptivity. But it comes at the cost of time, money and (analytic) rigor.

4.6 Research ethics

In a final section on research design, I provide some details about research ethics as it is important for good research. Ethical dilemmas occur at all stages of research (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 1). In a broader sense, research ethics include questions about honest representation of results, fairness in the process of academic knowledge production and general behavior of the researcher. The Academy of Management's (2006) ethical guidance encompasses all aspects of the academic profession (teaching, knowledge production, publication, etc.). The core principles are 1. responsibility, 2. integrity, and 3. respect for people's rights and dignity (Academy of Management, 2006, p. 2). As one can conclude from a history of research ethics in social sciences, ethical standards change over time (Jarldorn, 2014, pp. 52-54). What is considered to be the right way to do things is thus context-dependent as well. The same is true for the field of research: what is considered to be ethical depends on the academic discipline. Taljaard et al. (2014), for example, survey the chairs of ethics committees on the need for ethical standards for cluster-randomized trials in medical research. In management research, Frechtling and Boo (2012) look at the application of a particular and pertinent ethics code. They conclude that only some of the principles and rules laid out by the standard are complied with by the articles (Frechtling & Boo, 2012, p. 156). Greenwood (2015) studied ethics as a publication criterion in management in more in depth. His principal recommendation is to make ethics committees' consent explicit (Greenwood, 2015, p. 4). Jordan and Gray (2014) review the reporting of the ethics committees' approval in selected public administration journals between 2000 and 2012. The conclusion is similar to the one in management research with different respect for ethical protocols (Jordan & Gray, 2014, pp. 85-88).

As this is not a paper on research ethics, I do not comment on my commitment to broader ethical standards as a researcher. I rather limit myself to the more narrow description of the protocols I followed to ensure ethical compliance in this research project. It should be noted that currently no ethics committee approval is required in my academic institution for the production of a thesis. Notwithstanding this, I have followed the requirements of good research regarding honest and fair research and writing processes. I have tried to present data as objective as possible. Researchers cannot be entirely objective (selection of topic may already reflect a bias) but the researcher should strive for impartiality and fair representation and be open about his or her limitations (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 10). That is what I have tried to do at each stage. Most importantly, I have stated clearly that I gain access to the field through an international organization. That may influence the results as I could be seen as partial but, at the same time, it is the only way to be able to research my research questions with participant observation. Furthermore, I always make explicit that I am not involved in the particular project as a staff member of the international organization but to learn about it as a researcher. I hope that this helps to rule out possible power differences that may be perceived (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 253).[150] Objectiveness, in this case, can be challenging as one has to establish rapport with the research subjects which may involve the researcher on a personal level (Jarldorn, 2014, pp. 57-58). I nevertheless believe that I have overcome the challenge.

At the stage of the (formal) interviews, protection of interviewees is relatively easy to achieve. I explain and guarantee that the subjects are not quoted explicitly in any part of the published document and that all documentation from the interview will remain confidential (except for the two reviewers of my thesis). Interviews are recorded whenever the interviewees agree to it – likewise with confidentiality agreements. If the subject refuses to be recorded, no recording takes place. I offer the possibility to appear with name, function and organization in a list of interviews (see annex II). Given that all my research subjects are trained professionals in international development, I believe that this meets the requirement of informed consent, the protection from harm and the protection of confidentiality (Yin, 2009, p. 73).

Ethically more challenging is the participant observation. As a first step, I have, therefore, chosen to conduct open observation instead of covered observation. As for the interviews, the account is and has to be written in a way that individuals cannot be identified (Kawulich, 2005). Borrowing from ethnography is helpful as it has developed ethics standards for observation (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 1). Consequently, I chose to follow the ethical standards of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the United Kingdom (ASA), as they help to

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[150] It is a known problem, e.g., in research involving professor and student.

protect research subjects (Hampshire, Iqbal, Blell, & Simpson, 2014, p. 227).[151] One of the key principles is that field notes and all forms of personal data are private as the most important way to preserve confidentiality and anonymity. That is similar to the agreement I have with the interviewees and I just extend it to observation. Furthermore, the ASA states that "participants should be made aware of the presence and purpose of the researcher whenever reasonably practicable." (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 2) Therefore, I state clearly my research interest on interagency collaboration on each occasion I intend to make observations. This may include situations that do not allow for written consent but only informed consent (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 2). This is the case in my participant observation as formally mentioning my research before every encounter may interrupt the normal flow of interaction between the subjects. Moreover, the formal and doctrinal mentioning of the researcher's presence may at some stage or at some occasions be seen as a menace. In these cases informal (but informed) verbal consent can be accepted. Whenever interacting with the subjects during observation, I remind them of my research interest and have developed a short one-pager as well, detailing my research project and my interest (see annex IV). The one-pager I give to research subjects every time an opportunity presents itself naturally. I also discuss some of the recent observations obtained during the informal chats before or after the observations. This not only has the advantage that I am complying with my ethical obligations but it also involves the subjects directly in the research and a process of co-operative inquiry starts (see section 4.4). It allows me to continuously monitor my ethics and make corrections if required (Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK, 2011, p. 2).

4.7 Conclusion: case study research with documentation, participant observation and interviews to explore interagency collaboration

This chapter has elaborated on the methodology and the methods I use to explore my research questions. The methodology I chose is case study research as I want to research a real-life phenomenon that entails more variables than data points. The idea is to test Bardach but at the same time to listen to the data from the field to understand causal mechanisms at play. This may be most important for the developmental dynamics part of Bardach's theory. Furthermore, the field data should clarify the relative importance of each element as well as the need to add or delete some elements and adapt the theory to the context of international development. The combination of contextual factors with testing an existing theory makes it a localist approach. The context sensitivity also requires that I carefully monitor my own positionality as I am going to be part of the project as a researcher.

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[151] And I do not see the dilemma that Hampshire, Iqbal, Blell and Simpson (2014, p. 228) mention regarding the protection of the researcher himself in the process.

Empirically identified practices will serve as the indicators for the elements and their quantity and quality can provide an indication for importance. The unit of analysis is the ICC but if the whole interagency collaboration only develops one ICC or if different ICCs develop between the parties involved (contrary to Bardach's assumption) has to be studied further in the field. This has methodological consequences. If only one ICC develops, my research is a single case study with embedded sub-units of analysis. If several ICCs can be identified, my research is a multiple case study with holistic units of analysis.

As data collection methods, I employ documentation, participant observation and interviews. These serve to triangulate the findings and identify patterns for later analysis and interpretation. Analyzing documents combined with participant observation provides me with insight into what actually happens: actions and the formal part of collaboration. For that reason the findings of the two are presented together. The reasons to opt for overt participant observation (instead of covered) were, on the one hand, that I am anyhow disclosing my interest for ethical reasons and, on the other hand, that it provides an opportunity to engage with the subjects (e.g. through informal chats). The (formal) interviews are used at a second stage to understand the (perceived) ideas and thoughts of the subjects in the collaboration. It provides the story line of collaboration. This is also possible in informal chats but the formal interview set-up has the advantage of doing a more thorough follow-up and is suitable to get them engaged in research. This is similar to the techniques employed in participatory research. I also feed the findings back to the subjects (during informal chats, the interviews and after data collection by sending out the draft to the subjects for comments). Furthermore, I let my research be guided by the subjects to some extent (e.g. the recommendation to interview another person). The interviews are semi-structured around the elements identified in the theory.

Furthermore, I follow common research ethics. Notably, I strive for fairness and objectivity as much as possible throughout the whole research process. Regarding the data gathered, full confidentiality is agreed with all involved in the project. For the participant observation stage of the research, I follow the ASA standards.

5. Presentation of the case study: energy efficiency indicators in Latin America

The following section introduces the case study I selected for in-depth research. It first introduces the case as such (organization, collaborators involved and other details). Afterwards, I provide some thoughts on the application of Bardach's operationalized theory to my case study. This includes notably an explanation of how the dependent variable can be applied in the case. Lastly, I discuss how I use the methodology and methods developed in chapter 4 in this particular case. A conclusion ends the presentation of the case study.

5.1 Case study: United Nations energy efficiency indicators database for Latin America[152]

The case study I research is an interagency collaboration project intending to construct a database of energy efficiency indicators for Latin America and the Caribbean. This is the first project of its kind in the region and modelled on a similar project in the European Union called ODYSSEE. The project aims to include all countries in Central and South America as well as the Caribbean. Currently, it incorporates 19 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). The ultimate goal of the project is to have the database ready for all countries of the region (enabling comparison) and includes the publication of a country report at the end of the data gathering process. Furthermore, it aims to create a group of regional professionals trained in energy efficiency indicators which comes almost as a by-product of the capacity building process that leads to the database. This is achieved through a collaborative effort of capacity and group building encompassing various regional meetings. These meetings are first and foremost on technical level with the technical staff involved. The technical meetings take place two to three times a year on average. In addition, there is an annual regional policy dialogue which represents the political instance of the project. Although participation in the indicators project is not required in order to participate in the policy dialogue, the dialogue always has a session on the project designed as a high-level meeting.

The project is implemented by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and led by its Natural Resource and Energy Unit

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[152] Please note that the information provided about the case is based on documents and verbal information about the project. Although this included public information, some information was provided under the aforementioned confidentiality agreement. Therefore, I chose not to make reference to any specific document or person in order to avoid the possibility of someone deriving the source.

in the organization's headquarters in Santiago (Chile). The progress of the Central American countries is managed and monitored through the respective unit of the sub-regional office of ECLAC in Mexico City (Mexico). Reference to ECLAC as the International Organization will be made as 'IO' in the case study. The project is supported by funds and technical advice from two European donors, the German Development Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) and the French Environment and Energy Agency (Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Énergie, ADEME). Both of them are referred to as 'donors' throughout the case study. One of the donors' contributions is one professional staff member from a consulting company specialized in energy efficiency indicators (Enerdata) who has been involved in the project from the beginning. This professional staff member of the consulting company is hereafter called 'international consultant'. Counterparts in the countries are the respective entities in charge of energy efficiency (referred to as 'government agencies' or 'country agencies'). The formal institution and its name vary widely from country to country. In some cases it is a directorate or secretariat that is loosely linked to a ministry or the prime minister, in other countries it is a division inside a ministry or vice-ministry or it is a specialized public enterprise. Lastly, the Latin American Energy Association (OLADE, an international organization as well) is involved as an observer or associate. It has no specified functions but has been involved in the project since the beginning. I refer to it as 'observer organization'.

The project formally started at the end of 2011 (although I found during my research that preparations for it go back much further). At the beginning, it only consisted of six countries (all of them members or associates of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the common market of South America) and then gradually incorporated more countries. Largely, this has happened in two waves, with a second wave of countries joining the project around the beginning of 2013 and a third wave during the second half of 2014. The different points in time of agencies joining the project per se do not matter in my research as I first and foremost try to determine the presence of the elements of Bardach's theory and their impact on the dependent variable, the ICC. Nevertheless, the fact that not all participants joined the project at the same time is important to recall for two reasons. Firstly, the question is which countries to include in my study and which ones not. Secondly, the perception and knowledge of the agency representatives about the collaboration practices may change over time. Therefore, I need to keep it in mind when analyzing the interviews, although I do not examine the development of particular independent variables over time. Consequently, I have decided to include all countries up to and including the second wave and to exclude the countries that joined in the third wave. The reason for this choice is that the latest starters would not offer enough data to conduct a

conclusive investigation. For the remaining 14 countries, it is important to keep in mind the different points in time of joining when analyzing the ICC.

Another important choice was that I limit my observation and interviewing efforts to the agency's operational units that are immediately involved in the management of the project. These are the units in charge of managing the project at ECLAC, the unit in charge of supporting the project at the donor agencies and the consultancy and the respective units in the government bodies. In turn, my choice means that I have not included higher or lower hierarchy levels for those agencies, which may be a shortcoming. As the donor agencies, for instance, may get instructions about what to do in and with a given project, the decisions may ultimately come from the ministry that finances the donor agency. Or, in the case of the UN, some orders may come from the organization's headquarters in New York and should be considered in the management of the project. However, I believe that the impact of my choice is rather limited. The management of projects is usually rather local and the people involved in a project would notice in interviews or informal chats if there were organizational policy impeding certain actions. Moreover, this information would be found in the project documents. The local character of project management was confirmed during the interviews when higher-level officials were unable to provide detailed information and referred to their lower-level technical staff in charge of the project. Likewise, reference was made to organizational guidelines. From that I conclude that management is rather local and if interference from other levels is involved, hints can be found. As such, the interviews serve as a means to check the higher hierarchies' influence on the management of the project as well. Furthermore, it is simply impossible with a worldwide project to observe every encounter and communication and to formally interview everyone who was indirectly involved.

Access was granted to me by ECLAC's responsible official for the project. That means that I was part of ECLAC and as such introduced to the other parties in the project, although I emphasized that I am only studying it. In this way, I believe not to have overly skewed the findings. It has to be emphasized that I make no judgment on the quality or success of the project whatsoever. The only focus is the dependent variable which has been introduced earlier as part of Bardach's theory and is going to be adapted to the case study below. A practical advantage of choosing this indicator project as the case study is the language. All people involved in the project speak English, French, German or Spanish which are all working languages of mine. Consequently, observation and communication is much more direct than if it had to go through a translator. The only difficulty would be remarks or documents from the collaboration with Brazil if provided in Portuguese. Since the project language is Spanish, however, this should be the exception rather than the rule.

In conclusion, the project offers all means to analyze interagency collaboration between IOs and other agencies in international development. It is implemented by an international organization in development cooperation with another international organization affiliated. It includes two bilateral international donors as well as a subcontracted consulting firm and 14 government agencies. In order to advance with the project towards the goal of a database that allows for inter-country comparison, all of these partners have to collaborate. However, it is important to note that some steps require less collaboration between some participants than others. As that is the case in any collaborative project, I do not expect major problems with that fact but I have to monitor it closely during my study. Moreover, numerous events and encounters for observation can be envisioned in different countries. That also reduces observation bias due to a particular context of one or few meetings in one place. Consequently, I expect to be able to research every aspect of the management of collaboration in international development. For those reasons, I selected this project for my single case study to test Bardach's theory in international development. I believe it is the typical case required for the study (see section 4.2.4). An added advantage, of course, is that access was secured – a necessary condition for my research project.

5.2 Application of Bardach's operationalized theory to the case

Having introduced my case of choice, I have to link it to my operationalization of Bardach's theory and to clarify some details. First and foremost, it is important to note that it fits the definition of collaboration. To recall: Bardach defined interagency collaboration as "any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately." (Bardach, 1998, p. 8) The project can be subsumed under that definition as in total 19 agencies are involved in my case study and the increase in public value is the possibility of making public policies on energy efficiency more efficiently and effectively with indicators. That is achieved by working together (including the possibility of joint learning) as well as by laying the foundations for comparability between the countries. Likewise, it meets the 'public value' definition by Moore (1996, p.10): the value added to the public in the short and long run through increasing efficiency, effectiveness or fairness. Moreover, the case study I chose is not a simple cost-sharing agreement (which Bardach explicitly excluded from being interagency collaboration), but rather a substantive project involving resources, knowledge and other assets.

Furthermore, the professionals involved in the project meet the definition of an agency professional by Bardach. Their work entails a risk to society if it is not performed well, cannot be monitored effectively by those who bear the consequences, uses specialized technical tools and is conducted by them employed by the agency that partly monitors their performance (Bardach, 1998, p. 130). In my project the agency professionals are

usually civil servants working on energy matters in their countries. It also describes the work of the participants from the international and donor organizations (working on a development project in the energy sector).

How the dependent variable is applied in the case study is crucial – as I mentioned in the operationalization, this is case sensitive. In the operationalized theory, it is defined as "the state of affairs that craftsmanship is alleged to produce" (Bardach, 1998, p. 19) – the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC). But what does that mean in this case? Given that the project intends to construct an energy efficiency indicator database for several countries and to produce reports for each one of them, this has to be part of the dependent variable and constitutes the first of four indicators for higher or lower ICC. It is part of the compliance with the tangible, material part of the project.

Furthermore, indicators on the quality of the ICC are required and two indicators are included to this respect. The second indicator, therefore, is the exchange and relationship between the entities involved. As a large part of the process leading to the database involves capacity building and the creation of a group of professionals, it should be expected that the communication and trust between them increases, whereby exchanges increase and relationships improve. This enhances the ICC. It also brings about the third indicator: an increase in their understanding and knowledge of the issues and challenges every partner faces in energy efficiency. This is related to the mutual understanding inside the operational system but it is not the same. In the operating system element, this refers more to the understanding how the agencies are thinking and the issues involved. I refer more to understanding the broader context of energy efficiency (and its indicators) in the other country. This helps to commonly justify, for instance, why some countries were unable to advance on a matter that was agreed upon. It is basically the understanding when (formal) rules and agreements have to be broken in order to increase the ICC.

Lastly, a fourth indicator is if there are other collaborations derived from the energy efficiency indicators project, i.e. if the first joint project leads to other joint projects. If the project achieves to create a group of regional energy efficiency professionals, this may be a potential outcome and measure. It can be assumed that no new projects would be started if the collaboration were not deemed valuable and successful (although not starting new projects may also depend on other factors, e.g. lack of funds etc.).

It should be noted that, in my case, the subjective components of the ICC are more important than the objective ones (although not exclusively so). That mainly derives from the fact that I research an existing collaboration. Most of them require an agreement to work together in advance. The agreement is usually fixed somehow

formally through a document which is already the first element of the objective component as identified by Bardach. In most of the cases, the document includes details regarding budget, communication and other aspects. Nevertheless, these agreements do not necessarily mean that the collaboration will work.

With respect to the different elements of Bardach's theory, I seek for practices that indicate the presence of one of them. Once a facet has been found, the relative importance of an element has to be determined by the quality of the practice as well as the quantity that it is encountered in different situations as described in 4.2.5.

5.3 The use of research methods in the case study

Having chosen the case to be studied, I want to clarify what to look for in the specific case and how to apply my methodology. To test Bardach's operationalized theory, the evidence is practices that confirm an element mentioned in the theory. That can be:

- Verbal evidence (e.g. a conversation that exhibits trust between the UN project manager and the government staff of one country);
- Written evidence (e.g. a document from one of the donors detailing the transfer of resources); or
- Observational data (e.g. a certain procedure to reach common decisions indicating a causal use of different elements in the platforming element).

However, these different practices present in the evidence do not only serve as an indicator to confirm or disconfirm the elements present in Bardach's theory. Furthermore, the practices are indicators if elements that were not present in Bardach's theory need to be added (e.g. power could be a suspect from the discussion in section 2.1.2). Lastly, the practices provide clues on the relative importance of the elements. The more often a practice is present (e.g. every meeting observed, in each interview mentioned), the more likely it is to be more important than others that are found less often. That is the quantitative part of the importance indication. There is also a qualitative part that is perhaps more subtle. I also look for practices that are of utmost importance and without which the collaboration would not advance at all – and may be identified by the subject as such. An example would be the IO paying travel expenses for government representatives that would otherwise not be able to participate in the meetings. In that sense, this serves to explore causal links as well. All these are the indicators that I analyze to determine their impact (score) on the indicators for the dependent variable. Only if they influence the ICC, they are relevant for interagency collaboration.

It is important to recall that it is actually a condition for the use of case study that the boundaries of the case are not fully clear (Yin, 1981, p. 59). That is the case in the energy efficiency indicators project. Although I have described in 5.1 that I will only include the agencies' unit directly in charge of the project, it is difficult to exactly state the spatial limitations of the project. Meetings are held in different countries, communication goes via the internet and the entities involved are scattered over different countries. Likewise, temporal boundaries are not easy to define. The first countries formally started the project in 2011 but some steps had already been taken before that and some countries joined later. Thus, the project perfectly meets the definition of a case study as provided by Yin (2009, p. 18):

1. It investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context: an energy efficiency indicators project currently being implemented.
2. The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident: Where is the delimitation of the project – a date, a country or something else?
3. There are many more variables of interest than data points, and as a result:
   a. The case study relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data having to converge in a triangulated way: documents, participant observation and interviews.
   b. The case study benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis: Bardach's operationalized theory.

Thus, the challenge to define the unit of analysis becomes clear; the difficulty to determine if it is a single case study with embedded sub-units of analysis or a multiple case study with holistic units of analysis. As the project allows the agencies involved to advance some steps in the project without collaboration, it is not yet clear if in international development one should talk about one ICC for the whole project (and, thus, a single case study with embedded sub-units). Or, if it would be a better view to talk about several ICCs between the agencies (and, thus, multiple cases with holistic units). The answer to the question must ultimately emerge from the field but has to be kept in mind.

5.3.1 Documentation and participant observation
As explained, I use the analysis of documents and participant observation as a first method to look at interagency collaboration in the energy efficiency indicators project. That gives me an insight into actions and the rather formal part (although the overt and

participant observation offers the possibility of informal chats during observation). I treat documentation and observation under the same headline as they are often linked – many times, documents are obtained at the occasion of observable situations.

The observable situations in the case of the energy efficiency indicators project can mainly be categorized into two types 1. meetings of all agencies and 2. interactions in the period between meetings (which may include small bilateral meetings). Given that the project includes countries across the whole Latin American region and international donors, the main personal (direct observable) collaboration among all is at the occasion of the physical meetings. Other collaboration usually takes the form of electronic communication or meetings on a bilateral level. As those two categories are naturally separated, I record them in separate observation notes (including informal interviews during observation). Therefore, the observation notes are chronologically structured as follows: a) observational note from a meeting, b) observational note from in between meetings, c) observational note from a meeting, d) observational note from in between meetings, etc. Documents obtained during a meeting or a time between the meetings are recorded and analyzed in the respective observational note. Documents obtained during the interviews from interviewees are recorded in the interview summaries and analyzed there. Lastly, documents gathered neither from interviewees nor during the observation (e.g. historical documents from before the observation phase) are recorded and analyzed separately. The observational notes are taken when the event occurs and later translated and summarized. As it is also the first stage of reflection, this may be some time afterwards (see chapter 4).

This disclosure of my data sources combined with the previous explanation that I focus my research on the units directly in charge of the project should sufficiently delimit the data to include in documentation and observation. Evidence can take the form of documents, e-mails, calls, behavior or speech in meetings and informal interviews. Of course, in line with the standards for good research, whenever I come across evidence, I record and analyze it. However, it has to be recognized that this is only possible *if* I come across the evidence. In that respect, it helps that ECLAC's chief of the project requested including me in all communication. Nevertheless, it is impossible to guarantee or even verify that this has happened. On the one hand, it is already fairly easy to simply forget to include me in communication regarding the project, as I have no substantive role in the project. On the other hand, clearly the agencies have internal communication about the collaboration in the project but are not going to disclose all of that to an external researcher. It should be stated, however, that I felt well-integrated into the project. On occasions, I received e-mails from people involved in the project stating that they wanted to clarify a particular aspect of an interaction but did not want to do so publicly due to conflicts or sensitivities in their

own organization or in the collaboration. I count that as a proof for trust and, therefore, believe I have captured the true nature of this interagency collaboration.

With that in mind, participant observation started with a physical meeting on 8[th] April 2013 in Uruguay and closed with a meeting on 28[th] October 2014 in Peru. In total, seven physical meetings have been observed and interactions during the time in between recorded. With the above mentioned scheme, this resulted in twelve observation notes (one meeting was an exceptional event for which reason I did not start a new observation note for in-between meetings).[153] This means that I have carried out nearly 19 months of participant observation. Over these one and a half years, I have only missed two meetings of the project due to other commitments.

Regarding the analysis of documents, a total of 2,555 documents related to the project were accessible until 30[th] April 2015. Out of these documents only 44 had not yet been included during the participant observation but contained content relevant for interagency collaboration and were therefore included in the findings presented in chapter 6. This seems like a large discrepancy but can be understood by my counting method. The total number of documents also includes all drafts of one and the same document (which in the end I would only count once as a document included). Moreover, it contains, for instance, documentation related to an invitation to a meeting participant – which in IOs with the respective administrative procedures can mean up to five documents per invitee. This means large meetings with 100 participants already generate 500 documents only with the administration of the invitations.[154] Furthermore, it is important to remember that the documents obtained during observation are not included in the 44 – so the number of total documents included in the analysis is actually larger.

5.3.2 Interviews with a participatory style

In a second stage, semi-structured interviews with the people involved in the energy efficiency indicators project were conducted. The interviews usually started rather open with the subjects talking about whatever they deemed important regarding the management of the project and the collaboration with the other agencies. Later in the interview, areas that had not been covered yet but are suggested by theory were touched upon. When the interview was finished, information regarding the theory was provided whenever circumstances allowed. That gave the interviewees the opportunity to reflect on and discuss the findings with the interviewer. This process was enhanced by sending the draft findings to the subjects involved for feedback. All of that is part of the participatory spirit of my methodology.

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[153] That translates into 44 pages letter size in Times New Roman font size twelve.
[154] Which actually matches the number of large meetings observed quite well.

As I limit myself to the units in charge for managing the project, as explained before, I aimed first of all always to interview the technical person in charge of the project (I call them 'technical focal point'). For a second interview, I targeted the next higher hierarchical level with some sort of political component (either political appointee or policy-making capacity). This person I call the 'political focal point'.

With 14 countries in the project and one technical and one political focal point each requested for an interview, one would expect 28 interviews from the government agencies. However, that is not true. On the one hand, in three cases either the technical or political focal point was temporarily missing or had been in the office too short to be interviewed in a meaningful way. On the other hand, in eight cases the interviewees suggested talking to further personnel involved in the project (e.g. staff in charge of the project before or a national consultant supporting the project). In two cases, the interviewees suggested also interviewing at a higher political level. These interviews I have named 'third level'. This should not mean that they have necessarily a higher function as in other cases the political focal point. I simply chose this description to reflect that this layer was added in an unforeseen manner but on a hierarchical level above the one at which the political focal point operates. Likewise, in some cases, I decided not to interview the current focal point but rather a former focal point. However, that was only the case in countries where the focal point had recently changed (and in some countries both of them were included). The reason for doing so was that I wanted to interview someone that actually knew the project. In each of the cases, I discussed it with the remaining focal point and the ECLAC focal points. Moreover, it just reflects the reality of the project and the region where staff turnover, particularly after elections, often occurs. For the international organizations, donor agencies and other agencies involved, the people to be interviewed were determined jointly with the organization and the focal points at ECLAC (as they knew the project best). This reflects again the participatory spirit of the research.

In total this led to interview requests sent out to 35 government agency participants of which only three did not respond (twice political focal points once a technical focal point).[155] For the other agencies involved, twelve interviewees were contacted and all granted an interview. This means a total of 44 people were interviewed or a response rate of 93.6% - which is close to my target of 100% coverage. The interviewees include three respondents on vice minister level. Nine interviewees were interviewed twice (mainly because I had some follow-up questions based on the first interview). In two cases, the second interview had to be done by e-mail. Likewise, nine interviews were conducted jointly with at least one other interviewee combined. That was not my

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[155] I always followed up three times. If after three e-mails no answer was received, the interviewee was counted as 'no response'.

preference but I agreed to it when requested by the interviewees. In the end, that means the total number of interviews conducted was 44. The interviews took place between the 14th July 2014 and the 10th July 2015.

The list with all interviews (including organization/country, interviewee, title of the interviewee, role in the project, date and place) can be found in annex II. It is important to note that the functional title provided reflects the functional title that the person had at the moment of being focal point for the project. Six interviewees have chosen to remain anonymous. 19 interviews were conducted personally, the reminder through a phone or Skype call. The average interview duration was 50 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 87 minutes and the shortest 20 minutes.

Once data gathering, analysis and interpretation were completed, the draft was sent to everyone who had been interviewed. That means that 44 people were sent a draft of the document. 17 of them responded, some with comments, the rest did not provide any answer to the e-mail.[156]

5.3.3 Ethical considerations researching the project

To comply with research ethics, I have communicated my interest as a researcher during observation whenever feasible. This follows the ASA standards for participant observation. Mostly, I have done so verbally but I also handed out a one-pager specifying my research project when I had a chance to do so. Furthermore, during informal chats and later during the interviews, subjects were given the opportunity to influence the research and voice concerns. Thus, I do not see ethical hazards.

Regarding my broader ethical obligations, I tried to be as objective and fair in representing all views and data gathered in the energy efficiency indicators project. Although access to the raw data cannot be granted to a larger public due to confidentiality agreements, the two reviewers of my thesis are able to scrutinize them.

5.4 Conclusion: energy efficiency indicators in Latin America – a case study for interagency collaboration

To explore my research questions with the chosen methodology, I study an international cooperation project developing an energy efficiency indicators database in Latin America. The project involves two international organizations (ECLAC and OLADE), two international donors (GIZ and ADEME), one expert consultancy (Enerdata) and in total 19 government agencies (of which 14 are included in my

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[156] I always followed up three times. If after three e-mails no answer was received, the person was counted as 'no response'.

study). Access was gained through ECLAC and the influence of this fact on the findings has to be carefully reviewed when analyzing the results. As the project includes the objective to create a group of trained professionals on energy efficiency indicators in the region, I expect to explore all aspects of interagency collaboration.

In order to test Bardach's operationalized theory, I search for practices indicating the presence or absence of elements of the theory as well as the need to add new ones. Causal links and relative importance are explored through the frequency of occurrence of the practices but also their importance for the collaboration and collaborators to continue. The indicators to measure increasing or decreasing ICC in this respect are 1. the advance in achieving the project goal constructing the energy efficiency database and country reports, 2. more exchange between the agencies, 3. more mutual understanding of each country's challenges, and 4. the development of new projects as spin-offs from the indicators project.

To obtain the necessary data for these indicators, I have collected verbal, written and observational evidence. I have studied 44 documents, carried out 19 months of observation including seven physical meetings of the project and interviewed 44 professionals involved in the collaboration. In all my research, I have followed the procedures to comply with ethical obligations as laid out earlier.

6. Findings during data collection

The following sections present the data encountered in the field. Data deriving from observation and documentation is presented in the first section, the evidence from the interviews in the second. I separate this from the interpretation of the data which follows in the next chapter. That means that I try to only present the practices encountered in the field and how they manifested themselves in this chapter. The next chapter takes up these findings again and puts them into the context of Bardach's operationalized theory. This intends to increase reliability as readers should better be able to distinguish between data found in the field and the conclusions drawn from it.

Nevertheless, some personal thinking (and thus, in a sense, interpretation) is unavoidably already included in this part as – ultimately – the practices presented have to have a certain link to the dependent variables. This relationship may be doubted by my readers despite all arguments introduced in the next chapter.

The presentation of the findings is structured around the elements of Bardach's operationalized theory. I tried to make clusters around the different existing elements. If practices were found clustering around an issue that was not yet in Bardach's theory, they were reported as a separate and new cluster below. As some of the evidence can be matched to different elements, it is obvious that this kind of data is repeated under the respective different elements (as described in section 4.2.5). In that sense, it is also understandable that many elements are linked to a certain extent – even in a causal sense. This was already clear in the original theory provided by Bardach. Consequently, differentiating between the different elements is sometimes difficult. That is most obvious in the platforming stage.

6.1 Data from documentation and observation

In this section, data found during observation and the analysis of relevant documentation is reported. One observation made while analyzing my own research work is that the notes taken over time were getting more and more comprehensive. In that sense, the description also got thicker and thicker.[157] That is a good sign as it shows that over time, I learned to observe the practices of collaboration more in detail and was able to record them. Of course in the analysis stage, this poses challenges as well with respect to distilling the essence and presenting the data in the form of relevant practices under the elements of the theory.

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[157] In the sense of a thick description (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003, p. 167).

6.1.1 Political and institutional setup

Regarding the political and institutional setup, the clusters that were forming during the observation phase showed that the two elements actually can be separated. The evidence that informed about and was required on the institutional setup (understood as the more formal structures of a ministry or entity) was distinct from the data on the political setup (understood as the 'softer' part including political priorities). In the case of the observed meetings, this was usually already reflected in the title of the event. During all meetings observed that were called "technical meeting" (and hence with the participants usually on a technical level), much more information was conveyed on the institutional setup and supported by written evidence. In all "policy dialogues" (where the level of participants was usually a political one) more information was communicated regarding political priorities – verbally rather than in writing. Furthermore, the IO was found to carefully evaluate their prospective collaboration partners in the project regarding institutional structure and political viability.

6.1.1.1 The institutional setup and formal structures

At least three countries emphasized institutional challenges during technical meetings as a reason for slow progress in the project. These challenges were mainly rooted in a lack of cooperation on the national level (either between different government agencies or between sectors). This includes the relevant policy background and context. On the contrary, the four countries that advanced the most towards the goal of the project – the indicator database – emphasized the importance of working with other national entities on improving quality of the statistics available and having a solid legislative framework.

The information about the institutional setup (and the setbacks) was usually provided during meetings but supported with documentation (on slides, citing laws, etc.). Discussion during the meetings and within the organizations involved (government agencies, IO and donors) stressed the need for the institutional fit of the project. The institutional context had a more prominent role in presentations and discussions during technical meetings. Although the institutional (notably the policy) context and fit was mentioned as well during policy meetings with higher-level (political) participation, the presentation in this regard was brief and rather emphasized past products and milestones. This was the same for countries (which noticed the policy achievements) as well as for the IO and donors (which mentioned successful projects from their institutional past). As an example, all invitations to events that I came across during my research also briefly recounted the purpose and background of the energy efficiency indicators project.

Despite being available in written form, the information about these elements of the institutional setup was usually included in the presentations and discussions during physical meetings. As the representatives of the IO and the donors (including the consultant) were travelling to attend these meetings even for only short periods of time, this kind of active exchange could be important for gathering information. Being there in person to collect it may be important.

6.1.1.2 The political setup and priorities
Information on political priorities as well as challenges (e.g. upcoming or past elections) and implications for collaboration in the project was exchanged during various meetings. During one meeting, it was explicitly emphasized by different countries that the public value or benefit was what attracted political attention and in turn resources, but that the value the public and politics attributed to the project differed from country to country. This information seems to be crucial for the collaboration to start. In the process of incorporating a country of the second wave, several informal meetings between the IO and agents of the government agency were observed before a formal approach was made. The approach came at a moment when the project coincided with the country's political priorities, which was also remarked in the positive answer leading to the collaboration with the agency in the project.

Although this information was shared in the context of meetings on all levels, it was relatively more frequently found in higher political level meetings. This applied to the government agencies involved as well as to the IO and the donors. For instance, the IO proposed new projects in the context of high-level meetings or discussed the fit with existing funding envelopes for projects during bilateral meetings with donors. All this has a rather informal character and was often not found on paper but rather communicated verbally. Translation into written form, however, usually took place once it advanced to a stage of formal action – e.g. a roadmap for the project – and was thus converted into institutional setup.

The informal character already points towards an importance of personal interaction during meetings. Consequently, high rotation of staff (sometimes due to elections, particularly at the top hierarchy of the agencies) was perceived as a concern with regard to the continuation of the project as priorities might change. This was mentioned during various meetings by different agencies. For instance, the officer in charge of the project at the IO also worried on one occasion about a change of the political leadership in one of the government agencies, as it might set back collaboration due to a decrease in exchange of information on political priorities. In that context, being a rather small agency with few staff was mentioned by the participants in the project as a challenge but also as an advantage. On the one hand, the

few staff had many competing priorities but, on the other hand, they also knew the priorities and the characteristics of each project well.

6.1.2 Operating system

The evidence gathered regarding the operating system is structured around the elements of the operationalized theory. However, I added an element about communicating as the practices observed suggested an emphasis on the way parties communicate with each other and on which level.

6.1.2.1 Communicating

It was easy to notice that communication in the project followed a style that could be described as rather diplomatic – kind and respectful, even when establishing deadlines or insisting on the compliance with agreements. In written form, this was expressed by the use of the conjunctive form as the dominant one and expressions as "we share" (e.g. deadlines or commitments) rather than "we communicate" or "we inform". At the same time, the language was administrative and to the point – documents transmitted were, e.g. formal invitation letters. That was the case for all seven meetings observed, regardless of the level (technical or political). Likewise, facilitating information around the administrative and logistical side seemed to be good conduct. For all seven meetings observed, the IO produced so-called "logistics guides" containing information on accommodation, location, visa arrangements, etc. This included making available the information in a language accessible to the participants – all documents were provided in Spanish (the common language) for the meetings where only technical level staff assisted whereas documents were produced in English and Spanish for the political level events. The diplomatic and facilitative style came with some formalities that had to be respected, as all documents (invitations, logistic guides, agenda) carried the logos of the IO, the host government and the donor from left to right at the top and of other partners at the bottom. This order was always the same across all documents analyzed and was confirmed by the chief of the IO as an element of respect to the host countries and the donors.

Physical meetings had similar formal elements as opening ceremonies began with words of welcome first from the host country, then from the IO and, lastly, from the donor. That was always the case at high-level political meetings and at some of the technical meetings (and was able to be extended up to three hours at big events). Another important practice was to clearly communicate each contribution from every partner, such as the IO always mentioning explicitly which agency sponsored a lunch, dinner or other logistics. In a similar way, attendance appeared to be recorded – during one meeting the absence of the host country from the meeting was mentioned by several meeting participants.

Although a certain diplomatic and facilitative formalism was observed on both technical and political levels, there are nevertheless differences between the two. On the technical level, communication was more informal and this informality was even referenced explicitly. As expected, the technical level communicated about work in progress and unfinished products. The form in which experience was shared was through storytelling and common stories were even developed during meetings lasting longer than one day. Meetings typically left room for a high number of comments. It seemed to facilitate exchange and in some meetings the IO even explicitly introduced new techniques to promote exchange between the agencies. It appeared to be intended to promote an environment of equality – during one meeting, according to a representative of the IO a "participants list without functional titles in order to create a sense of equality to facilitate exchange" was intentionally provided.

The more commitment and the more communication with higher political levels were required, the more formal communication became. If decisions about future collaboration were expected to be made in upcoming meetings, it was usually communicated beforehand. Agreements and schedules were shared in writing – usually by the IO's project manager by e-mail. In some occasions, this included the request to share it with the higher hierarchy levels (also twice requested in meetings by two agencies). When it reached the top hierarchical level, communication was formal with ministerial notes nominating focal points or the signing of Memoranda of Understanding between agencies before the exchange of funds detailing every legal detail. In that sense, it is possible that lower-level communication starts the process, as it was noticed during the accession of one new agency of the second wave countries that several technical and informal meetings were held before a formal approach to the agency was made.

It seemed that the latest electronic communication tools are not adequate for these communication needs. Although e-mail was commonly used, only younger and lower-level staff communicated through instant messenger and online social networks (in fact only one case was recorded) for the purposes of the project. The official online social network for the project was not frequently used. The IO mainly shared documents through electronic platforms (through the network, on the website or through other file share tools) but none of the other parties involved did so.

6.1.2.2 Flexibility
Flexibility in the sense of adapting to new and unexpected situations was observed on all levels of collaboration. To begin with, documents from the beginning of the project suggested longer time requirements to advance – e.g. there was a six-month elapse

between the first political level dialogue establishing collaboration and the first work meeting on the project (for the first wave countries).

Operational flexibility was noted constantly. That ranged from adapting meeting agendas due to a delay in schedule or a change in presentations due to cancellations from agencies or last-minute answers to inquiries. Also changes/differences in products and delivery were common and it should be underlined that it was not possible to single out specific agencies or agency classes – it occurred throughout: at the government agencies, the IO and the donors.

Interestingly, flexibility was also noticed on a more formal or legal level. In one case, a contractual arrangement had to be extended by a certain period of time as the product was not ready, which was done without major discussions or disagreement. Likewise the IO's workplans and associated budgets for the project left room for maneuvering. They were usually agreed upon for two years with flexibility for the organization to use funds according to current needs (as long as the overall framework was respected). One of the most interesting observations was two different versions of a memo of a meeting between two agencies with contractual implications. The two different versions also entailed different content on how to proceed. The agencies, however, agreed that both memos were correct and reflected the meeting.

6.1.2.3 Motivation

Motivation was (naturally) difficult to observe and I had to make assumptions on what could motivate the collaborators in the project. The communication from the IO to the government agencies in all invitations to meetings made reference to the benefit the country was going to derive from working on the project, which may be a motivation for a good civil servant.

On the professional side, recognition may have been a motivator. The country reports published for each of the participating countries indicated the agency and/or the name of the agency official (technical level) who wrote them. In a similar way, the project provided the opportunity for learning about energy efficiency indicators under the advice of international experts. Moreover, being part of this likeminded group of energy professionals provided an element of motivation. The group spirit was enhanced due to the fact that during the physical meetings participants were usually observed to go out for lunch, dinner and other activities together (also when they were not sponsored by any of the agencies involved). The researcher was also greeted by one agency official with "welcome to the club" after the first (technical) meeting in which he participated.

This motivation may have been enhanced by the fact that the meetings took place in different countries and travel was paid for by the IO – on one occasion even a two-week study tour to Europe. In some cases host countries also provided dinners and other entertainment programs.

6.1.2.4 Mutual understanding

Again, mutual understanding was difficult to observe or find in documents, as it is more associated with the people's state of mind and occurs implicitly. There were no generalized practices observed regarding how mutual understanding was expressed. But some examples can be given in which I would say that mutual understanding exists and is important for increasing the ICC. One example regarding advancing towards the project goal came from one of the government agencies which stated during a technical meeting that it was unable to advance due to institutional barriers. In reaction, several agencies expressed their understanding as that had happened to them as well. During meetings, the project manager from the IO frequently and commonly recognized the differences that countries exhibit in terms of resources, notably available staff, and offered the IO's support if necessary as well. In addition, the IO was once thanked for this kind of support explicitly by one of the government agencies, as the IO not only supported them within but beyond the limits of the project in addressing a challenge the agency had at that time with another project.

Besides this kind of mutual understanding of challenges to advance in the project and the collaboration, practical or operational matters were likewise addressed with implicit mutual understanding. For instance, during the Soccer World Cup, sessions were modified if one of the national teams of which the agency was present was playing. Furthermore, subsistence allowance transfer payments different from standard procedure were provided by the IO for participants from countries where international wire transfers were difficult. Lastly, documents prepared by the international consultant were shared occasionally in editable format to make them easier to use for the agencies involved.

6.1.2.5 Accountability

I was able to notice accountability processes during my observation and, naturally, in documents. First of all, there were agreements with the donors and the countries that established accountability between the parties – mostly oriented towards the delivery of certain products. Regarding the relationship with the donors, it was mainly focused on the assets received and the product required in return. Therefore, the project manager and the unit chief regularly communicated about the project's development with the donors involved (acknowledging the donors' reporting needs to higher levels and other government entities). Products were also labeled in a way that matched the

agreed-on product fully (e.g. the title of a report exactly matching the title of an indicator or project line). The process of labeling and communicating the required outcomes served to demonstrate abstract products. For example, one frequent product to be shown by the IO was support of the government agencies in the policy-making process (a rather abstract product). This was proven through letters from the government agency involved in the project confirming that.

The country agencies less frequently reported back to the IO, even if that was required or agreed upon. In that sense, it appeared to be a rather flexible accountability approach towards the government agencies, as products were often not provided within timelines agreed upon. But there were different management styles within the project: the sub-regional office of the IO requested that the government agencies under its management report on advances once a month. Admittedly, however, not all complied – particularly the countries that had staff constraints did not. In that light, it was interesting that I once picked up a sentence from a donor agent saying that besides the formal advances and reporting on the project, it actually mattered most that the country's agency staff took ownership of the project in order to ensure continuity.

6.1.2.6 Financial exchanges
Pure financial exchanges only happened from the donor to the IO – not inversely and to no other agencies except to the international consultancy (and for consultancies the IO's internationally applicable regulations determined the terms). The project agreements with the government agencies specified that their contribution was their staff time as an in-kind contribution. The IO remarked in the same agreements that it was able to sponsor a national consultant in case there was a lack of manpower and the IO provided the assistance of the international consultant as well. Furthermore, the IO covered the travel costs for meetings. All this was also regulated by the IO's internationally applicable regulations. As budgets were for fixed periods and were unable to roll over to the next budget cycle, the funds were usually fully spent in time.

Another interesting exchange in this project was information – the data gathered as part of the project. This was mentioned explicitly in the project agreements with the government agencies and it was specified that the data would be made public only with the permission of the respective country.

6.1.3 Resources
The following reflects my observation and analysis of documents regarding the resources involved in the interagency collaboration. The structure follows the operationalized theory.

6.1.3.1 Turf

Turf issues were not really observed in the collaboration, as the agencies did not overlap in their jurisdictions and respected each other's authority. Most of the management of the project was left to the IO. Given that this was a development cooperation project, it could be said that this was considered its authority. In turn, the IO respected the mandate of the government agencies. Even when products were not delivered on time, no strong intervention usually followed and contractual agreements respected responsibilities and sensitivities (e.g. data publication, see above under accountability). The same applied to the donors – beyond the contractual agreements (and even there with some flexibility), there was no interference with authorities. The only thing I noticed in one meeting was that when one country was forgotten in the seating order by staff of the IO, a colleague immediately noted that and the issue was fixed. One could interpret this occurrence in a way that equal treatment and respecting each other's authorities was in fact important.

6.1.3.2 Autonomy

As can be derived from what has been said about turf, not much interference with autonomy was noticed in the collaboration. The agencies respected each other's autonomy up to the point that no strong consequences followed if the project did not proceed according to agreements. The agencies gave each other rather a free hand in managing their own affairs in the context of the project. This was mostly true for the collaboration with the government agencies but to a certain extent also for the other agencies involved. For example, the international consultancy communicated directly and according to its own judgment with the government agencies on the data collection process and commented on it. In a rather diplomatic and political environment in a project led by an IO, it might not have been like that in all cases.

However, the IO and the consultancy also usually complied with the agreements concluded with the donors – it would probably have created a problem if they had not. This was most likely linked to the fact that the major flow of resources was between donors and IO – not to the government agencies. But again it was true that while having contractual accountabilities which were respected, autonomy was respected regarding the way to get to the milestones. This was also reflected in the project agreement. The agreement established a steering committee presided over by the IO with the donors and participation of OLADE as observer. However, it mentioned operative coordination by the IO and technical management by the donor and an international consultant. This could be seen as the respect of autonomy – all agencies have to steer the course but how is determined by the IO.

6.1.3.3 Money

As mentioned, the budget was managed entirely by the IO and derived in large parts from the donors (a fact that was always clearly communicated in all related documents) with some smaller parts coming from the IO's regular budget. The mix of funds made the use of them more flexible. No funds were transferred to the government agencies and that was stipulated starting from the project agreement with them (but it did not communicate the budget for the project). However, other valuable resources were contributed and exchanged in the collaboration. One important factor was staff time which was contributed by all agencies involved in kind (except for the international consultancy). In some cases, the IO additionally provided national consultants to get the project started based on the needs of the government agency. This was explicitly recognized and valued by the countries which received that support. Also travel (including accommodation and food) was provided by the IO for the meetings – which in one case included a two-week study tour to Europe. The terms of these resources were governed by the IO's internationally applicable regulations. However, if there were issues with the terms, disputes were usually settled – within the rules – to the satisfaction of all parties.

An important contribution from the government agencies arose when they offered to host a meeting in their country. This did not occur infrequently. At least in the observed cases when the IO was planning a new meeting, there was always at least one government agency which offered to host it. Although travel and meeting costs were covered by the IO, it took human resources for the government agency to organize and coordinate everything. And some agencies went beyond the organization and offered further logistics such as joint dinners, receptions or sightseeing. On two occasions, the host agency even gave souvenir packages to all participants. Interestingly, an increase in side events of a social nature was noted the smaller the country and agency was (although I have to admit that the sample observed was too small to identify clear trends).

6.1.3.4 People

It was noted in several instances that the human resources sometimes posed a challenge to the government agencies involved in the collaboration (notably the smaller ones). The challenge was twofold. Firstly, the project required a considerable amount of staff time, while in more than 50% of the government agencies staff working on the project was limited to only one or two individuals. That was remarked also in the meetings as major constraint. In response to that, the IO explicitly offered the support of a national consultant to support the process.

Secondly, and noticed as well in the meetings, staff rotation was high. This posed challenges on two levels. If it occurred on the technical level, the agency lost the professionals who had learned to work with the energy efficiency indicators and may not have been able to keep on track with the collaborative project for that reason. To address that, some agencies had designated two staff to the project (even some of the smaller agencies where human resources were not abundant). If change in personnel occurred on the political level, political priorities changed in some cases and shifted away from interagency collaboration. However, the government agents recognized that the participation of the IO in the project helped to shell the project against attacks from national politics. Another means to keep priority on the project commented on by meeting participants in one meeting was to show results.

Nevertheless, the rotation of personnel did not apply to all agencies in the project. I looked at the names that figure in the agendas and travel lists of the project and some of them do not change over time. Notably, that was true for the IO and donors (including the international consultancy) but also for some of the countries – mostly for the ones that up to today advanced the most in complying with the formal goal of the project of producing the indicators database and national report.

Lastly, I noticed that probably the skills or competencies of the staff in the project matters as well. This derived from the points that have been covered so far and will be covered in the next sections. If, for instance, certain communication practices were important (see above), staff was more successful in the interagency collaboration if they managed and understood these practices. Similarly, the personality of the respective representative most likely influenced elements such as trust, etc.

6.1.3.5 Political standing
Political standing was, again, one of the elements for which a direct observation was difficult. I had to interpret my observations in the field about how it was expressed in the collaboration. It seemed to me that explicitly expressing recognition for others was a demonstration of the other's political standing as well as it helped the party recognized to increase its political standing among all the others. That was linked to what I mentioned under communication; the fact that the agencies explicitly expressed thanks and recognition to every agency that contributed to the project. Examples ranged from the visibility of logos and the order of speakers in high level events to the recognition of the IO's contribution of a consultant that helped the country to advance. In some documents I analyzed, the IO even explicitly thanked the government agencies and countries for their political support. As mentioned under the communication element, the form depended on the political level and got more formal

the higher the level was (e.g. with a note recognizing the IO's contribution to making better policy).

That political standing was important and expressed in fine details, I found most pronounced in two examples. In one case, when a new country joined, interest was received from two agencies of the country. The collaboration was started with the hierarchically higher agency although the project would have been a better technical fit for the other agency. Likewise in a meeting, it was pointed out by several participants that the host country did not send high ranking officials to the meeting. These details were apparently important to signal political standing.

6.1.3.6 Information

Information sharing was an important part of the collaboration and mainly done in technical level meetings (including political elements, e.g. how to secure political commitment). The information shared during those technical meetings observed was about the work in progress, advances with the project and learning. It was rather informal. In fact, discussions and sharing experience took a prominent place in all meetings (although information was made available electronically afterwards) and were promoted by the IO, e.g. with the introduction of new facilitation methodologies.

At political level meetings, information was more oriented towards the communication of agencies' past achievements and products and priorities for the future. As noted earlier, information in the sense of formal data published was handled more carefully and required consent from the agencies involved as per the project agreement.

Keeping a steady flow of information from the IO to the donors seemed to be important as well, as constant communication through e-mails and short meetings was observed. Another important information flow appeared to be with other IOs not involved in the collaboration but working on similar topics. At least in two occasions the IO in charge of the project held meetings about the project with other IOs that were at that moment not part of the project.

6.1.4 Steering a course

In the following section, I record the observations from the field and documents regarding steering a course in the interagency collaboration. This is structured around the elements identified in the operationalized theory.

6.1.4.1 Vision, goals and process

The broader vision in the sense of the benefit of the project for the countries involved (through their respective agencies) and the way to go was communicated mainly by the IO. Countries that were at advanced stages of the project supported this vision when voiced in physical meetings by emphasizing the importance of the project to show results of energy efficiency and improve policy-making. The vision communicated by the IO included proposing the next countries to approach for collaboration during physical meetings. This was usually discussed before internally by the IO and with the donors. These discussions were nourished by results of meetings held with other organizations not directly involved in the project about their ongoing and future projects. In that sense, the overall vision was rather driven by the donors and the IO than by the government agencies, although they were always consulted. It has to be noted, however, that the process was more consultative for countries joining in the first wave than in the second wave. Several consultative meetings were held with the government agencies by the IO before launching the project. For the second wave countries, it was much more a communication of the vision and the offer to be part of it.

The same seems to be the case for the goals in terms of next steps and schedule. The proposal of schedule and products in the majority of the cases came from the IO (rooted as well in the commitments with the donors). When joining the project, government agencies received a chronogram of the project highlighting the most important goals. Nevertheless, the government agencies had more influence on this goal setting process than in the visioning and there was usually a discussion on the way to get from one step to the next one. The unit chief of the IO even organized a round table during one of the meetings once specifically to receive informal feedback on how the project should advance in the view of the technical focal points. Schedules were discussed with the agencies' focal points and agreed upon. Countries were able to take initiative and requested assistance from consultants to achieve goals. For example, the offer to host a planned meeting came from countries. All these goal setting processes were on a technical level.

The process of visioning and goal setting driven by the IO with consultation of the government agencies was never subject to complaints. The issues important to each agency were communicated during the meetings and comments were welcomed by the IO. For instance, when the IO proposed to publish proceedings of the meeting, these proceedings were edited in real time on a projector incorporating comments from everyone.

6.1.4.2 Form

The most notable observation in terms of the steering form was that in the negotiations about the most important resource – funds – usually only the IO and the respective donor were present. That means that vision and financial resources were pre-determined with no influence of the steering body.

Nevertheless, the project documents, notably the official agreements concluded with the government agencies, specified a management structure for the project. According to the agreement, this included a directive committee for the strategic direction of the project (vision-oriented and presided over by the IO and one of the donors). Furthermore, a technical coordination committee was established which included a technical coordinator/focal point from each national agency. The country report of one of the countries also mentioned in this respect that the IO was in charge of operative coordination and that one of the donor agencies with its international consultant was responsible for the technical management. Interestingly, these committees never formally convened during any of the meetings. As mentioned before, several aspects of the management of the project were proposed for discussion by the IO and debated but on no occasion were the different committees convened formally.

6.1.4.3 Leadership

From the previous points on vision and forum it can already be distilled that the IO led the process in terms of proposing a vision to a large extent, negotiating the resources with the donor and making the necessary operational arrangements to advance towards the project goals. This notably included monitoring the progress towards the stated project goal with the help of the international consultant. It also comprised the leadership to reach out to other organizations not directly involved in the project and to broker new projects which were later proposed to country agencies. For instance, the IO liaised with the Latin American Parliament which subsequently issued an official resolution referring to the policy dialogues of the project and offering to host the next one in its headquarters. In this regard, leadership was always taken at the same level: technical level staff from the IO took leadership on the operational and technical matters while leadership on policy, contractual and donor arrangements derived from the political leadership of the IO's staff in the matter.

There are indications that the leadership by the IO was accepted by the other agencies as reference was made to the IO as an authority on the matter. Moreover, the IO formally managed the project – e.g. it "formally closed the process of data collection for" some countries as stated by one of the government agents. Likewise, it provided the structure how to collect and report data and the government agencies accepted.

And the sub-regional office of the IO requested countries to report on advances every month and most of the countries complied.

The general leadership of the IO did not mean that other agencies did not sometimes take the lead in the collaboration. For instance, the international consultancy often took the lead in following up on the data collection and improvement process. In a similar way, donors sometimes took the lead to comment on the advances of the project and the next steps that should follow. In addition, government agencies came forward with requests and proposals during the meetings regarding how to improve the collaboration and hence the achievement of the project goals and vision.

6.1.5 Culture
In the following section, the findings on the cultural element are detailed. As usual, the structure follows the elements of the theory.

6.1.5.1 Bureaucracy culture
Different communication practices and flexibility have already been reported on in section 6.1.2.1 and 6.1.2.2. This may already have triggered some expectations about the bureaucratic culture of the project. The expectation is probably justified. On the one hand, the bureaucratic culture of obedience, delegation and process orientation was found in many grains in the collaboration. Processes had to be formally closed by the IO and the donors, the contribution of each agency had to be (formally) recognized, things were "left in writing" to be consulted on with higher hierarchy levels for the government agencies and formal agreements were concluded.

On the other hand, flexibility was demonstrated in many ways to circumvent problems and advance with the collaboration. One example was setting targets in the first place, but not raising formal complaints when the targets were not achieved. Another example was the IO's project manager mentioning in a meeting that it helps to raise the profile of the collaboration project if the government agencies formally recognize its value. Subsequently three government agencies sent letters that did exactly that. Likewise, the approach that the IO took to informally reflect with technical focal points on how the project should develop (including the omission of formal titles on the participant list in order to create a sense of equality) was a rather pragmatic one. In a sense, it showed a certain pragmatism to advance that is not necessarily common in a bureaucratic context.

6.1.5.2 Negotiation process

As already mentioned in section 6.1.4.1, a very characteristic observation was that the negotiations about the greater vision including the financial resources were always conducted bilaterally between IO and donors. These were probably the most important negotiations in the interagency collaboration project. Negotiations also occasionally took place for major contractual agreements, e.g. with the international consultancy. These were guided by applicable rules of the organizations and in case of dispute were solved in a mutually agreeable way within those rules. The agreements with the countries to join the project were usually standardized and did not entail major negotiations in that sense.

On the more technical level, agreeing to goals was usually part of an exchange and discussion on the subject. These discussions were characterized by solving issues in mutually agreeable ways – so much that it did almost not deserve to be called a negotiation. In some cases government agencies requested changes to the proposal from the IO and everyone agreed on them. In some cases, representatives of government agencies stated that they did not have the authority to decide on a matter and requested that the issue be formally referred to a higher hierarchy level in writing.

6.1.5.3 Trust

Trust is again one of the elements which cannot be observed directly. However, I did observe practices that in my view demonstrate the importance of trust and trust-building and -maintaining processes. During technical and political level meetings, it was observed that it was usual that participants had lunch together and also attended other 'social' events such as dinners and receptions. When these were not part of the official program, the IO's staff on some occasions organized them after the official program on their own accounts without obligation. This increased at least the opportunity to build and maintain trust and create a group spirit (time spent together). For example, the project manager of the IO referred to the other government officials as colleagues in his communication. In this regard, it was noted that sharing private information (e.g. family matters) and being oneself was common. Even high-level officials told jokes that would probably not be called 'politically correct' and the individuals used their local dialects and expressions during conversations. Some participants exchanged small gifts (e.g. chocolate, souvenirs from their countries) if they knew each other already. On the professional side, compliance with the standard practices elaborated on before probably also increased trust. Thus, communicating in the way appropriate, delivering the promised products and recognizing the others' contributions probably increased the trust gained from others at the same time. It seems that trying to comply with these practices was more important than actually

achieving them, as individuals showed comprehension if something did not go as planned.

The focus on the individual in these trust-building and -maintenance processes consequently proved to be vulnerable to staff changes. The individuals that were working on the project for a long time knew each other and had more frequent exchanges with each other. A director of one of the government agencies involved in the project once explicitly emphasized during a meeting the importance of long-term relationships to exchange information on a trust basis and provided examples from working with two other agencies whose staff had known each other for a long time. Likewise, the agent of the IO once expressed concern about a staff change in a government agency due to the fact that the former incumbent was a trusted person. However, having been acquainted with the others for a long time was not a necessary condition to be a trusted person. In one instance, sensitive issues were discussed immediately and openly in an informal way during the first meeting between an agent of the IO and an agent of a government agency.

In the group, trust seems to facilitate an open exchange as institutional challenges were openly recognized by two countries during meetings and received with understanding by the others. Another country openly thanked the IO for help at a crucial moment by facilitating a consultant to support the agency. Also, a donor representative was able to openly share his views on the advances of the project in a casual way. On one occasion, a government agency even shared internal documents of another project with the IO following a discussion on the side of one of the project meetings.

6.1.6 Platforming

This section elaborates on my findings concerning the platforming observed in the interagency collaboration. I follow the elements of the operationalized theory but, given the evidence from the field, I decided to structure it around the three big blocks of platforming. A finer structure (e.g. each of the platforms) would have been too narrow with too little evidence. Treating platforming as a whole in this section, however, would not have reflected the differences I noticed.

Nevertheless, one observation has to be reported which is valid for all of them: the fact that I definitely discerned an intentional sequencing of the collaboration in the data. Documents demonstrated that the first research published by the IO proposing such a project founded on scientific analysis dated back to 2009. The first informal meetings and the first policy dialogue on the subject started in 2010, while the first official project meetings dated to 20-22 September 2011. And it did not look like that this was only a delay in process. Various meetings were held in between with the countries that

later became the first wave of the project. Therefore, I interpreted that as a conscious process staging the collaboration.

6.1.6.1 Right pillar

The theory claims that in the right pillar processes of trust, leadership acceptance and building a communication network should happen. I observed over the one and a half years I followed the project, that collaborators that were with the project longer usually had more exchanges with each other. At meetings, they gathered more quickly, had meals together, shared stories and exchanged small gifts. This was most notable after the two-week study tour to Europe. After returning, people started to share interesting articles and had virtual discussions on subject-related matters (although this did not translate into a permanent exchange). The same is true between the IO and the donors as well as between the donors and the government agencies that started to share opinions openly. One of the most interesting cases in this respect is a former staff member of one of the government agencies involved in the project. At the beginning of the project, the individual was a focal point for the project, then left the government agency and became a consultant for the IO on the project to share his experience. Acceptance of leadership was also noticed as several meeting participants accepted the leadership role of the IO once they felt they could recognize it openly during meetings. One official of a government agency even stressed that having an IO in the project helped to mitigate the vulnerability of the project against changes in staff at higher hierarchy levels.

6.1.6.2 Left pillar

I noted in the data from documents that the start of the project is rooted in research from years before the project started, in which a lack of this kind of project in the Latin American and Caribbean region was identified. This provided a creative opportunity for which the intellectual capital in the form of donors and international consultancy was later found (and was stressed in every document related to the project). The outreach to the first wave countries then created an implementation network on the technical and an advocacy group on the political level.

For the later joining countries this was a bit different as the project had already taken shape. Nevertheless, the creative opportunity and the intellectual capital still existed and were enhanced due to there already being a group of government agencies in the project that provided further regional intellectual capital. In fact, for the Central American countries, the regional system for the integration of Central America (SICA – Sistema de Integración Centroamericana) issued a recommendation to its members to join the project. Moreover, (anticipated) policy change which required projects of this kind proved to be a true window of opportunity in some of the countries. Once

convinced to join, the second wave countries extended the implementation network and advocacy group, which later translated into even more critical mass to approach the remaining countries of the region. This in turn provided the argument to receive more support from the donors and subsequently the international consultant.

6.1.6.3 Top pillar

The steering capacity improved over time with steering arrangements that became more established (e.g. the informal exchanges between government agencies, IO and donors) and participants that shared their ideas more openly. The confidence between the parties also led to more direct communication, which is part of an operating subsystem. Furthermore, learning was collective and continuous. For example, in one meeting one of the government agencies proposed to involve universities on the national levels in order to cope with the shortage of staff at some agencies, which was welcomed by another government agency and subsequently explored for the project. In that way, continuous collective learning was observed.

6.1.7 Momentum

In this section, the findings on momentum in the collaboration project are described. I again use the elements provided by the theory as a structure.

6.1.7.1 Opportunity

Regarding opportunities, it was noted that with increasing output from the project (e.g. policy dialogues, country reports and word of mouth) more possibilities to market the project arose. First of all, more countries became interested in joining the project and hosting its meetings. Moreover, the project was discussed in more meetings with other organizations not involved directly in the project but working on similar projects.

With respect to the incorporation of countries, I noted that strong reference was made to policy and policy change as an entry point for the project. Consequently, policy or policy change that made the project a good fit seemed to be a window of opportunity.

6.1.7.2 Vulnerability

The only vulnerability mentioned by several countries was the change in staff, both on the technical as well as on the political level due to the loss of knowledge and change in priorities. It was also observed in at least four countries that the project got significantly delayed after a change in staff regarding the production of the database. One government agency remarked that in some cases the political weight of the involvement of the IO helped to mitigate that vulnerability.

6.1.8 Additional findings from documents and observation

This section reports on issues and evidence I found while analyzing the field data and was unable to match to any of the previously-mentioned elements. Nevertheless, this data was too prominent and clustered around certain areas to be omitted as simple 'background noise'.

The first issue I discerned in my notes on seating orders was that participants from the same country or organization always sat together. Likewise, regions (e.g. South America, Central America, etc.) usually stuck together as well as people of the same gender tended to usually mingle with each other. One participant from a Central American country once mentioned proudly that he was an exchange student financed by Germany to study in Costa Rica, had worked in El Salvador and had family in Costa Rica. Therefore, he considered himself rather Central American than anything else. Furthermore, language led to groupings as, for example, one of the donors and one of the international consultancy representatives did not speak fluent Spanish and translation by some of the participants to the others was therefore necessary.

A second point I noted was that family matters were discussed on the side of meetings frequently and possibilities (time and means) to connect with home were important.

A third point noted was that some of the government agencies congratulated government agencies of other countries and other countries as a whole on their achievements in the project as well as on their development in general. In the sample I looked at, there was a trend that larger countries with more resources congratulated smaller countries with fewer resources. However, I recognize that the sample was too small to produce a strong correlation in this respect. Likewise, one of the donor agencies congratulated the bigger countries explicitly at least twice during meetings and once mentioned during a meeting that there is a strong interest in the big countries.

A fourth and last detail noticed was that, besides indications that there was acceptance that the IO led the collaboration process (see above), the IO was quite strong in behavior and communication. There were internal discussions about the inclusion of new countries before this was proposed to the other government agencies (jointly with the donor). The IO took the lead in the organization of the meetings, proposing schedules and formally concluding steps in the project. On one occasion, the IO's chief introduced the IO's project manager as "the owner of the project". As previously mentioned, the other agencies involved recognized this leadership of the IO and mentioned the benefits of having the IO on board (e.g. prevention of the collaboration project being brushed aside when high level staff in the government agency changed). Likewise, the IO usually proposed its plans and discussed them with the other agencies. Nevertheless, the IO proposed two new projects to the group on one

occasion and requested participation in them without any previous consultation. In a similar way, it once announced during the preparation for an upcoming meeting that an official summary would be published which would serve to present the regional position on the subject at another international forum. This was not discussed and agreed upon before with the government agencies (although the summary was then written jointly during the meeting with the possibility of including comments from everyone). Inside the IO, thoughts also came up on ways to better ensure compliance with deadlines and penalize non-compliance.

6.1.9 Dependent variable: ICC

In this section the observations I made in the field and related documents that provide evidence on the dependent variable are described. The paragraphs are organized around the operationalization I provided for the case study around the four indicators:

1. Progress on the output of the project (database and reports);
2. Increase in exchanges between participants;
3. Increase in understanding other agencies' backgrounds; and
4. Collaboration on other projects.

Regarding the first indicator, it became clear that there was progress over the time of the project. The status table on energy efficiency indicators completion developed by the international consultant for every meeting already showed that more and more government agencies provided the data over time. This was also noted in the national reports published to date which stated that this is partly due to the adaptability of the indicators to the country's needs. The quality of these indicators was refined with the comments from the international consultants. Challenges in advancing towards the indicators and ultimately the national report seemed to be very country-specific (e.g. a policy requirement of this kind of indicators). By the end of my observation, only two countries of the first wave had published their national reports (none of the second wave). This was still fully compliant with the donor agreements (and the donors in fact expressed satisfaction with the project during meetings), although it seemed few given that five countries started the project in the first wave.

With respect to the second indicator of increased exchange between the collaborators, it was noted that there was an increase in number and quality. Notably, this was true for the exchange between the government agencies, the two donor agencies and the international consultancy. In the beginning, the government agencies had little or no contact with them and over the course of the project consulted on different technical and resource matters with the three agencies. The same increased exchange was also stated by two of the government agencies with agencies visited during the study tour to

Europe, but I was unable to verify that these two specific exchanges actually took place. Furthermore, the exchange between the government agencies increased. Three countries had at least one exchange with one other government agency regarding the methodology of the energy efficiency indicators to learn from each other. One agency had exchanges with two other government agencies and one agency even reported sharing experience bilaterally with three other agencies. The help of the project in increasing collaboration between the countries was also recognized in (formal) written letters from the agencies of two participating countries.

Regarding an increase in mutually understanding each other's background and the agencies' backgrounds I noticed the frequent exchange regarding the institutional and political context of the project that each agency emphasized and presented. The more open and frank these exchanges got, the more comments were also received that the other agencies had gone through similar processes or challenges in advancing with the project. Some countries even congratulated other countries on their progress, which in my view meant that they knew the context and previous status quo quite well. Similarly, the fact that many agencies stressed the problem of staff rotation in the region showed that they understood each other's agencies' realities. It was therefore logical that they demonstrated mutual understanding if the collaboration did not advance as scheduled. I would say this was also shown by the way the IO and the donors interacted with the government agencies and their ways of follow-up on agreed-upon products.

Lastly, with regard to the indicator of developing new collaborations from this collaboration project, several different forms of new collaboration were observed. First and foremost, more government agencies wanted to collaborate within the framework of the project. That was already shown by the fact that countries joined the project in a second wave but became more obvious as over the time observed more countries got interested in being part of it, which later led to a third wave, and still more countries were interested in joining in the future. Furthermore, with the government agencies that were part of the first wave and completed most of the database and country report, expanding the project to include a policy database on top was under discussion. This could be seen as a collaboration of a new type. Secondly, the government agencies involved in the project reported to have developed new collaborations with other government agencies in their own countries in three cases (in two cases with the national statistics institutions and in one case with the ministry of transport). Thirdly, the IO involved in the project was approached by at least three government agencies to collaborate on other projects besides the energy efficiency indicators one but through channels developed within the project. On the contrary, the IO also twice proposed new projects to the government agencies through the focal points and once used an output of the project in the context of another project. Lastly, the IO was able to

develop further collaborations through this project – sometimes more and sometimes less closely related to the project. This is most obvious in the case of sponsors for the policy dialogues. While three sponsors contributed to the event in the first dialogue, the last event that I observed featured nine. Moreover, the Latin American Parliament became quite present in the meetings with a resolution at the last policy dialogue and the offer to host the next high-level meeting. Furthermore, the IO also concluded two Memoranda of Understanding with two other agencies that had been attracted through word of mouth about the energy efficiency indicators project. However, the Memoranda did not only target this field but rather a wide-spread collaboration on different energy topics.

6.1.10 Summary: the findings from observation and document analysis
In the previous sections, the findings from the observation and documentation analysis were provided without adding any interpretation. This should give readers the possibility to draw their own conclusions first.

Practices reflecting the importance of the political and institutional setup and knowledge about it for the collaboration were identified. I was able to clearly separate the two based on my evidence. For the operating system, all elements suggested by the operationalized theory were confirmed (by their respective practices). The element of communication was added due to the particular style and importance of communication in the project. Differences in the communication styles of the political and the technical level were noticed. Likewise, all the elements under the resource heading were discovered to be present with the evidence for turf and autonomy being very similar. Steering seemed to be mainly done by the IO with a strong position in visioning, goal setting and leadership. A steering committee form was described in project documents but was not referred to in conversations during the meetings observed. The culture in the interagency collaboration displayed a bureaucratic culture element and negotiation took place as well. However, the negotiations usually ended with mutual agreements and could not be called negotiations in a strict sense. Trust-building and -maintaining processes were important with their respective practices.

Regarding the developmental dynamics of the interagency collaboration, it became clear that there was a conscious sequencing of different steps in the project. My conclusion was that, for research purposes, the best approach was to structure these steps around the big three pillars (right, left and top) of the operationalized theory. Maintaining three pillars on one side provided the right amount of detail to see differences, on the other side the three pillars were broad enough to actually be able to find sufficient evidence. For the momentum element, the strongest opportunity noted

in the observations and the documents was policy change. For the vulnerabilities, it was staff change.

In addition to the elements of Bardach's operationalized theory, I added a category capturing what was too prominent to be simple background noise but did not fit under any of the elements. First of all, I noticed that people gather around certain groups: people from the same countries, regions, language groups and gender usually clustered during meetings. Furthermore, family was an important topic besides the fact that this was a work project. Moreover, country agency representatives used to congratulate the others on their achievements. A slight tendency was noted that this was done more by bigger and more resourceful countries (and donors) than by smaller, less resourceful countries. Lastly, a sense of ownership of the project was found for the IO. For the dependent variable and its four indicators, evidence was found that showed progress.

6.2 Data from interviews

This section documents the findings from the interviews. Analyzing the data, I noted first of all that a lot more information was produced during the interviews than during observation. The interviewees really went into details which made documentation and coding a quite extensive and difficult task. Nevertheless, it is a good outcome as it could be judged as a sign of trust in the interviewer. Consequently, I was able to capture the reality perceived by the interviewees as closely as possible. Furthermore, the findings differed from the ones during observation and the analysis of documents. Much more information was gathered on the why and how (intentions, ideas, beliefs). This was the purpose of the interviews and, again, a positive sign. In some cases, the perception was noted to differ from the reality (proven by documents or events).

6.2.1 Political and institutional setup

As the political and the institutional setup were distinguished during the observation phase, I decided to code the data from the interviews in the same way. Nevertheless, the interview data was not that clearly separated into political and institutional setup – mainly because the interviewees provided the links between the two. One of the interviewees of the IO brought it to the point stating that the political and the technical were linked. Also, one of the country representatives said that there were two levels of approval for projects: firstly, the possibility to comply with the demand of the project (institutional factors) and, secondly, if the entity was interested (political priorities). One interesting comment came from one of the national consultants working with one of the first countries to join the project. He said that during the start-up phase of the collaboration, the setup for the country had been clarified in detail to determine the important institutional factors and political priorities to advance collaboration. In this

sense, needs and opportunities in the institutional and political setup were analyzed for each of the countries joining the project.

6.2.1.1 The institutional setup and formal structures

Information about the institutional setup was often shared as part of the background information with reference to the reasons and motivations for an agency to embark on the project. This happened more in interviews with technical level staff than higher, political level staff (18 technical staff mentioned the institutional setup compared to 15 staff on a political level). Mostly, information on how political mechanisms work (election of staff, budget and workplan approval) was shared. This was sometimes used by the interviewees to measure the institutional stability of the agencies involved. Moreover, regional integration mechanisms were referred to (e.g. in Central America). Also, the majority of the donors, IO and observer organizations mentioned their respective institutional setups in the interview. It seemed to be important for them. They used the information mainly to clarify their exact mandates.

The interviewees mentioned several institutional factors specifically impeding them from progressing. Above all, these were availability or lack of information to be able to fill the database (mentioned 12 times) and the fit with or absence of policy on the matter (eight times). Other factors cited were institutional stability (five times), good or bad cooperation with other national agencies and availability of human and financial resources (both three times). In one interview an interviewee from an agency mentioned the fit of the project with another project as important for being able to progress.

Knowledge about these institutional factors was demonstrated by the IO (but also by the observer organization and some of the countries). Several representatives of the country agencies recognized it explicitly. For example, one interviewee said: "ECLAC is known for identifying the weaknesses in the region." He confirmed that there were sometimes problems in this respect with other IOs, as their projects did not match the needs of the country. In the end, the agency spent much more time in these unsuitable projects on explaining what it did not need rather than what it needed.

6.2.1.2 The political setup and priorities

Many comments were received that the project coincided with current political priorities of the administration in power. These comments were quantitatively not attributable to either the technical or the political level (noted by 13 political level interviewees compared to 12 technical level interviewees). However, a difference in quality and depth of the answer was distinguishable with the political level attributing

much more importance to political priorities. Different names were provided for it ranging from political "vision", "objectives", "strategic goals" to "interests".

The nature of priorities was quite different between the various organizations. Some respondents referred to the information and learning (or capacity building) obtained from the project and its indicator database (including the development of methodology and standards). Others targeted improving policies in the future. International comparison, validation of their own data and regional leadership on the matter were also named. Two respondents said that they hoped to acquire new projects in the future with the results from this project. In this sense, it was emphasized by several interviewees that the outcomes of the project coincided with the countries' interests or vision. Once the project (and the issue of energy efficiency) coincided with the interests of the country and its population, it was often a political priority and consequently obtained the necessary resources. If the project was not a political priority, it complicated the access to resources. One interviewee mentioned that this might be related to the fact that the project was not tangible in the sense that the politicians were not able to cut a red ribbon as they did when inaugurating e.g. a new power plant. Nevertheless, political priority did not always come with formal action. One country in the project considered it a high political priority but never formally notified the IO about its participation as a country.

Also for the IO and the donors, the political priorities of their organizations were quite important. In this respect, one agency stressed that it did not have a political goal for each product but that the project as such had of course an impact on its portfolio and discussions. In another case, the donor did not consider Latin America a priority at the beginning of the project and just issued an order to focus on core activities. Notwithstanding this, its agents linked the proposal for the new project to other already ongoing initiatives and stressed the participation of the IO. Combined with an interest in two particular countries, this in the end allowed the project to commence. Sometimes other political circumstances beyond the project (e.g. presidency in other international fora) were able to make the project a political priority, too. For that reason, it was important to monitor the general political landscape, macroeconomic situation and the products of other international organizations according to an interviewee from the IO.

The knowledge about and becoming a political priority is very people-based. References were made to opinions and convincing people. In this regard government change was able to change priorities and interests – for the good and the bad. A new vision for the topic of energy efficiency or the project helped in that sense to advance with the goals of the project. However, I was unable to draw a clear picture of at how high a level this priority has to be planted. One interviewee made reference up to the

presidency yet another interviewee said that the minister would not know about the project – the director was high enough. Many of the respondents agreed that the IO had a particular sense for those priorities and tried to understand the interests of each administration but mentioned different reasons for this. References included the intellectual authority of the IO, the aligned ideologies of the IO and the country and regular exchange in meetings. Also, it was mentioned that the governance structure of the IO was quite special as the recipients were the governing entities.

6.2.2 Operating system
In the following, the findings from the interviews regarding their insight into the operating system are summarized. To structure it, I use Bardach's operationalized theory but maintain the element of communication discovered during observation.

6.2.2.1 Communication
Generally, interviewees saw the way or style of communication as important. Their comments showed that communication in this collaboration may reach levels of a political statement (depending on level and purpose). For example, one interviewee said that a report had to be edited to make it "politically digestible". Also, the IO confirmed that in meetings the speaking order followed a historical protocol of having first the host country, then the IO and afterwards the donor and sponsors speaking. The same is true for putting their logos on project-related documents. In two cases, respondents reported that on certain matters there was first an informal communication to request a formal communication in order to be able to do a particular thing.

Furthermore, different communication styles according to level and issue were noted during the interviews. In fact, one of the interviewees said: "The communication depends on the topic." First of all, the respondents usually communicated with other participants of the collaboration on the same level (i.e. technical focal points with other technical focal points and political level with political level). The same applied for institutional responsibilities – the IO's regional office for Central America, for instance, led the communication with the countries in that region.

The political level usually communicated on matters that were described by one respondent as "issues of representation of the country". However, what these issues included differed from agency to agency but usually included institutional agreements, publication of documents and assignation of travel. The form to communicate about these matters was normally through written letters (although then distributed as an attachment to an e-mail). This served to be able to designate responsibilities and delegate authority (if required) – internally as well as externally. Another purpose was to keep a record of the interactions.

On the technical level, communication was mostly about technical information and difficulties with the project, as told by the technical focal points. This also seemed to make the communication on the technical level relatively more frequent (more comments were received by technical focal points than from political focal points; one political level interviewee did not even know how communication in the project worked when asked). Communication was mostly through e-mails as this was said to be more direct, which also applied to the communication with the international consultant. Twice, comments were received that it was due to language issues as well, as the counterparts did not have the same mother tongue. But it seemed that this happened only occasionally. In one interview, a problem with a national consultant was reported who communicated directly with the IO without informing the ministry, which was consequently unable to monitor compliance. Keeping key people informed was stressed as important and interviewees consequently mentioned copying those key people in on all e-mails. This included different groups, both internal and external stakeholders.

Meetings were reported to have the main purpose of sharing information. Again, on the technical level the shared information concerned problems in advancing with technical matters (namely the database template). On the political level, meetings usually served either for monitoring the progress of the project or the preparation of (future) agreements. Most obviously, this was reported for the start-up phase.

6.2.2.2 Flexibility
There was general agreement among the interviewees that the IO was pretty flexible in the project (a literal reference to the IO's flexibility was recorded in a response ten times). That was also stated in comparison to other IOs' projects. One exemplary comment in this respect was that in this collaboration "there are no formal agreements". At the same time, respondents felt that on some particular matters there was no flexibility – mainly regarding the overall coordination and administration of the project. However, no clear matters were specified.

The argument cited for not being on schedule sometimes – the operational side of flexibility – was that things were "out of one's hands". This could be due to current political priorities or due to internal complications (staff, budget, etc.). Most frequently, the (un-)availability of information to fill the template or methodological questions were referred to in terms of internal complications. In some cases, this was because the country agencies felt they did not know the actual requirements in the beginning – so they also had to be flexible. These reasons were understood by the IO and other agencies in the project and they adjusted their treatment of each country to its particular situation. In turn, the country agencies had to react flexibly to some

unforeseen changes from the IO (e.g. provision of consultants). In a sense, the project as such was flexible as the agencies were able to modify the technical terms of the project. From the beginning, all agencies agreed to adapt the data template (the main product) to the countries' realities. Although countries joined the project at different stages, there was "always a certain flexibility", as the international consultant said. In terms of the contractual flexibility, I noticed that this went even further, as one country actually never formalized its participation as a country but only participated as an agency. Another country had first declined its participation and later retracted the decision and joined.

Interestingly, the donors also showed flexibility, as no clear schedule of activities to comply with was referred to. The goal or impact of the collaboration was rather cited as the compliance framework. They stated that the impact is what interested them, how they got there did not matter. That was facilitated by the modality of financing contracts for budgeting which provided a certain autonomy to the IO – and came with challenges for accountability. One donor representative's statement brought it to the point: "You need to be flexible – we do not need [all] countries at the same level. It is a process." This was likewise reflected in the statements made by the IO's representatives. One of them said that the project followed an organic process where unforeseen events were incorporated. The person said that this was normal in a project that entailed both a technical and political component and that "you cannot plan, you need flexibility." Institutional factors were cited as crucial for that, mainly the fact that the IO was not financed by only one country to do something in another country but rather that the workplan was agreed upon biennially by all member states. This provided a mix of funding from different sources. It was seen as linked to the fact that the IO was not an implementing agency but rather working as a think tank – which required flexibility.

6.2.2.3 Motivation
The interviewees from the IO, one donor and the international consultant agreed that motivation was important for this collaboration to be successful. One of the interviewees pointed out that motivation was not only about pushing the agencies to work and following-up. The collaborating partners had to understand how useful the project was. In this person's view, the effective countries were ones that had made energy efficiency a priority. One respondent was exemplary in saying: "What does it interest us if they [the other agencies] work or not?" Besides the value of the project, targets were seen as a motivation. Therefore, once a country reached a target, the collaborating agencies tried to provide something extra of interest for the country to work on. The international consultant mentioned that as "the carrot" (as a contrast to working with a stick). The 'job' of motivating was seen as something to be done on

the personal level – something that had to be done by someone. It was more difficult in this project, as no money was involved for the country agencies. Notwithstanding this, one donor and the international consultant agreed that the IO did good work on that compared to similar projects in other regions.

The country agencies' representatives mostly referred to the utility of the project as a motivator. However, different levels of motivation were mentioned. The first one was the utility of the project for the country and its progress. For example, one respondent said: "I do not care about advances; I want to have a good outcome. I am committed to my country". Secondly, compliance with law, commitments and instructions from higher hierarchy levels were mentioned. Lastly, some interviewees told me about personal and professional growth as motivation. These three levels were not clearly distinguishable and the interviewees would probably not even have been able to differentiate between them themselves. This is also shown by the components that were cited as motivating: learning was mentioned as well as sharing or teaching their own experience. Comparing their own country internationally and better policy-making were referred to as well. The design of the project probably played a role in this (e.g. the modality of working with all countries at the same time). Moreover, simply calling on commitments worked as respondents said twice that the meetings were important to make them work. Shaming seemed to be part of motivation, as the achievements (and lack thereof) represented the country. All of them were most likely motivating on all three of the levels depending on the individual. On a more personal level, pride in one's own work and sense of belonging to a community were mentioned. Travel was controversial as a motivation. Particularly, the IO and one donor said that travel and the daily subsistence allowance received could work as a motivation. But only few country agents confirmed that – the decision inside each agency which staff member should travel to a meeting was usually dependent on the political level perceived to be required. The comments during the interviews signaled that compliance with commitments and sound administration of the project by the IO, the donors and the international consultant also had a motivating effect.

These comments were received across technical and political levels and no tendencies were found. These motivators likewise seemed to be valid for the IO, donors and the international consultant. Donors emphasized a match with political priorities and a personal interest in the project. One of the donor agents even stated to have taken vacation days once to work on a new phase of the project in his/her own time when it was not yet a priority for the administration. The IO emphasized its motivation by the fact that the project generated thinking and a regional cooperation process, all of which it found exceptional.

6.2.2.4 Mutual understanding

Virtually all interviewees showed mutual understanding in their comments – an element about which I took a lot of notes. A lot of understanding was voiced by country agencies with respect to the realities and internal dynamics the other country agencies were facing. For example, one country agent stated to have even declined the consultant offered by the IO because he felt that other countries needed that help more. Interestingly, technical level interviewees mostly referred to government change, resources, staff shortages and lack of information as challenges (for oneself and others). Political level respondents rather cited political priorities and policies as determining information about other countries. Only few references to operational challenges were made (e.g. languages barrier as a challenge).

The IO was cited by country representatives as very capable in understanding all of these challenges. It was said to always "be close to the country" and "conscious about needs, strength and weaknesses". The IO's agents, in turn, correctly pointed that out as a strength and used their own judgement as one criterion for incorporating new countries. They agreed that the heterogeneity (e.g. in terms of availability of information) of the countries made it impossible to advance at the same speed towards the project goals. They stated that this could be handled flexibly. They also had a good understanding of the motivations, interests and dynamics of the country agencies. Nevertheless, the other involved agencies, namely the donor and the international consultancy, were also very informed about the countries' realities. Notwithstanding this, all of these agencies agreed that there were always new lessons to be learnt and constant learning was required.

Likewise, good mutual understanding was remarked among the IO, observer organization, donors and international consultant. The comments suggested that everyone was conscious about each other's strengths and limitations. This went so far that the IO was able to simply request the donors' continued support as previous inquiries had shown that this was going to be granted as opposed to a formal application procedure usually expected in such a process in development cooperation. The countries usually guessed rightly the interests and limitations of these organizations as well. They were, for instance, not bothered that they did not know all details of the project – considered to be an internal issue of the IO. Furthermore, when the IO requested a formality from the countries internally important to the IO, the country agencies also understood that and complied.

This level of mutual understanding required frequent exchanges. Mostly, they happened during physical meetings and seemed to be facilitated by keeping the meetings on a technical level. Alongside with the facilitation by the IO, this was perceived to depoliticize the exchanges. One country representative said: "I do not

know the realities of other countries. That is why this project is so important: the exchange between professionals." However, previous relationships with the agencies and their agents facilitated mutual understanding as well. The IO had worked with all of the countries previously but the donors and international consultant had also had projects with some of the countries in the past. The country agents likewise met sometimes as part of other fora. For instance, the Central American countries were able to discuss issues related to and beyond the project in the context of the regional integration mechanism (SICA). In that way, it looked like mutual understanding was not only based on trust but in turn also promoted trust.

6.2.2.5 Accountability

The country agencies' representatives mentioned commitment to the project most of the time as the reason for feeling responsible. It was either seen as a responsibility for the institution or for the country as a whole. Nevertheless, none of the interviewees referred to the citizens or the people as the ultimate level of accountability. It was the progress of the country, legal obligations and the peer group that were mentioned as a reference. Mostly, reference was made to the immediate commitment to the IO to deliver products as a return for assets received. The feeling of commitment usually derived from an understanding that the IO also has obligations to meet, for which certain products were required. This was even mentioned on a micro level, e.g. for travel. One interviewee said: "If they invite you for a meeting, the least you can do is to send the papers required." In this respect, the IO was perceived by some respondents to be easier than other IOs – with less contractual obligations. In turn, the IO was also held accountable by the country agencies for delivering promised assets in the agreed-upon time. According to the few comments received on the matter, the IO complied.

The only interfering obligation to disregard the commitment to the IO in the project (or at least delay products required) that was mentioned were higher political obligations. Once complying with a responsibility towards the IO meant the risk of political problems, the obligation was not met, e.g. publication of certain information. In this regard, the rather loose feeling of accountability was expressed by one agent saying: "It is not an obligation, right?" Establishing new commitments for the country in that sense had to be authorized by the correct political authority. In turn, the IO (and the other organizations part of project) understood this higher level accountability of the agencies and recognized its own limited means for sanctioning incompliance.

Accountability seemed to be more important for the IO, the observer organization and the donors. 40% of the comments received under this element heading came from these agencies, although they are much less in number than the country agencies.

Institutional accountability is the reference point for all of them – the steering bodies and authorities that approve contracts, workplans and budgets. One time, an agency even said that incompliance could make the agents personally liable. The indicators that had to be achieved according to the workplans seemed to be the most important accountability criterion that had to be complied with through delivering the products in the terms of reference. Likewise, following the established rules for fund management was crucial. Due to the fact that the IO had several different funding sources, it was accountable to different parties. At the same time, this increased its flexibility regarding the how and when to comply with them.

6.2.2.6 Financial exchanges

The only real financial exchanges happened from the donor to the IO (and to the international consultant). However, these flows were not known by the IO's staff before the implementation of a new budget cycle as they were negotiated on a higher political level (see 6.2.3.3). Sometimes donors provided additional in-kind resources such as specialized consultants for a particular topic. Likewise, access to specialized knowledge was one of these in-kind exchanges. Nevertheless, funds did not only derive from the two donors for the IO, it was rather a mix of funds from different sources. When the financial exchanges came out of the regular budget, it was assigned by the designated steering bodies without influence from the staff in charge of the project. The reliable management of these finances according to established rules was perceived to be important in the interviews. One interviewee from the IO also suspected that the IO is the cheaper option in that sense for donors, as administrative and monitoring costs are lower compared to other options. The budget was not known to the other agencies involved in the collaboration, which they did not consider a problem. It was seen as something internal to the IO. For example, one respondent said that "it is ok – business is business." Interestingly, not even the regional office of the IO knew the budget as it was managed in headquarters and not disclosed.

The assets received by the country agencies were support through national and international consultancies and travel. In exchange, they provided staff, time and information. Although the contribution from the IO was not monetary, it was appreciated (naturally more would have been welcome as well). Understanding was perceived for the mode of operation in the collaboration.

The particularity of exchange of information was stressed in the interviews by several agencies as well – not only the country agencies but all kinds of agencies. Although sharing data and information inside the project was not at all perceived as sensitive, the publication of the data was. The difference was the "official seal". Once it became official information from a country, it had to be approved by the political authorities.

However, only the official seal made information a valuable barter for exchange. If the information was already in the public domain that was, of course, less of an issue.

6.2.3 Resources
The following section documents the findings on resources during the interviews. The structure follows the operationalized theory developed earlier.

6.2.3.1 Turf

No issues were reported regarding turf. Besides the mandate, turf was perceived to be related to the core interest of each agency – and that core interest was respected by everyone. For the government agencies involved in the project, it was notably politics and policy on energy matters. No other agency interfered in that, as none had authority to do so and, moreover, it was considered to be a local matter. Quite strong opinions were voiced in this respect during the interviews. To cite only two: "We are not subjected to donations – we work together with partners" or "I do not like the [kind of] collaboration that tells me what I have to do."

Likewise, no interference was perceived with the turf of the other agencies involved in the collaboration. The project, and its management in particular, were unanimously seen as turf of the IO (often because it had started it). It was considered the IO's project: "I find it ok that we do not have a say in an ECLAC project." Conversely, the IO respected the mandates of the other agencies and, for example, delegated the technical side of the project fully to the most competent agencies. Respect for turf thus derived from perceived strengths and limitations of the other agencies. One interviewee put it in the following way: "Do things technically sound and politically visible." Interestingly, some of the comments obtained under the turf element were closely linked to the political standing of an agency. It could therefore be that turf was based on an historical accumulation of political standing. Similarly, the IO's regional office's mandate was respected as being in charge of the countries of its region. The only two organizations that did have a slight overlap in mandate (and, thus, turf) were the observer organization and the IO. In this area, some comments on competition over turf were noted, but sometimes with reference to historical differences.

6.2.3.2 Autonomy

The remarks reported under other elements, chiefly turf and flexibility, already signaled that there would be a high degree of autonomy for the agencies involved in the collaboration and comments of that kind were made indeed. People felt that it was always possible to have their own opinions, adapt the project and its products to own needs and manage the project as required by the country's agency according to its own

rhythm. The idea was that everyone achieved their own objectives. To a certain extent, taking this kind of ownership and acting autonomously was almost required by the IO, as one representative said that "it is not only a one-way but a two-way street; the country has to decide what is of interest to it." The interviewed agents agreed that this was not necessarily the same with all IOs and three responses cited bad projects with other international agencies. The very practical example of autonomously recruiting a national consultant was mentioned twice to show the degree of autonomy in management. Although paid for by the IO, the selection and interview process was usually driven by the government agency which was to host the consultant.

Similarly, the donors gave a good degree of autonomy to the IO to manage the project. One donor representative explicitly recognized that it was the business of the IO how to achieve what was agreed; the way did not matter. This was also seen as important by the IO due to its nature as a think tank. Lastly, the two donors were quite autonomous and flexible working side by side with each other on the same project without influencing products. One of the respondents said that they only looked at the best technical solution and left it to the IO to decide with whom to work.

6.2.3.3 Money
The statements recorded under 'money' were very similar to the ones from section 6.2.2.6, 'financial exchanges'. Money was only managed by the IO. The country agencies did not have problems with that and appreciated the resources received. Nevertheless, some respondents stated that they would have needed more resources. The most important resources provided to the country agencies were (national and international) consultants and expertise, travel and the costs of meetings. The countries in turn provided staff (time) and information. The initiative to offer hosting a workshop or policy dialogue could come from both sides; either the country offered it or the IO proposed it. The costs for meetings were borne by the IO but the preparation was done by the collaborating agency. The resources involved were "never discussed" in the collaboration and the budget, in particular, was not shared (not even with the IO's regional office). One time, it was reported that a country agency requested being allowed to manage the budget for the national consultant itself, which the IO refused. Once an interviewee claimed that he had not been aware of the possibility of receiving a national consultant. Not all countries received a national consultant as a resource – either because they did not needed one or because the IO did not provide one. The level of support provided and the expansion of the project was subject to the availability of funds, as the IO confirmed. In two cases, however, countries contributed their own funds for their own objectives in the project or raised new funds for that.

The money of the IO was received in large parts from the donors but also came from the regular budget. The latter was allocated by the designated political entity with no participation from project staff. The trend was budget cuts. Likewise, project staff was not involved in the donor negotiations (information was only received about one of the donors). Consequently, the IO had to adapt to resources available and also to adjust the resources made available to the countries. Notwithstanding this, the (funding) relationship with the donors seemed quite stable as one donor interviewee said that the project was never really called into question but was rather a fixed point (but it was also believed that the budget would not increase). In turn, the IO mentioned that not much work had been required to convince the donors to support the project. Occasionally, donors provided additional expertise in kind. In some cases their name or logo was perceived as a resource of political standing. As the donors themselves recognized certain limitations to what they were able to fund, the IO had combined the different funds in flexible and smart ways.

6.2.3.4 People

People seemed to be a key issue for all involved, as virtually every interviewee commented on that. On the government agencies' side, the differences in team size were enormous. Between one and 30 people were working on the project at the different agencies. Lack of (qualified) staff was the biggest concern – not only for government agencies but also for the other agencies. Occasionally, staff rotation was mentioned as a challenge. To address staff shortages, some country agencies resorted to the offer of the IO to provide a national consultant. In two cases, this help was felt to be so essential that the consultant's contract was extended for more time through funds from other donor projects at the initiative of the country. Another country started to collaborate with a local university to circumvent the lack of staff. If a country opted for a national consultant, involvement in the recruitment and day-to-day management of the consultant was usually high. The challenge of having a consultant doing the work was not to lose the knowledge once the consultant left (also recognized by the IO, the donors and the international consultant). Nevertheless, it depended very much on the consultant and how she/he perceived her/his role.

In that sense, it was interesting that the criterion for opting for a consultant or not was really the expert knowledge about the subject. However, this led to two different lines of reasoning. Some agencies requested the consultant since they did not have this expertise. Others told me that because they did not have the knowledge, they did not want to have the consultant in order to be able to build the capacity in house.

Furthermore, it was noted that the "energy efficiency world" was small. Several respondents said that they knew others in the project from other (professional) occasions. This was mentioned on all levels, but it seemed that the technical and

political worlds stayed apart from the other. However, I was unable to verify this in detail, as not all interview partners made reference to a specific person. One particular case was a former staff member of a country agency who later became a consultant for the IO.

Lastly, the characteristics of the people working on the collaboration were mentioned as an important factor for success. Some characteristics were seen as important rather internally inside an agency, such as being a person trusted by higher hierarchy levels (because that increased room for making decisions). Looking beyond the own agency, other characteristics were judged as important as being able to drive forward the collaboration (often the same elements as the ones elaborated on before and hereafter). Notably, the interview partners from the IO agreed that, internally, they disposed of a good, complementary team, particularly in the start-up phase of the project. I identified that two types of people were usually involved, the ones that disposed of the technical or knowledge capacities and the ones that had a talent for management and operations.

6.2.3.5 Political standing

Most of the comments on political standing came from political level counterparts. It seemed that political standing indeed functioned almost like an asset that could be exchanged for other assets. This worked among all of the agencies. It was interesting that in order to 'make something happen' political standing did not necessarily have to be acquired at the highest level but only at some political level with the means to drive things forward. Also, political standing was able to change over time and it was commented that this had happened for two agencies. Different practices were mentioned to demonstrate political standing for another agency: attending meetings (the higher the level of the attendee the higher the standing), following up and communicating (the higher the level the higher the standing), being patient to solve challenges together and recognizing the achievements and contributions publicly (e.g. through speeches).

On the one hand, political support was considered important externally in order to be able to advance in the project. For instance, one comment was that with another IO the involved agency would not have embarked on such a project. On the other hand, this support sometimes was needed internally to increase the agency's own standing inside the institutional architecture. The reasons mentioned why the country agencies mostly felt that the IO's participation was able to increase their respective political standing at home were different. The following is a list of the answers received: it had the same ideology, it was a capable and recognized institution, it was the starter of project, it [the United Nations] raised the profile, it treated everyone the same way, it provided visibility, it [the project] delivered results and it provided a network. In turn, some

government agencies also recognized that it was "important for us to be part of it [the project]". This was occasionally used by the IO as a diplomatic strategy to get countries to do something, especially if the country had ambitions to achieve or led a particular part of the project.

6.2.3.6 Information
The majority of the comments were received on the information flow between the IO and the country agencies (and vice versa) as well as between country agencies. The information shared was mainly data and direct information on energy matters (the data required in the project) as well as ideas and strategies to overcome challenges in gathering this data and advancing with the project. As noted before, finding this kind of data was a challenge for some of the agencies involved. This information and strategies were also the main content of the exchanges with the international consultant. From the IO to the government agencies, the information flow mainly consisted of presenting the project and elements of it as well as presenting the next steps. The information that was valuable to the IO, in addition to that mentioned above, was also information on other projects executed by the agencies.

To facilitate information exchange, several comments were received that it was helpful that the technical was discussed on the technical level. Combined with trust in the IO, this helped to depoliticize the discussion and share openly. Comments received on the political level were slightly different in tone. The statements felt slightly more strategic, such as "you learn about the reality of other countries. We do not comment on it – but we realize it." Also, the political level respondents mentioned networking as one purpose for information exchange, which was not frequently mentioned by the technical level respondents.

Information was usually exchanged personally in meetings. Other means for sharing information (e.g. e-mail) were not appreciated by interviewees on all levels but particularly disliked on the political level. The meetings were also thought of as the forum for exchange as responses by the IO, the donors and the international consultant showed – a place for technical exchange or a sort of capacity building. This combined well with the fact that these meetings served as pressure to make the country agencies advance. The policy dialogues were in turn designed by the IO as the forum for political monitoring and promotion of the project.

6.2.4 Steering a course
The following section summarizes the comments gathered during the interviews regarding steering a course. It has been structured around the elements developed

based on Eugene Bardach. Nevertheless, under the leadership element some comments received from respondents on ownership have been included as well.

6.2.4.1 Vision, goals and process

Already during conversations with interviewees inside the IO, different visions were communicated. The starting point of the project was still named fairly consistently as the interest in constructing an energy efficiency database that would allow for comparison between the countries and the impact of their policies. But regarding the long-term vision, different versions were voiced: capacity building, fostering horizontal cooperation and energy integration of the region were all named. All of these were probably related but it is interesting that not even the IO was able to single out the most important one. Nevertheless, all interviewees from the IO seemed very convinced that this project was something innovative and valuable. It was pointed out that the vision had to be adapted from time to time by the IO as well, e.g. the coverage of countries according to political interest. In that sense, the vision was adapted to what was possible. Likewise, not all outcomes were foreseen by the IO and the project revealed learning and new opportunities for the IO (as well as for the donors and the international consultant). The vision was presented to the country agencies before starting the project. More extensive presentations were given at the beginning of the project to the first wave countries.

Country representatives on all levels likewise enumerated very different visions for their agencies participating in the project. Even inside the same agency, interviewees referred to different interests. Mostly, these visions were congruent with the (several) visions mentioned by the IO's representatives described earlier. In addition, attracting more political attention and resources were named. Two most exceptional visions mentioned by country agency representatives were once the interest in that the project helped founding an energy efficiency agency and once that the region would be able to negotiate as a block in the future. One country agent formulated very rightly in this respect that a country could only state a vision "if the country has a vision and is not just firefighting". Generally, the project was considered to be a "good match of objectives and interests". All agencies, government agencies, IO, donors and international consultant, recognized that these can differ from agency to agency. In that sense, it was said that everyone in the project was happy without having overly tangible targets. Also, the donors had intangible interests as, e.g. promoting energy efficiency at world level, promoting European expertise or developing synergies with bilateral programs. Furthermore, different visions were mentioned when asked about the future in case the IO should not continue the project at some point. In the beginning, the IO and observer organization had discussed that the observer

organization could take over the project. But some countries had other visions. Moreover, different ideas for new future projects were raised by different agencies.

The goal setting process (the more nitty gritty details such as schedules and next steps) was generally described in four big phases:

1. Presentation of template;
2. Filling of the template and feedback;
3. Calculation of indicators; and
4. Publication of the national report.

Afterwards, the IO proposed to start a database on energy efficiency policies as a complement and the development of composite indicators. This schedule was part of every official invitation to the countries to become part of the project. Targets were seen as important to make things actually go forward by countries and the IO alike. Furthermore, they provided later the legitimization for the IO to press if not complied with. In the day-to-day management of the project, the meetings were the main forum where the goals were discussed. It was common practice that the IO proposed, the countries agreed to and the agencies tried to work towards the goals. However, most of the agents agreed that if priorities changed or there were technical challenges, the schedule had to be adapted and delays accepted.

This process seemed to be accepted by everyone. The interviewees said that there was "no pressure", and "no imposition"; the process had been "flexible" and one had had the possibility to have an opinion and participate. Likewise, the international consultant noted that generally there were a lot of comments and also recalled that the countries liked that detailed explanations were given about why certain issues were important. The government agencies also agreed that this was part of how collaboration worked: someone had to manage it – a standard procedure for all projects proposed from outside the agency. For the donors, goal setting was seen as simple: the goals were the indicators stated in the agreement measuring impact in long functional chains.

6.2.4.2 Form

It was interesting to note that not a single interviewee ever mentioned the steering committees that were provisioned for in the written agreements with the countries. The sense of absence of these fora and that there were no formal agreements was enhanced by comments such as: "Steering was not explicit but a process." Notwithstanding this, most of the respondents agreed that the meetings were important to determine where the interagency collaboration would go. Many said that the meetings were where one

could have an opinion. The process was seen as the following: the IO proposed goals and approaches, the countries confirmed these or, vice versa, the countries proposed something and the IO made it official. This was also the view of the IO itself: at the annual policy meeting, opinions were collected and the plans adapted accordingly. One of the IO representatives in this regard provided a very interesting remark that the reason why no committees were required was the trust that the countries had in the IO and its management of the project. The person said: "The more committees you have, the less you trust in the manager." In that sense, the IO was often mentioned as a coordinator, the one that maintained order and managed the process. However, not all agreed. One of the interviewees from the IO was of the opinion that a steering committee with all countries would increase the professional outlook of the project. It should be noted that the IO also communicated openly that the management structure was not invented by them but copied from the way the comparative project was managed by the European Union. The fundamental difference was that no international management committee existed for the Latin American project. The reason for that was that the funding of the European project by the European Commission made this mandatory, which was not the case in Latin America. The IO's view was that it did not have the resources or the mandate for another committee. From the donors' point of view, it was clear that steering was done through the budget and the contractual agreements.

6.2.4.3 Leadership

The interviews with the IO representatives showed that there was a big deal of leadership from the IO's side in starting the project; one could say that it took the lead to actually get the project together. This happened on the technical or intellectual level through arranging the project in a technically sound way to address a knowledge gap in the region, providing and adapting the template of the database and selecting the countries to join. Moreover, it was done on a political level by travelling to meet people ("identify the right people"), presenting the idea, engaging diplomatically to address concerns and scheduling meetings. This was not done by one individual but a group of people was involved in different tasks. One could say that there was not one leader but that the IO led the process. This leadership continued to the mature stage of the project. Countries and the IO agreed that budget and agenda (schedule) came from the IO as well as it ensured follow up. Furthermore, the IO took initiative to reach out to other organizations not involved in the project at that moment to be able to propose new projects to the government agencies.

Most of the interviewees agreed on the leadership of the IO and saw it as normal – mostly with reference to the fact that the IO was the agency that had started the project. In that sense, the collaboration was seen a bit as the IO's project. In one case,

that extended to the point that the country agency's representative said that the IO had to approve his work on the project. But this was the exception. The most common answers were of the same tone as the following: "There is no leadership because there should not be one. It [the IO] is rather a technical director (…) a coordinator." Likewise, the IO's regional office and the donors recognized that this project was led by the IO from its headquarters and that the idea came from there.

Furthermore, the leadership of the IO did not mean that the other agencies did not take the lead at some points. For example, country agencies offered to host meetings, expressed interests and proposed future projects matching their priorities (which they did naturally outside the project as well). The latter was mainly mentioned by political level agents. As two countries stated in the interviews that they felt empowered to make decisions for the country in the project and both had also seen good advances, it might be that being empowered helped to take the lead and hence to advance more quickly. Success in gathering the required data might actually lead to a sort of transition in the leadership from the IO to the country, as some of the successful countries literally took the lead and, for instance, acquired more resources for their country in the project from other sources. This was also seen as important by one of the IO's representatives, who stated that the idea from the beginning was that at a later stage countries could take the leadership in the project. In this respect, it was voiced once that the countries took ownership because the IO was not a cooperation agency that had to 'sell something'.

In addition to Bardach's framework, the interviewees were asked during the interviews who was the owner or leader of the project. Of course as a researcher, I had in mind the idea of ownership of an international cooperation project as the development world understands it (section 2.1.3). The first thing I noticed in the answers to the question was that the interviewees were not familiar with the use of ownership in the development literature. Many different answers were received – also with respect if the owner or leader of the project was an agency or a person. Nevertheless, the IO was named as the leader in some sense seven times and the countries as the owners eight times. Only the interviewees from the IO itself saw it differently with three interviewees stating that the project was owned by the IO and only one respondent thought the owners were the countries. However, the comment was received again that this was changing over time with the countries becoming more skilled over time and taking over more ownership.

6.2.5 Culture

In the following section, I elaborate on the findings from the interviews regarding the culture in the interagency collaboration. It is structured around the elements of Bardach's operationalized theory.

6.2.5.1 Bureaucratic culture

On one side, many aspects of bureaucratic culture were reported in the collaboration by the interviewees. This concerned mainly travel, publication of documents and any (formal) commitments of the agency. Notwithstanding this, taking a closer look, these aspects were almost exclusively reported for processes inside the respective agencies. And they were mentioned for and by all agencies: country agencies, donors and the IO. Some of the government agents, which were among the most advanced countries in completing the project, mentioned that they usually had a large degree of freedom to decide about the project and worked flexibly in teams to advance more quickly. This could be a hint that a certain freedom was required to be able to perform. However, it should be said that the comments received regarding bureaucracy in the collaboration were quite balanced. Although too much bureaucracy was criticized by some interview partners, many of them understood the benefits of bureaucracy and its need to make things work. More than anything, bureaucratic hurdles were seen as a delaying factor – once it kicked in, it just took time.

On the other side, the collaboration between agencies as such did not appear to be overly bureaucratic. The interviewees' comments were full of examples of flexibility and adaptation to the realities and challenges faced. In that sense, individuals were the ones that overcame bureaucratic challenges posed by their own agencies and tried to find pragmatic solutions to advance. The principal obstacle that was mentioned in the interviews centered on the problem of not getting the data required. One of the common practices employed to address this shortcoming was asking other participants in the project about their strategies (and it was mentioned that it saved time). This could go up to the point that some agency representatives just asked the others for a final product they needed and the others agreed to simply provide it to them. Also, searching for alternative sources for the data on the home front was one of the pragmatic solutions. Interestingly, simply estimating data not available was a debated subject during the interviews with different government agencies having quite different views. From the ones that saw it as "practical and efficient" to the ones that saw it as unacceptable, everything was represented. Flexibility in that sense was cited to be required when things were beyond the agent's control. For example, one interviewee said: "If the information does not exist, one has to adapt the goals." This in turn was also the option communicated by the other agencies involved and the reason for the donors' and IO's understanding if things did not advance as agreed.

Two extremes among the answers regarding pragmatic solutions were, firstly, one agency that described how it was easier for them to create a new agency than modifying the mandate of the existing one. Secondly, I was told by one official that he had even lied once about an aspect of the project to his hierarchy in order to receive the clearance to advance.

6.2.5.2 Negotiation process

Only once did an interviewee say that there were actual negotiations in the project. The rest of the interviewees did not really see negotiations going on in the collaboration. Before countries joined the project, meetings were held on a technical and political level. During these meetings, information availability and resource requirements were mainly discussed but that did not have the character of negotiations (nevertheless, one interviewee called this "negotiate with the countries"). Moreover, much of the outcome was possible to predict given that before the meetings informal contacts were usually activated so that situation and interest were clear before formally engaging. The actual agreement with the country agencies was a standardized document and no negotiation over it was conducted. If a country decided not to join it was difficult to change its position – once a position had been taken, there was usually no change (according to two interviewees). The way these negotiations were conducted was to try to convince using arguments and information. The IO's representatives were very clear about that. One said: "As we are a think tank and have a certain intellectual prestige, it is relatively easy to sustain and defend a certain position."

It that sense, the person also did not feel that the IO had to do much to convince the donors to engage in the project (although he recognized favorable circumstances at the moment the project was proposed). The relationship between IO, the donors and the international consultancy functioned in a similar way. One usually knew each other well and there were no surprises. There was no one else involved in these consultations and they were not really described as negotiations but rather as a top-down communication of the budget available. For the regular budget approved by the designated bodies, it worked the same way. Furthermore, a large time gap between the design, approval and implementation of projects was noted for the regular budget.

On the technical level, small negotiations were sometimes conducted within the framework of the project. These concerned lower-level issues such as the adaptation of the template or deadlines. However, these negotiations were not conducted directly but instead implicitly by indicating in an e-mail that a new deadline was necessary.

6.2.5.3 Trust

Comments on trust were received from almost all interview partners, irrespective of level. Generally, trust was either based on belonging to a particular agency or on personal characteristics. The two were interlinked but personal characteristics were often mentioned to play a role at least partly. One interviewee put it in the following way: "Trust was not an explicit decision but established through personal links." The personal characteristics named as important for trust building were being tolerant, being interactive, being concerned about the other and being transparent. This was also related to personal feelings about the others. (Personal) contact was important for building the trust level, as many of the respondents saw the meetings as crucial for that: building a community. Due to this personal dimension of trust, staff change might be a challenge and it was interesting that in some of the most advanced countries no staff changes occurred over the whole duration of the project. In that sense, it was mentioned that having meetings on a technical level helped. It was seen as being above politics and tearing down barriers. The presence of the IO further stimulated this.

For the country agencies, it was interesting to note that many of the participants knew each other from other projects and contexts. In two cases, movements between agencies even occurred. One country agent moved to the IO and one donor agent moved to a country agency. Many times, knowing each other was related to geographical proximities. For example, the interviewees from Central America said that friendships had formed over time because there were so many meetings on the regional level on different energy matters where they discussed common issues. No clear picture was derived from the interviews regarding if cultural issues were involved in the regional proximity. Some interviewees made remarks that affinities mattered (and that, for example, the level of confidence was lower with other agencies from outside the region). Others did not see any inconvenience with countries from other regions but rather common characteristics as the reason for the regional link. One interviewee said: "The Latin culture does not justify mistrust – we are so integrated." Others were of the opinion that political differences were the real variable in the equation of trust. Some believed that language mattered and speaking the same language helped. Nevertheless, several agencies mentioned engaging in projects with bilateral cooperation agencies from around the world, even with employees of these agencies integrated in their own agency. This put into perspective the importance of language. One interview partner concluded on all these different aspects of trust: "It is a combination of technical matters, personal contact and regional link." Trust led to sharing information openly with other agencies and asking for information when needed, especially in informal chats. Also it made it easier to disagree and voice concerns about aspects of the collaboration. This included the international consultant as a trusted person. One agency remarked that they knew the international consultant from 30 years ago when he was involved in the founding of their office. In turn, the

international consultant also said that he was engaged in trust-building processes because he had a real long-term interest in the project. Many of the interviewees told me that this was not the case for all organizations they had collaborated with.

The IO was seen by the government agencies as "family". All of them said to have a good relationship with the IO. However, the reasons named for that were different. Engagement in (and satisfaction with) previous projects, regular contact and a network (including personal contacts in some cases), the history and reputation of the IO working on issues that mattered to the region and being in line with countries' thinking were all mentioned. Interestingly, one of the most frequently mentioned issues was that the IO treated all countries equally (which was also mentioned about the donor and the international consultant). Also, it was said that it helped that the IO was from the region and understood the region well. This trust helped the countries to be able to share their concerns and needs. In addition, the IO's representatives had a lot of trust in the countries' agents to speak openly. From the point of view of the IO's representatives, the most important factor in building trust with the country agencies was the maintenance of an intellectual authority.

The relationship between the observer organization and the IO was the most indiscernible. Interviewees said that there was a good amount of trust but mainly referred to the past when one of the IO's officials had worked for the observer organization. It was mentioned that there might recently have been changes due to an overlap of interests and little reciprocity.

The donors said they were mostly interested in providing the best solutions for the project and that they were partner-oriented. A high level of trust in the IO and the project was voiced. They were open about their views on the advances of the project.

6.2.6 Platforming

In the following sections, the findings from the interviews regarding the platforming process are reported. As for the observational research and documentation analysis, it is structured around the three main pillars.

The interviewees confirmed intentional, planned steps in building the collaboration. There was agreement that this process was driven by the IO. The IO's interviewees referred to a conscious decision to take certain steps and mentioned that "the direction of the division gave political authorization, freedom and funding for conducting the missions to get together the countries and convince them." Also, the two waves of countries joining the project were consciously decided on. Notwithstanding this, the IO's interviewees recognized that lucky coincidences were part of this process (e.g.

donors' interest and disposition). These coincidences were mainly felt on the political front – if a country at that moment wanted to be part of such a collaboration or not. One IO representative felt that this was so important that he stated that there was "no staging, adaptation was the word of the moment." The same person believed that "planning in this kind of projects is almost ridiculous, it is more day-to-day." However, the staging occupied a lot of the IO's human resources. It seemed that employing the right people at the right time was important. Likewise, timing seemed to be a factor, as in some cases the elapsed time between different platforming steps was reported to be significant.

From the view of the other agencies in the collaboration, the platforming led by the IO was most obvious in the start-up phase of the project – through "institutional channels", as put by one interviewee. The process was described by the majority of the government agents as:

1. Informal approach (mostly by the IO);
2. One or several informal meetings to introduce the project and sense interest;
3. Formal invitation in writing (in case of interest);
4. Agreement; and
5. Starting to work together.

This was most obvious for the first-wave countries, but the second-wave countries also reported similar steps. Many interview partners form country agencies agreed that "they invited us in a very coordinated way". The same was mentioned by respondents from the observer agency. After the start of the project, the countries felt that the IO proceeded in a planned way and in a logical sequence. One respondent said: "It was positive that it was step by step."

With the donors, the IO staged a similar, rather long, process first conducting substantial research and later holding several meetings with them. The donors recognized that the IO was very capable in the platforming process with the country agencies and compared that to other regions where the process had taken years.

6.2.6.1 Right pillar
The right pillar is the one where building the communication network is reflected in the platforming process, including acceptance of leadership and trust building. This communication network was well established for two groups. Firstly, the IO, the donors and the international consultant had already developed their links long ago for the majority of the people involved. Different previous relationships were mentioned,

such as knowing each other from university or having worked together for more than two decades. Consequently, between the agencies of this group, a communication network had developed before. Secondly, the country agencies among themselves had a communication networked based on the fact that many of the agents knew each other from other regional projects and engagements in the past. In that sense, it consisted of a rather implicit communication network. Both of these networks required certain ingredients to function. Different examples were named such as language, personal contacts, cultural and political affinity and personality. As these were very much centered on the individual, staff changes were seen as challenges.

In the beginning, this type of network was not that well established for this particular purpose between the IO and the countries. It seemed that the missions conducted by the IO were mostly used to specifically build this network to be able to communicate with the country agencies. In some cases, of course, the seeds were planted, from e.g. previous projects or friendships (for example, the international consultant had worked with one of the country agencies 30 years ago), but in general it had to be developed. Occasionally, interviewees from the government agencies said that there was more trust in working with the IO as an intermediary than directly with the donors, but this feeling was not shared by all of the country agencies. In that sense, the acceptance of leadership of the IO might be based on the reputation of the organization.

6.2.6.2 Left pillar

The left pillar includes the platforming steps of identifying a creative opportunity, building intellectual capital, developing an implementation network and forming an advocacy group. Interestingly, these elements were all clearly identified by the interviewees (although not with the same words).

The IO led this process and the respondents reported the sequence to be:

1. A long and serious study about the topic of energy efficiency and identifying the knowledge gaps (starting in 2004, five years before the first approach to the countries) which led to the project idea (creative opportunity);
2. The presentation of the idea to the country agencies and other organizations combined with receiving information from them on where they stood on the matter as well as consolidating the IO's own expertise by engaging with e.g. the international consultant (intellectual capital);
3. Through the previous meetings and the beginning of the project the creation of a working group on technical level (implementation network); and

4. Involving the political level in the project, namely through the annual policy dialogues (advocacy group).

These steps were most pronounced for the first wave but also noted by interviewees from second-wave countries. The clear identification of a knowledge gap or a need (creative opportunity) was explicitly acknowledged by one interview partner of a government agency who said that with other organizations it was not like that.

The intellectual capital stage was the place for countries (and other agencies) to provide their view on the project and to adapt it on a technical level. This was the step where they voiced doubts about e.g. the nature of information (such as if it was public or not). Based on this exchange, one agency first declined to join the project. The intellectual capital was the reason for including the observer organization as well, as the IO and the observer planned that the observer would take over the project at some stage.

In crafting the implementation network, the IO also gave much thought to the question where project could be affiliated institutionally. Other existing regional entities working on energy matters were considered before the decision was made to start the project on its own. Geographical equilibrium seemed to influence these considerations. The donors were part of the thoughts on an implementation network regarding the resources needed for the network and the creation of an advocacy group (political promotion through the donors supporting the project) as well.

6.2.6.3 Top pillar
The top pillar comprises the platforming steps of reaching an improved steering capacity, an established operating subsystem and continuous learning. To achieve all of the three, the interview partners made clear that the meetings were crucial for the project. Through the regular meetings, the steering capacity was improved and the operating subsystem formed – "the community" as it was called by some respondents. The members of the community knew the procedures and 'codes' of the collaboration and together they learned continuously on different levels. First of all, they learned more about the subject matter of energy efficiency; in addition, they learned how to advance with the collaboration. The learning experience fed into improving the process of collaboration and advancing the project. This was the case for the IO as well as the country agencies and the donors. The learning was sometimes supported by positive developments in the agencies' constituencies favoring the project (e.g. policy change or institutional strengthening). The IO stated that the development of the project was a continuous learning process in that sense by adapting the plans to unforeseen situations. One agent in particular saw this as a normal condition for

projects that have both technical and political components. He said that it was "learning by doing; the more we did, the more we learned."

6.2.7 Momentum

In the following section, the findings on momentum in the collaboration as the interview partners talked about them are summarized. The structure follows Bardach's theory.

6.2.7.1 Opportunity

The country agency representatives mentioned different opportunities in the interview. These were divided into two streams. On the one hand, six interviewees described the project as such as an opportunity. It seemed that some agencies joined the project because they knew about the potential benefits and wanted to raise the profile of energy efficiency at their home front with local politicians (e.g. to attract more resources). The involvement of the IO was cited as beneficial in this respect, as was the fact that it raised the profile of the matter on a regional level (one interviewee said that this was a bandwagon effect).

On the other hand, some interviewees mentioned opportunities on a national level as the reason for making the project a good match. The opportunities mentioned were (in brackets the number of times it was mentioned):

1. Link to other projects of the agency (four)
2. Institutional fit (three)
3. Policy fit (eight)
4. The opportunity to compare with other countries (two).

Institutional and policy fit seemed to be a powerful opportunity, as only one out of all responses received from country agency representatives did not make reference to either one of the two. Often, these national opportunity moments were mentioned in relation to a (fairly) recent change in policy or institutional setting that now required more attention to energy efficiency. The donor agencies mentioned political interest and the availability of resources as the opportunity for them to engage in the project.

6.2.7.2 Vulnerability

Government change (elections) and staff change were cited as the most important vulnerabilities of the collaboration. Only five of the interviewees from government agencies did not mention either of them. This could occur on a political level (as policies and/or staff might change) or as direct change of capable staff causing a delay

in acquiring the technical competencies again. The turnover of capable staff was seen as dangerous in their own agency but also in other national agencies required as partners in the data gathering. The international consultant agreed that staff change constituted a vulnerability but said that this was the case everywhere in the world. One of the reasons, he said, was that the participants might be able to get better jobs somewhere else with the specialized knowledge received by working on the project. These challenges were said to be mitigated once the project was translated into "business as usual" – meaning that the project was institutionalized and included in national plans and budgets. This was related to the other vulnerability cited: that the project did not continue and that, consequently, no agency ensured follow-up and resources for the activity of indicator collection and database creation. Sometimes this was seen as a task that could only be handled by an IO (unspecified, not necessarily the same IO as in this collaboration), as the countries themselves' doing so in the long term without any outside pressure was seen as challenging. The IO's interviewees concurred with many of the comments mentioned by the country agencies. For them, a decrease in financial resources received from the donors appeared as the biggest vulnerability, notably keeping in mind that the project was growing. The donors, in turn, stated that they did not see any vulnerability as the project was rather embedded in the programming.

6.2.8 Additional findings from the interviews

The following section summarizes comments from the interview partners that I was unable to attribute to other elements of Bardach's operationalized theory. Mainly, two sets of comments were received: firstly, comments on cultural issues involved in the project and, secondly, on the power dynamics within the collaboration. In addition, reflections of the interviewees on smart practices are compiled at the end.

Working with people from different cultural background was obviously normal for the donor agencies. They also said that dealing with cultural differences was normal as a result. For the country agencies, identifying a clear position on the cultural dynamics involved was much more difficult. The opinions were very different from one interviewee to the next. Most of them felt that culture did not matter in this particular project but that it did matter or at least could matter in general. Likewise, there was a tendency to perceive culture mattered more, the further away the origin of the people and the origin of the organization involved. For example, some interviewees said that the IO probably did not have to overcome cultural differences as it was from the region. Some others believed that the level of confidence might have been lower if they had worked directly with agencies from Europe. Others did not see that point at all, as several of the countries also had numerous cooperation programs with bilateral agencies from across the world – in some cases even with staff members of the

bilateral agencies incorporated in their own agencies. Strong ties were for instance felt on the regional level (e.g. the Central American countries among each other), because regional organizations existed through which they regularly met and had similar problems and friendships. This might be related to work styles, the interviewees said, as management styles had cultural roots – a lot concerned time management in this respect. In that sense, different local dynamics were assumed in some interviews which made reference to political difference as well. Nevertheless, many of the respondents cautioned that difference in resources and institutions might lead to different dynamics rather than cultural differences as well. It seemed that the perception of cultural differences differed from individual to individual and case to case. The same was true for the question whether language mattered or not. Some people felt that speaking the same (native) language was important and some did not. One interviewee pointed out that even when everyone spoke Spanish misunderstandings were possible, as even small words had different meanings across Latin America (e.g. 'maybe', 'probably'). This was the reason why this person preferred to call rather than write. The only conclusion the majority of the interviewees agreed upon was that a regional organization brokering the other relationships was helpful.

Interestingly, some respondents took the question on cultural differences to a second level during the interviews. They said that cultural differences were not so much about the management of the collaboration in this project but rather about how the collaboration and the topic of energy efficiency were seen in the cultural context of each country. One of the IO's representatives phrased it like this: "It is not so much about treating a [someone from country X] differently from a [someone from country Y] but rather about understanding their opposite points of view." For the same respondent, it was exceptional that all the countries sat down together and explained their understanding of energy efficiency to each other. Some interview partners said that this more profound understanding of different cultural perceptions might also influence the trust one had in particular institutions.

Regarding power dynamics, the donor agencies were again clear that they did not pursue any direct political goal with their engagement. They were rather interested in finding the best solutions for the project. Of course, this had to be within the scope of the political priorities and interests of their governments and synergies with their bilateral programs were welcome. Nevertheless, they showed confidence in expressing their views on the strengths and weaknesses of the project and the collaboration clearly and openly. For the countries, a few references were made to the power dynamics among them. Generally, there was no feeling of competition or rivalry. They recognized that, historically as well as on a political or personal level, these rivalries might exist, but not on the technical level on which they were collaborating as part of

this project. In that sense, the country agency interviewees also felt that it was normal that other government agencies congratulated them on their achievements and the country's general development during meetings. However, they said that this would have been different if the congratulations had been received from countries from outside the region. Nevertheless, one country agency representative of a rather big and resourceful country said that one goal was to become a regional leader on the topic because "if we manage to be an example, other countries will do better as well." Also, other countries and the other agencies recognized that some countries were simply more influential than others due to their size, resources or other factors.

With respect to the management by the IO, it was important to many of the respondents that the IO treated all countries in the same way. This was also felt about the donors and the international consultant. Likewise, no one felt that the IO was imposing something on the countries. Some of them were very clear as well that if they had felt an imposition, they would not have accepted it. One agency representative told me that they did not want imposition but projects according to their agenda where the knowledge was handed over to them. The arguments listed by the interview partners as to why they did not see the collaboration as an imposition were different. Some said that every agency opted for being in the project without obligation from anyone. Furthermore, the IO was only the one that brokered the relationships and made the approach. Also, it was recognized that the IO was not a bilateral cooperation agency that had to sell any product but rather was consensus-oriented. Lastly, many respondents referred to the fact that the IO always invited comments and opinions on the project and modified the planning accordingly. Several answers were received that this was ultimately rooted in the governing structure of the IO – a multilateral agency where the governing entities were recipients. This was said to be different for other organizations.

For the donors and the international consultancy, slightly more imposition was felt by the countries regarding the project's technical content. Many of them also compared this project to other bilateral projects with other organizations and stated that bilateral agencies generally impose more than this IO did. They appreciated this about the IO. The observer organization felt that the IO provided more visibility to the country agencies due to the differences in resources. This sometimes provided the IO with a competitive advantage. One country agency mentioned something similar.

In addition, the question whether the interview partners noticed any smart practices employed by an individual or agency that helped the collaboration to flourish was included in the interviews. The answers were very diverse and on different levels but I was able to identify several common topics. The country agencies said that obliging them to work and pushing them for results was important. Inviting the countries to

regular meetings was seen as one option of achieving that. The meetings were also a smart practice as they enabled the contact between the people involved as well as were the platform for exchange. Treating all countries equally was another important practice. Moreover, this contributed to motivating the collaborators – likewise an issue seen as crucial and, perhaps, related to the highly appreciated expert advice provided in the project. Furthermore, being flexible was a good practice that was named. Lastly, many interviewees said that the possibility to voice one's opinion, participate in the management and layout of the project and adapt it was a smart practice. The representatives of the IO in turn saw the layout of the collaboration with its triangular construction (donors, countries and IO) as a smart practice. Likewise, the good relationship with the donors ensuring access to resources of all kinds (managed according to well established rules) was seen as important.

6.2.9 Dependent variable: ICC
In the following section, the findings from the interviews regarding the dependent variable are elaborated on. It is structured around my operationalization of Bardach's theory under 1. progress on the output of the project (database and reports), 2. increase in exchanges between participants, 3. increase in understanding other agencies backgrounds, and 4. collaboration in other projects. In addition, some of the interviewees' thoughts on the concept of collaboration are included at the end of the section, as I felt it would be good to understand their views. Furthermore, it seems important to note that the donor's comments were also captured quite well by the indicators. Notably, this was the case as the donors' interest increased over the project duration due to political interest. Consequently, success in the collaboration was seen as a success by the donors.

Regarding the first indicator, progress on the output of the project, the country agencies felt that the project was a success. Comments such as: "there are results" or "what is being achieved is important" were no exceptions. Some of the country agencies even gave exact numbers during the interviews. One agent said that his agency went from 8% completion of the data template when they started to 97% at that moment. Another representative mentioned that they improved from zero to 75% of data completion during the time between two meetings. The IO and the international consultancy agreed that the project was a success – although countries showed different levels of advancements. Therefore, one of the IO's interviewees qualified his sentence "five years from the start, I would say it is an exceptional project" by recognizing that this was mainly true in terms of quantity. The number of countries producing indicators was exceptional but one had to be clear that there were differences in quality. The donors had mixed views (also differing from one interviewee to the other). On the one hand, they were of the opinion that some

countries could do more. On the other hand, they said: "We do not need all countries at the same level, it is a process."

Regarding the second indicator, the IO's interview partners clarified that making the countries work together was always the true objective of the project: stimulating horizontal cooperation under the cover of indicator generation. They believed that this had never happened in the region before. However, they did not monitor if there was any exchange between the country agencies in between the meetings. The respondents from country agencies confirmed that most of the exchanges happened during the meetings. Outside of this setting, some countries stated that they shared experiences with other country agencies but also agreed that this was nothing permanent most of the time. Nevertheless, the disposition to share experiences with others involved in the collaboration was clearly mentioned by several interviewees ("if someone asked we would share"). Many interviewees also felt that the project was designed by the IO in that way – that exchange was an integral part of it. Exchange with the IO and the international consultancy was likewise seen as normal and frequently practiced. Interestingly, the international consultant commented that he had also learned something from the way one of agencies presented indicators, and that he was able to take that back to his other projects. In this way, exchange happened unexpectedly in the other direction as well.

An increase in understanding of other agencies' backgrounds was noted with respect to the comments made by country agencies. Notwithstanding this, it should be recognized that it is highly likely that the countries already started with a relatively good understanding of the issues and contexts that were important for the other countries' progress. In general, country representatives were not bothered by the different rates of development in the project. They saw the project constructed in that way with the different waves of countries joining – first the ones with more information and resources. Some voiced unhappiness about the fact that not more country reports were produced on time but at the same time said that this was not surprising, as it had been like that in other projects as well. Some agencies mentioned in fact that they themselves were unhappy with their own achievements. But at least being able to identify the knowledge gaps one had to work on was seen as positive. Several respondents said that they knew that similar issues existed for other countries whereby showing an understanding of the others' backgrounds. In that sense, there was a tenor that some were quicker in some matters than others and that those could learn from the rest regarding other matters, a group vision. In one case, an interviewee even said that they did a lot like another country in the project and had the same conditions, which meant that he had to have a quite good understanding of how the project developed in the other country. The IO, the international consultant and the donors agreed as well that differences in progress were normal in such a project. They

stated the project had been planned in that way. In their view, different realities, (human) resources, motivation and politics were the most important influencing factors – the countries were seen as very heterogeneous in this respect. If one did not want to have differences of pace, one would have to work on a bilateral basis rather than as a regional project. They also mentioned that availability of information was not an important criterion for selecting the countries to join the project, which logically meant that they did not expect similar progress on the first indicator. They felt that a balance had to be struck between what was desired and the realities on the ground. Likewise, they said that "there are countries that are doing an excellent job." The three agencies, the countries, the IO and the donors, were clear about each of the agencies in the project having their own interests. This was also where the observer organization came in initially: it had its place but its full engagement was never defined.

Lastly, regarding the indicator of collaboration on other projects, the first success that was mentioned was the number of countries integrated in the project. The 19 countries that had joined the project at that time were considered an exceptional number by the IO. It also stated that expanding the project with a database on policy had already been part of the initial plan. Two countries said that the whole project was a new experience in that sense as collaborations usually only happened on a regional level and not with the whole continent. Several country agencies stated that they built new relationships with other agencies in their own countries thanks to the project, either because they needed information from them or because these were interested in the information from the project. Two countries founded new institutions due to the project and one country asked one of the donors for help to establish a new agency. Two country agencies mentioned that one of the interests and hopes of this project was that it would lead to new projects and funding opportunities – one of them managed to build a project pipeline as a direct outcome. Several other agencies mentioned that they had started conversations with other donor countries on projects (for which they had made contacts during the study tour).

One country raised doubts about whether the advances in the collaboration were commonly achieved or rather by each individual country. Another country made a comment that everyone advanced at their own rhythm. This left me with the question whether the agencies themselves saw this project as collaboration. Consequently, a question to address the matter was included in the interviews. From the answers, it became clear that the project was seen as collaboration but that the concept of collaboration was very different from one interviewee to the next. Therefore, I was unable to deduce a common definition from the interviews but noticed some key topics that were seen to be part of collaboration (and present in this project). Mostly, no difference was noted between cooperation and collaboration. First of all, all partners involved said that collaboration should have a common interest and goal. This

constituted the two-way street that was felt to be necessary. Likewise, sharing (of experience, information, practices or knowledge) was important. This created a group experience. Lastly, the provision of expertise needed by the other parties formed part of the concept.

6.2.10 Summary: the findings from the interviews
In this section, the findings from the interviews were summarized. To enable readers to draw their own conclusions, I added the least possible own interpretation.

The political and institutional elements of the operationalized theory appeared to be much more closely linked during the interviews as during observation as many interviewees talked about aspects of both. The institutional setup seemed to be more important for the technical level while political priorities were emphasized by the political level interviewees. Under the operating system, communication, the added element, was important, mainly through meetings. Flexibility was likewise seen as an important practice as well as motivation. A high degree of mutual understanding was noted, while accountability was principally an issue for the IO, the donor, the observer organization and the international consultant. This might be related to the fact that financial exchanges were almost exclusively centered in the IO. Furthermore, all resource elements were found. No turf issues were reported but a high degree of autonomy with money, again being mainly dealt with by the IO. People seemed to be a key element of concern to all. Moreover, both political standing and information were considered to be valuable assets for exchange. Regarding steering a course, different visions existed among the agencies and within the agencies involved. However, all of them were compatible and a participatory process was noted in their development. No one mentioned the steering committees provisioned by the project agreement as a form of steering but several interview partners said that the meetings were a forum. It was felt that leadership came from the IO, which did not mean that the countries did not take the lead on some occasions. Consequently, most of the respondents agreed that the IO was the leader of the project but that the countries were the owners. Regarding culture, bureaucratic culture was noticed but mostly within the agencies, pragmatic solutions were searched for by involved individuals to advance collaboration. No real negotiations were mentioned by the interviewees. Trust was considered as important and based either on being part of a particular agency or on personal attributes.

With respect to the developmental dynamics, platforming in the sense of a planned sequencing was confirmed. The right pillar of the operationalized theory served to establish the communication network. For the left pillar, clear steps were identified during the interviews. To set the top pillar of platforming, regular meetings were crucial. Under the momentum heading, some interviewees mentioned that the project

itself was already an opportunity to raise the profile of energy efficiency. Likewise, changes on the national level in institutional setup or policy were potential opportunities. Government and staff change were the most prominent vulnerabilities for country agencies. For the IO, the biggest worry was a decrease in funding.

I added a section to capture comments that could not be recorded under any of the elements of the operationalized theory. The situation regarding cultural differences remained unclear. The interviewees felt that cultural differences were not relevant in this project but that they were in general when cooperating on an international level. It was interesting that some interviewees introduced a sort of second level of culture: the question if the perception of energy efficiency as a concern to be dealt with by policy at all was important in the context of the collaborator. Power issues were not perceived to be important. Some countries might have an ambition for leadership but no imposition was felt from any of the parties involved in the collaboration. Regarding smart practices, the IO believed that the way the project was constructed, in the form of a triangular cooperation, was a good practice. The country agencies named treating all countries equally, motivation and working together as the most important ones. For all the four indicators of the dependent variable, progress was noted by the interviewees over the project duration. I was unable to identify a common definition for collaboration (or cooperation) among the interviewees.

6.3 Conclusions on the findings from the case study

The findings provided in the previous section demonstrate first and foremost that a lot of evidence has been gathered. The presentation tried not to aggregate any interpretation at this stage to enable readers to draw their own conclusions and increase the study's reliability. The rich description shows that a lot of insight from an insider perspective was gathered. It has to be stressed that particularly the interviews contributed to that. The evidence from observations, documentation and interviews was sometimes converging (confirming the same findings) and sometimes complementary (each adding a detail to the same finding). No contradictory evidence was found regarding the theory as a whole.

This is unusual in social science. However, it should be emphasized that not all findings were consistent on the individual level (which can be found in the detailed records). This fact was sometimes more and sometimes less expressly acknowledged in the text due to space limitations. The question is why there is so little contradictory evidence. One possible explanation is that the researcher approached the research field blinded by the previously developed theory. This can be implicit (i.e. the answers are interpreted by the researcher to make them fit) or explicit (i.e. the researcher is not looking for contrary evidence at all). However, I believe I have circumvented that risk

as I followed academic protocols and standards. In addition, participants confirmed my findings. Another possibility is that so much was learned about the subjects during the participant observation phase that the questions were so targeted that there was little margin for error. In my view, this was at least partly the case, as is also demonstrated by the detailed list of findings during the observation. Lastly, another option is that the theory used is very encompassing and reflects closely what is happening and perceived. I would definitely argue that this is the case for Bardach's theory but it should be recognized that it is a flexible one too. It is able to adapt to the circumstances as needed and makes it easy to link empirical evidence to its elements.

Empirical evidence was found for all the elements proposed by Bardach's operationalized theory. Due to the amount and quality of evidence on the institutional and political setup (namely from observation), the element was separated into two distinct elements. The institutional setup appeared to be more important for the technical level, whereas the political setup was more relevant for the political level interviewees. Communication was added as a separate element inside the operating system. Furthermore, it was noted that data gathered for turf and autonomy were rather similar. In the developmental dynamics, a conscious sequencing of processes was evident. However, the best structure for research proved to be around three big pillars of platforming (left, right and top pillar). A category was added capturing evidence that was not possible to be allocated to any of the existing elements. This evidence seems to be clustered around cultural influences and power topics. Data was gathered on the development of the indicators of the dependent variable of the collaborative effort.

7. Interpretation and discussion of findings

After the detailed description of the findings from the case study, these are here put into theoretical context. The aim is to provide a clear and reasoned answer to the research questions while aiming for generalization to provide a theoretical framework for interagency collaboration in development cooperation:

1. Can Bardach's operationalized theory be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation?
    a. Which elements of the existing theory can be confirmed by empirical evidence?
    b. Are there elements that are missing? If so, which?
2. How do these elements impact the dependent variable – the Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC)?
3. Which empirically found practices can be linked to which element(s) of the theory?

In order to do so, the same structure is repeated while describing each element extensively and specifying which practices were found in the case study and the processes whereby they are linked to the dependent variable. This makes reference to the indicators developed in section 5.2 for the presence of the dependent variable:

1. advances achieving the project goal,
2. more exchanges between agencies,
3. increased mutual understanding between agencies, and
4. new projects deriving from the collaboration.

This answers questions 2 and 3 and, as a consequence, question 1a. To answer question 1b, elements empirically found are added under the existing elements where appropriate and those that cannot be subsumed under existing elements are discussed in a dedicated section. Subsequently, a summary model of the elaborations is provided as the answer to research question 1. Lastly, smart practices and craftsmanship are discussed.

7.1 Political and institutional setup

The political and institutional setup elements are confirmed by data from both observation and the interviews. Notably, observation also indicates that the two can be distinguished from each other quite well and are distinct in nature. Likewise, evidence is found that there are two different groups that require different information: technical-level staff and political-level staff. The participants in an interagency

collaboration have to understand which information is important for which group. This is probably attributable to the function, as technical staff have to move within the given institutional framework of an interagency collaboration while political staff set the agenda for collaboration based on its priorities. In practice, information on the institutional setup (understood as the rather formal structures) is found to be shared mostly on the technical level. The information shared usually concerns the local institutional panorama, the legislative framework and the project background. While this information is shared during physical meetings, it is usually available in written form as well. It influences the dependent variable, as it is basic information about the counterpart's stability, ability, functioning and mandate, and thus crucial for assessing the potential ICC. While this is the basis for all indicators of the dependent variable, it is almost directly reflected in indicator 3 of understanding the others challenges. This is exactly what the craftsmen involved in the interagency collaboration try to do – scrutinize the others regarding their infrastructure to deliver. The IO is recognized to be particularly knowledgeable about the institutional setup and thoroughly scrutinizes which agencies to collaborate with.

The sharing of information on the political setup (understood as the soft part of an agency, e.g. political priorities) is a practice found on all levels – although more pronounced on higher political levels. Mainly focused on political priorities and interests, the information is primarily communicated during the start-up phase of the project. The form is typically verbal and happens during (formal and informal) physical meetings, at least as long as the information has not yet been translated into a formal position of the agency. The priorities and interests that agencies pursue with the project are quite diverse and attached to the personnel and its opinions. This makes staff rotation and government change a source of changes in the interagency collaboration. Political priorities and interest are linked to the (perceived) needs which trigger building the collaboration in the first place. This is strongly associated with the allocation of resources of all kinds and in turn determines the possibilities of advancing with the project goal (indicator 1 of the dependent variable). Furthermore, political priorities influence the likeliness of subsequent projects (indicator 4). The craftsman has to react to or anticipate these changes which make it a task very much dependent on the individual. This includes regular monitoring of the general political context of each agency. The IO in the case study is recognized for being particularly good at that for different reasons. It may be that this is part of its usual business to survive as a multilateral agency in the politicized context of international aid.

For both elements, the political and institutional setup, it is noted that the information is usually communicated in physical meetings and in person. This can be seen as the diplomacy part of international development aid where sensitive information is exchanged in order to make progress in collaboration. This can be interpreted as an

important step in minimizing the distance issue mentioned under 2.1.2. For effective collaboration, it is of the utmost importance to overcome the distance between the different agencies in order to be able to understand their realities. Sometimes, that requires physically being where the other collaboration participants are and creating a network. As both elements have an important aspect of laying the foundations for the other elements (operating system, resources, the course and culture), it is demonstrated as well that placing the two at the basis of the interagency collaboration concept is justified. As they are particularly important at the beginning of an interagency collaboration, they are quite similar to the environmental theme identified in collaboration research (see 2.2.2). They are the determining element to explore the collaborative advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2002, p. 273).

7.2 Operating system

The elements of the operating system of the operationalized framework are confirmed and a communication element added. The evidence from the interviews in particular underlines that development cooperation is a political activity that requires a diplomatic style of communicating. The particular nature and importance attributed to it justify a separate element. Communication gets more formal the higher the political level is (which usually means at the same time a higher degree of commitment from the agency). This correlates with the form: the more formal the communication the more likely it is to be in written form, usually as letters and e-mail (latest information technology such as online social networks are not accepted). As a practice, it can be noted that these communications are written in a respectful and polite way and concern matters that are seen as an official position, agreement or decision of the agency involved. The written form also serves here to delegate a matter from higher hierarchies to technical levels. As such they are crucial to obtain in order to progress on indicator 1, agreed-upon products. Likewise, formal communication recognizes the contributions of each agency to the interagency collaboration, notably during physical meetings. This may be an attempt to mutually assist in increasing the political standing of the collaboration. On the technical level, the practice is verbal, less formal communication and often takes the form of stories and comments, typically to facilitate exchange on common problems in advancing towards the project goal. It tries to make people feel equal in order to ease exchange – comparable to the tasks a project team manager faces (see Jones, 2008, pp. 114-115 and 2.2.4.1). On all levels, the meetings are the main forum for communication. Communication indirectly impacts all indicators, as none of the participants joins the collaboration without appropriate communication. It is crucial regarding indicator 2 of the dependent variable, the number of exchanges. Exchanges on the technical level are likely to be the first entry point to get the project started through acquiring the information about the political and institutional setup (section 7.1). In that sense, the communication element could be

argued to be so fundamental that it should be at the basis of the interagency collaboration framework alongside (or maybe even before) the political and institutional setup. However, it is also very similar to the other elements touched on in the operating system (and a topic from the organizational system theme under 2.2.2). Furthermore, it is required throughout the interagency collaboration, whereas the political and institutional setup of each individual agency is rather the starting point. Therefore, communication is maintained as an element under the operating system. Lastly, it is important to note that communication is always reciprocal.[158] Agencies vice versa emphasize similar topics (avoiding the issue of framing from section 2.1.2) and communication usually takes place on the same level (i.e. technical with technical and political with political level). A question is whether this kind of formalism is heritage of former colonial procedures and now imposed by the agencies of development cooperation. Given the importance that all agencies place on the formal side of communication this does not seem to be the case. It may well be that the functioning of public agencies is influenced by their heritage, but it seems unlikely that the way of communicating is still consciously seen to be shaped by this past and only imposed by the development cooperation agencies.

Flexibility is particularly emphasized by the interviewees. It is practiced on all levels and by all agencies and is seen as normal for a project that has technical as well as political challenges. Flexibility is fostered by the fact that the project has 'soft' targets such as creating more information rather than 'hard' targets such as building a renewable energy power plant. Operational flexibility enables adapting schedules, agendas and products to the realities faced by the collaborative effort (issues perceived as being beyond control). Flexibility with formal agreements is demonstrated by adapting legal agreements to the needs of each agency. While all agencies have to be flexible, the particular ability of the IO and its staff is underlined, also in comparison with other projects led by IOs. The flexibility shown by the IO derives to a large extent from the fact that it relies on funds from different sources which makes the use of the funds flexible according to need over a two-year period. This helps minimizing the restrictiveness of logframe-like management tools that donors require (see section 2.1.2) as well as mitigating the impacts of uncertainty (an important challenge discussed in project management, see Korhonen, Laine & Martinsuo, 2014, p. 21 and 2.2.4.1). These management tools are the limit of flexibility – the frontier where one's own accountability starts. Reacting flexibly to partners' needs demonstrates a high level of mutual understanding (indicator 3), thus increasing the ICC. Likewise, it enables progress towards the project goals by giving more time for their achievement (indicator 1).

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[158] Although it is a different kind of reciprocity than the one discussed under section 2.2.4.2.

Motivation is seen as crucial by the collaboration participants (manifested namely in the interviews, in line with O'Toole, 2003, pp. 239-242). The sources of motivation are all linked to getting a benefit from the project. However, these benefits are on very different levels. Firstly, the benefits can be generated for the country (better policy-making, improved information and international comparison). Secondly, the agents can be motivated by some sort of professional benefit (learning and teaching experiences, building a professional network, compliance with rules and targets of the project and being part of a group of professionals). It should be noted that the last factor is closely linked to creating a new professional network – usually a weakness mentioned for development cooperation (see 2.1.2). Lastly, motivating benefits can be personal (pride of one's own work, recognition and travelling). In this respect, the motivators found are grouped into categories quite similar to the ones proposed by Bardach (1998, p. 34): careerist, bureaucratic and value-creating purposes. Motivation is indirectly important for progress towards the project goals (indicator 1 of the dependent variable) and may incentivize new projects (indicator 4). In terms of building a professional network, it impacts indicator 2 as well, with more exchanges between the participants. Nevertheless, it is a precursor of some of the other elements of the concept as well as (e.g. increased motivation to achieve something possibly increasing one's flexibility). The participants agree that motivation is personal and motivating has to be done by individuals, hence a craftsman's task. The practice is about reminding everyone of the benefits that are motivating the collaboration. The IO and its staff are described as particularly skilled at that – also because sound administration of the collaborative effort is having an additional motivating effect. It also mitigated that no monetary incentives are provided to the country agencies, which is usually an important motivating factor, e.g. in Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley and Marosszeky's (2002, p. 325) concept of governmentality.

In general, a high level of mutual understanding for other agencies' challenges regarding institutional, practical and operational barriers exists among participants from all agencies. The IO and its staff are most able, as they have worked with all agencies involved before. This is recognized by all agencies as well as correctly stressed as an advantage by the IO itself. It demonstrates that the perception of strengths among the agencies is quite reciprocal – the right direction for reciprocal relationships noted under relationship management in section 2.2.4.2. But some of the other agencies also have fora in which they have the opportunity to get to know each other. Particularly for those that did not know each other before the project, the practice of holding regular and frequent physical meetings leads to build understanding and continue learning about it. Keeping the meetings at a technical level as well as the presence of the IO facilitates the exchange as politics stay out this way. The understanding required on the technical level circulates mainly around government change and resources (of which staff and the availability of information

are the most important). On the political level, policies and political priorities are the information in demand. Understanding other information is less important (e.g. the budget available to the IO for the interagency collaboration). Mutual understanding of these agency-related factors helps the political as well as the technical level to draw conclusions about the general context of energy efficiency in the respective constituencies. Consequently, it is conducive to indicator 3, better understanding when plans have to be modified or delayed. The close link between trust and understanding indicated by Bardach's original concept (see 2.3.2 and 3.3.3) is also found as evidence indicates that understanding is not only based in trust but facilitates trust as well.

Accountability processes are encountered and their importance is recognized. Accountability is shown when linked to agreements, notably on funds in return for products, or to liabilities on a higher political level (e.g. steering bodies) – institutional accountability. Consequently, the two agency classes mostly involved in accountability processes are the IO and the donors, as significant flows of funds only exist between these agencies. The most important aspect in these accountabilities is to reach the indicators agreed upon – the classical logframe tool in international development (section 2.1.2). Here, the practice is full compliance and in order to achieve it products are labelled in a way to exactly match the required indicators. For that reason, the IO's staff communicates regularly with the donors. As the IO has different sources of funds, it has to serve different accountabilities but at the same time it increases its flexibility regarding when and how to fulfil an obligation. This is the source for flexibility with government agencies' accountabilities as well. Their accountabilities are handled much more laxly. In that sense, the IO's participation shields the government agencies against the management tools typically imposed by donors in international development. The practice of government agencies' accountability is not full compliance, as higher-level political obligations may interfere with the commitments made to the project. Complementary evidence from observations and interviews indicates the practices applied to increase compliance despite all flexibility. They consist in reminding the commitments made with the IO in the project as well as recalling the benefits for the country or legal obligations and comparing a country with the peer group. However, compliance ultimately cannot be enforced – which is a confirmation of the challenges dealing with sovereign states (introduced in section 3.4). Interestingly, the country agencies hold the IO accountable for its commitments as well, thus confirming the recent trend in international development regarding mutual accountability within the ownership debate (MacLachlan & Carr, 2005, p. 1 and 2.1.3). Accountability is important to advance towards the project goals (indicator 1 of the ICC). Notwithstanding this, it is only true for institutional accountability, notably about resources from the donor. This is quite different from project management, where the parameters of cost and time are crucial (Cobb, 2012, pp. 5-6), and indicates the longer-term view of development cooperation.

Financial exchanges are rare in the project and occur almost exclusively between the IO and the donors. These financial exchanges are governed by the agreements and internationally applicable rules of the IO. These rules were established long ago and acceptance of the importance of these rules is noticed (without any reference to these rules possibly being seen as a colonial heritage or from another culture). Rules also lead to the bureaucratic phenomenon of entirely spending the budget at the end of the budget cycle. Furthermore, the IO receives other in-kind contributions from the donors (experts and knowledge). These two assets are also the ones that the IO exchanges with the other agencies involved alongside with support for travel to meetings. In exchange, the government agencies provide staff time as well as information – the most valuable barter they have once it bears the seal making it official information of the country (and sometimes associated with important sensitivities). For that reason, the project agreement contains particular regulations regarding the handling of this information. This is the reason why the proposal is here made to rename this element 'exchanges of assets', as it seems that the narrow focus on financial exchanges is not appropriate in international development collaboration. As a practice, all these exchanges are governed by rules and agreements. Exchanges of assets influence the dependent variable through indicator 1, because the exchange of the assets required affects the possibilities of the agencies to progress towards the project goal. It is interesting that, while literature from the organizational system theme identified in 2.2.2 and New Public Management in particular place an emphasis on exchanges and associated contracts (e.g. Jones & Kettl, 2004, p. 454 and 2.2.2), they do not have the same importance in development cooperation.

7.3 Resources

The elements under the resources heading are confirmed by field data. Turf in the sense of authority over the subject matter is recognized as important but mutually respected by the agencies participating in the interagency collaboration. This is easy, as there are no overlaps of jurisdictions (except for the IO and the observer organization). The government agencies have local authority through their mandates and thus act within their dominion of comparative advantage or strength (e.g. political standing). Interestingly, the IO is seen as having the authority over managing the interagency collaboration, as it is a development project and the IO is the organization that started it. Managing the interagency collaboration in a development project is the IO's turf. This is remarkable in the light of the debate on ownership in section 2.1.3. None of these agencies (not even the donors) try to interfere with that contrary to some of the development literature, and the country agencies actually refer to the collaboration project as "the IO's project". At the same time, asked about their authority on policy- and decision-making regarding the subject matter, they defend their turf fiercely. It looks as if the discussion about ownership of a development

project is slightly misplaced in this case: ownership is rather considered to be important regarding ownership of the subject matter rather than the management of the project. This brings the project closer to the reality of the local context as well and consequently avoids the issue of distance some development projects suffer from (section 2.1.2). Clearly, the practice identified in the field is not to interfere with other agencies' turf at all. Turf impacts all the indicators of the dependent variable almost as a prerequisite. Only with turf is an agency able to have the authority on the home front to make progress, have exchanges with other agencies to be able to understand their issues and start new projects.

Very similar to turf, autonomy is perceived to be important but is also perceived to be granted by all involved agencies. The basic principle is that each agency is free to manage its own way towards milestones agreed on and to adapt the products to its own needs. The idea behind it is that everyone should achieve their individual objectives. This is regarded as important reciprocally by all agencies and the IO sees it as a requirement for the government agencies to be able to take ownership (see discussion in 2.2.4.2 and 2.1.3). The government agencies had other experiences with other IOs in this respect. Taking into account that the IO's turf is the management of the project, the autonomy granted to the IO by the donors is reflected in its role as operative coordinator of the project. This autonomy entrusted in the IO is most likely due to the fact that it fully complies with its accountabilities as well as past experience (one could also name it credibility, Bruning, Dials & Shirka, 2007, pp. 25-26). As for turf, the practice is not to interfere with the other agencies' autonomy. The link between autonomy and the dependent variable is likewise a prerequisite for achieving any of the indicators. As turf and autonomy are so closely linked and even hard to distinguish from each other, it is concluded that they should be merged into one element. Looking at both, one can see that the agencies did not display a big power difference (source of all development cooperation issues identified in 2.1.2). All agencies in the interagency collaboration respect each other's mandates and autonomy and in turn keep their share. Therefore, only little power differences and imbalances occur (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005, p. 168).

As a practice, money is handled almost entirely by the IO after having received it from the donors. The IO adds additional funds from its regular budget for some activities, which increases its flexibility. Interestingly, none of the two flows is really predictable for the IO – although the values were historically rather stable (and reliability is important, Benson, 1975, p. 233). The reason is that the negotiations with the donors as well as the allocation of funds from the regular budget are conducted without the staff involved in the project. This requires rapid adaptation to the result and thus the flexible adaptation of the project: real craftsmanship. It is also interesting in the light of resource dependency theories discussed in international development (2.1.5) and the

management of interagency collaborations (2.2.2). While some see resource dependency as the core of interagency collaboration (Klijn, 1997, p. 21), notably in donor-recipient-relationships (Shutt, 2006, p. 154), the unplannable budget combined with the reliance on different funding sources reduces the IO's resource dependency significantly through an increased preparedness to adapt. Money is not passed on to the government agencies and information about the budget is not shared (a fact that is understood by the other agencies involved). Only two country agencies raised further funds on their own for the interagency collaboration project. In-kind resources in the form of consultants and travel are passed on to the country agencies which appreciate these resources (although they do not consist of monetary contributions, the resources continue to have their incentive function, Finkelstein, 1997, p. 789). The country agencies likewise contribute in-kind resources, notably staff time and information. In addition, they make a special effort when they host physical meetings. Although direct costs are covered by funds from the IO, hosting a meeting takes a lot of staff time. Furthermore, some agencies go further and sponsor meals or events around the meetings. Interestingly, this is particularly the case for smaller countries. It could be that they want to increase their standing by being good hosts, whereas big countries do not need to do so as their political weight is enough. However, the sample was too small to allow conclusions. The behavior about money is in line with Bardach's findings (1998, p. 181): in-kind contributions dominate, information about funds is withheld and the situation is eased as the agencies do not depend on one funding source. Given that money is not the only resource that is important, another name for the element is required. As people and information are covered by other elements, 'monetary and other physical in-kind assets' is here proposed to reflect travel and, notably, the efforts of hosting meetings (although it naturally overlaps with the people and information elements). Monetary and other physical in-kind assets influence the ICC through the abilities to advance towards the project goal (indicator 1). Nevertheless, travel may also positively influence the exchange with other agencies and understanding of other agencies' issues (indicators 2 and 3).

Human resources are crucial for interagency collaboration and sometimes present a challenge for the agencies involved, notably for the government agencies. Two aspects are challenging in this respect: firstly, some agencies suffer from short staffing, in particular staff qualified for the subject. In addition to technical qualifications, staff members of government agencies in this interagency collaboration require internal skills (e.g. trust from higher hierarchy levels) as well as external skills (e.g. trust from other agencies – the ones covered by my framework). Secondly, staff rotation in government agencies is high in some countries. When these changes occur on the technical level, the agency loses the personnel that has acquired capacity through the project; when it occurs on the political level, political interest may shift away from this interagency project. Although it is difficult to circumvent, the practices to address

people challenges are first of all to show and communicate results as well as to stress the participation of the IO. This helps to avoid changes due to political-level rotations. To address shortages in staff, the IO's practice is to offer additional manpower in the form of national consultants. However, not all agencies are interested in this support, as they prefer to delay the project a bit and rather build their own capacities in order not to lose the knowledge once the consultants leave. In that sense, it should be noted that in these cases a delay in progressing towards the project goals agreed upon may mean a better overall development result for the country involved. The IO's practice of being flexible has to be recalled and mutual understanding underlined to enable these delays (and the ability to do so due to the mix of funds). As skilled people are required to advance towards the goals, to maintain exchanges with the other agencies and to understand them as well as to craft new projects (the skills mentioned above), the element is indirectly linked to all indicators. The link is further stressed by the fact that the majority of the most advanced countries regarding indicator 1 had observed the fewest staff changes. Also the donor staff, the international consultancy staff as well as the IO staff did not change much. This is remarkable as IOs are usually prone to staff rotation as part of their policy, which is usually a source for distance from the realities in the countries they serve (Chambers & Petit, 2004, p. 154). Furthermore, the IO's interview partners remarked on the complementary skills its staff possesses: not only technical experts with the required knowledge of the subject matter, but also staff skilled in managing collaboration. The latter are craftsmen. Personal relationships seem to be part of these skills, as noted by some participants. Mostly, relationships exist on the same level (technical staff with technical staff as well as political-level staff with political-level staff). This is similar to the issue of networks mentioned under 2.1.2 for development professionals but, on the contrary, these networks form among the government agency participants and may thus be beneficial for results.

Political standing is required from time to time, either to overcome internal institutional challenges or externally to be able to advance with the collaboration. Consequently, political standing indirectly impacts all four indicators of the ICC, as it is a valuable card that can be played to acquire other resources that allow increasing any of the four indicators. This is the reason why political standing is rightly placed as an element under the resources pillar. The practice is to mutually communicate political standing but through fine details (e.g. meeting attendance, correspondence, joint problem-solving and recognition of achievements and contributions). The higher the political level on which this occurs, the more valuable it is (and the more it is seen as important). But it does not have to be the highest political level in order to advance, the level that is able to enable advances is sufficient. The IO possesses remarkable political standing among all agencies, although the reasons for that are individually different.

Information is an important resource and a constant flow. In the interagency collaboration studied, this was in a way built in by default, as it targets an increase in information available on the subject of collaboration as a direct output (and once officially endorsed becomes a valuable asset, see above). Thus, it directly impacts ICC indicator 1 and the practice of sharing information about the subject and strategies to overcome obstacles on the way to obtaining this information is found. Nevertheless, information on the interagency collaboration as such is shared as well among all agencies as a practice, notably between the IO and the donor. This influences indicator 3 of the ICC as it enables increased understanding of other agencies' issues. The style has already been discussed under the communication element. The content of the information on the technical level is directly related to technical details of the project, while past achievements and future priorities of collaboration are emphasized on the political level. This information is preferably exchanged during physical meetings. The technical-level meetings are designed in an informal way to provide the necessary depoliticized space for technical exchange. On the political level, the more formal policy dialogues serve as a forum for reviewing progress and networking to learn about the realities of other countries. This is remarkable, as it explicitly tries to circumvent being too distant to the realities of other agencies, which is usually a problem in development cooperation (see 2.1.2). Nevertheless, it remains at the level of meetings and dialogues which may not reflect the reality on the ground (Irvine, Chambers & Eyben, 2006, p. 64). According to Dyer and Singh (1998, pp. 664-666), this may positively affect a common culture of collaboration as knowledge sharing is conducive to that. Interestingly, the IO maintains information flows about the interagency collaboration and its subject matter with other, non-involved IOs as well. This can be seen as an extension of the network – maybe to keep talking the same language as other development organizations (section 2.1.2). Shutt (2006, p. 163) notes that these networks are important for sharing information regarding resources, procedures and other topics.

At the end of the resources element, it has to be noted that protectionism about resources (and monopolizing them) was not encountered (except for the money resource entirely managed by the IO). The reason for this is the difference between imbalance and mutual dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 168). In the case of multilateral development cooperation, there is an initial imbalance in resources and power. Nevertheless, the IO has an obligation to spend the resources on the interagency collaboration. Consequently, it needs the government agencies to be able to progress, which gives them a level of power as well. Their incentives are positively aligned (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 666). This is also the reason why no ethnocentrism of the "us-against-them" type is found, as Bardach (1998, p. 183) described in his case studies.

7.4 Steering a course

The elements included in the steering a course pillar are confirmed. Rather complementary evidence was gathered from observation and interviews regarding the vision, goals and process. The vision (in the sense of the broader perspective and benefits of the interagency collaboration) is mainly developed by the IO with the donor. Their agreement constitutes the framework in which the collaboration develops. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate the one vision of the interagency collaboration, as Bardach (1998, p. 201) proposes, as this is pre-determined reflecting the fact that it is a collaboration within a development project. The IO communicates its (rather broad) vision to the other agencies and it is discussed during the physical meetings. At the beginning of the interagency collaboration, this process was a bit more participatory for the first wave of collaborating countries, because the project was still more adaptable. For the later waves of accession, some of the structures were already established and had to be taken over as they were. Nevertheless, different visions are communicated by the different agencies and even by different agents within one agency. These different visions are part of the rather open vision of the IO and thus allow each agency to realize its particular interests that motivate participation, in line with the findings for other interagency collaborations (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 104). The aforementioned flexibility enables the practice of letting these visions coexist and of allowing all those involved to realize their individual visions (commonly recognized as linked to the individual motivations for being part of the collaboration). Participants agree that these vision(s) get updated from time to time to the current status quo. Goal setting (in the sense of the next lower level of milestones to achieve) functions in a similar way. The big milestones are already in the project document signed by the government agencies at the beginning and largely driven by the IO and its donor agreements. Nevertheless, the practice is that while the IO proposes the goals, countries are able to provide an opinion during physical meetings and to discuss. While there is less room for the coexistence of different goals, the process of reaching the goals is more participatory – and congruent with the elaborations on autonomy. This process happens mainly on the technical level and brings in opinions from locals (contrary to what Gasper, 2004, pp. 48-51 reports), bridging the gap between the development practitioners' reality and reality on the ground (section 2.1.2). It is understood by all agencies involved that goals are necessary: without agreeing to goals, the interagency collaboration as a whole could not advance. Notwithstanding this, agencies stress that, if political priorities change or technical difficulties are encountered, delays simply have to be accepted. As these processes of visioning and goal setting are open and the opinions of all are respected, agencies do not feel imposed on by any of the other agencies. Having a forum to be able to discuss and provide reasoned arguments with the possibility to modify goals is seen as equal and fair treatment, similar to Bardach's (1998, p. 206) findings. The practice to have an open vision encompassing all agencies' particular visions and a

stricter goal setting process is the equivalent to Bardach's advice to substitute management for governance and only focus on solving the next issue (Bardach, 1998, pp. 210-212, 231). Moreover, it enables connecting the narrow view of project management (where goals have to be reached, see 2.2.4.1) with the longer-term view of development collaboration. It also mitigates the usual ambivalence that all parties should own a project but one party has to manage it (Arvidson, 2004, pp. 230-231) through an inclusive vision while maintaining concrete goals. The vision, goals and process mainly influence the ICC's indicator 1 (achievement of agreed-on product), as they map the way towards it. Nevertheless, they potentially influence the exchanges between agencies (indicator 2) and future projects (indicator 4) as well due to the fact that a bad process or non-matching goals and visions may impede (future and current) collaboration.

The form is an element that is less important in this case. While formal documents establish two committees (one with steering functions), these never formally convene and none of the participants made reference to them. The practice is that the IO usually proposes goals and the others discuss them and come to agreements during meetings. Sometimes, the country agencies initiate this process. This is blended in with the rest of the meeting agenda and no committees formally convene. Moreover, the committee is not included when the budget and vision are discussed with the donors. In a sense, this is the most important discussion, as it sets the framework for collaboration but it is not subject to a common form of steering. This coincides with the view that the management of the project is the IO's turf (see above). Therefore, the form of steering is classified as a forum. The interagency collaboration participants are asked for their opinions and can influence the way forward but no real formal structure exists. Furthermore, this happens during meetings with technical-level staff (also in charge of implementation) influencing the steering. Consequently, it could be an implementation network as well. However, the policy dialogues also review progress on a political level. For that reason, I concluded that the best form to describe it is a forum. In that sense, a steering body that sets goals based on an established mechanism (see goal setting above) exists in line with Agranoff's (2006, p. 58) findings. It may well be that this form has followed function as recommended for interagency collaboration, as it seems to fit the arrangement with the donors (Bardach, 1998, p. 216 and for integrated UN missions Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005, p. 17). Usually, the form of steering through its power to determine the way forward would have an impact on direct outcomes of collaboration (indicator 1 of the ICC) and potentially as well on future projects (indicator 4). As the form of steering is rather weak in the case study, this is difficult to encounter empirically. Therefore, the element could be deleted. However, the form may be important in other interagency collaborations in development cooperation (it existed in this one as well, at least in writing). Therefore,

the element is maintained to preserve the value of this framework for (theoretical) generalization, otherwise it would skew findings for other case studies.

As an element of the framework, leadership is confirmed. While all agencies in the interagency collaboration take leadership on certain matters, the IO is the principal source of leadership. This view is shared by all participants and mainly rooted in the fact that the IO started the interagency collaboration project and its management is seen as its turf (see 7.3). An interagency collaboration requires leadership to be able to progress (Bingham, O'Leary, & Carlson, 2014, pp. 4-5). Leadership, thus, is important to establish and drive towards the goals agreed on (indicator 1 of the ICC) as well as in brokering new projects (indicator 4). Nevertheless, there is indication that once countries progress more towards agreed-on goals (indicator 1), they start to take more leadership, notably when it comes to searching for new projects (indicator 4). In that sense, there may be a transition of leadership from the IO to the government agencies. The fact that the IO was the organization that crafted the collaboration initially (on an intellectual level identifying the technical needs as well as on a political level identifying interest) further cements the feeling that the IO owns the project. Contrary to what could have been expected from the debate on ownership (2.1.3) as a term coined by development practitioners, the IO's staff agrees that the IO owns the project. However, as mentioned in 7.3, this sense of ownership is limited to the project and leaves the ownership of the subject matter to the government agencies in their respective countries. Consequently, the ownership debate in international development should look more into the fine details of ownership. The leadership style practiced by the IO is inclusive, facilitative:[159] while clearly taking the lead, it leaves room for debate and adjustments. This is contrary to what Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and von Hippel (2005, pp. 35-37) recommend for integrated UN peace missions. The difference may be due to the military component requiring a stronger leadership. In the case study, leadership cannot be attributed only to one person but rather a group of people (with complementary skills, see 7.3). It stays at the same level. The IO's technical staff leads the processes on the technical level – goal setting and operational management – while political-level staff lead political processes e.g. the visioning.

7.5 Culture

The elements of the culture pillar are confirmed in the case study. It has to be recalled that the culture pillar in Bardach's original work was focused on joint problem solving. While it was proposed to open it up in my operationalization, it still looks into the spirit inside the interagency collaboration through its three elements. One could say that it looks into the guiding behavior (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, p. 333) or logic

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[159] An exception is the budgeting process with the donors, where the donors take leadership and determine the budget in a rather top-down manner.

(section 2.2.2). Bureaucratic culture looks more into the details and reasoning inside the interagency collaboration. Organizational culture has been used in joint venture research for that (Gómez-Miranda, Pérez-López, Argente-Linares, & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2015, p. 365). As this is more all-encompassing, the element has been renamed to 'organizational culture' to also capture non-bureaucratic culture. In the interagency collaboration, bureaucratic values dominate within the participating agencies. These administrative procedures and hurdles cannot be circumvented and sometimes lead to delays in the collaboration. All participants understand that. However, the required culture of pragmatism (Bardach, 1998, pp. 234-235) is found in the collaboration between agencies. Here problems are solved jointly in a flexible way as far as possible. This is a people task – the craftsmen of interagency collaboration are called upon their strengths. The practice is to maintain and respect each agency's organizational culture for domestic matters while creating team spirit for collaboration. Thus, the interagency collaboration has managed to build not a common culture as suggested by joint venture research (2.2.4.3) but a hybrid team culture as in project management (Jones, 2008, p. 113). The incentives are aligned which is consistent with findings from Dyer and Singh (1998, pp. 666, 669): all agencies can only win by collaborating, as this means additional resources. It easily allows for multiple bottom lines of different stakeholders (Schwenger, 2013, p. 99). A question is whether this flexibility in collaboration tasks is due to a hybrid culture, as I believe, or due to cultural differences. In the end, organizational culture has to be interpreted through sensemaking as well (Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015, p. 266) and is influenced by national culture through socialization (Gerring & Barresi, 2009, p. 249). Nevertheless, I think the impact of national culture on organizational culture is limited in this case for two reasons. Firstly, the participants come mainly from one region and, secondly, the agencies from other cultural backgrounds (donors and international consultant) provided views similar to the others. Organizational culture potentially affects all indicators of the dependent variable directly. It contributes to the achievement of goals, to an increase in exchanges and understanding and to future projects. The more of a flexible organizational culture agencies report to possess in the project, the more they achieve the indicators.

Negotiation processes happen only marginally in the interagency collaboration. On a higher political level, there are conversations about budget and vision bilaterally between the IO and the donors. However, this is a rather top-down communication of the budget available. Based on it, the vision is adapted to the available funds. The work with the international consultancy is determined in a similar way. With the country agencies, it also works the same way: the project agreement is transmitted (which leaves room for different visions and autonomy) and no negotiation takes place. This is enhanced by the fact that an informal contact is usually established before a formal approach is made to inquire about mutual interests. If a country has

doubts about joining, the IO uses its intellectual leadership and tries to convince it through arguments but recognizes that this has limited success. Thus, there are no surprises and no need for negotiation. On the technical level, small negotiations happen sometimes. On the one hand, these happen during the discussions for goal setting in meetings. These are solved through argumentation with the consensus of all. On these occasions the delegation problem (Bardach, 1998, p. 249-250) sometimes occurs and country agency representatives have to check back with higher hierarchy levels first. However, this is accepted and does not cause inconveniences. On the other hand, country agencies request changes to plans directly from the IO without involving other country agencies from time to time, which is also negotiated bilaterally. Due to the fact that the interagency collaboration takes place in the framework of a development cooperation project, value creation and value claiming as found in Bardach's (1998, p. 239) case studies is not an issue. By collaborating, the agencies create value and can generously claim value, as their turf does not overlap at all. Likewise, they do not have to try to let other agencies pay for the interagency collaboration (Bardach, 1998, p. 242), as the donors already do. Surprisingly, some agencies even reject offered resources (e.g. national consultants). In some cases this is due to strategy, in some cases it may be a matter of pride as well. For all these negotiations, the practice encountered in the field is to find mutually agreeable solutions (within the framework of existing rules). This type of reciprocity is similarly found in non-profit research (Waters, 2009a, p. 144). Consequently, negotiations are a weak element in this case and may potentially be deleted. However, I think negotiations in other interagency collaborations are potentially important, notably when the agreements with the donors do not leave so much room for maneuver. Also, they did happen in this collaborative effort, although they were not common. Lastly, it may be that negotiations with the donors in fact happen in this case as well but on a higher political level of which the project staff does not know the content. Consequently, the element stays part of the framework. Negotiations first and foremost impact the advances on agreed-on products (indicator 1) as well as potential future projects (indicator 4).

The trust element is confirmed as well – all interviewees in the interagency collaboration see it as an important element. Trust mainly helps to openly share opinions, concerns and information. It derives either from the other institution involved, the people involved or both. The IO is the primary example, as all other agents and agencies manifested trust in it and its staff.[160] While professionalism, good track record, personal contacts and a long-term interest in the development of the

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[160] Recalling that the IO is seen as the project owner, this meets Bardach's (1998, p. 252) definition of trust: "trust is confidence that the trustworthiness of another party is adequate to justify remaining in a condition of vulnerability."

region[161] all contribute to the trust base, the most important ingredient is treating all participating agencies equally. Furthermore, respecting the practices of interagency collaboration described above helps – although trying is more important than actually doing so. This is one of Bardach's (1998, p. 264-265) pieces of advice as well: selecting representatives with the right skills for the interagency collaboration. The practice of trust-building and -maintaining happens on a personal level: the participants involved tried to get to know each other on a personal level, creating a group spirit by being themselves and sharing information about their private lives. It is an interesting way to reflect both the personal element of trust and the fact that it is a group that has to trust (Bardach, 1998, pp. 260-261). This contributes to building a local network of trust contrary to other development projects (Shutt, 2006, p. 164). While that makes time for doing so during meetings crucial, it is likewise possible to dispose of this time through other fora – several agency representatives know each other from other occasions, which increases trust for this collaboration as well. The more time previously spent together, the higher the level of trust seems to be the rule of thumb. Similarly, the personal aspect of trust makes it vulnerable to staff changes. Trust may be cultural (in terms of national culture, 2.2.4.4) but mixed evidence exists on that. While some participants feel that having the same cultural background helps to build trust, others claim it is more the same political context or resource endowment that matters. Trust is able to influence advances towards the project goals (indicator 1), mutual understanding (indicator 3) and may trigger future projects (indicator 4). However, the strongest impact is on indicator 2 of the ICC, an increase of exchanges between the participants. If the participants do not trust each other, they are only going to interact the mere minimum.

7.6 Platforming

The first part of developmental dynamics, platforming, covers non-random processes that craftsmen consciously initiate to reach a higher ICC. This kind of sequencing (how and when to use which of the previously mentioned elements) is fully confirmed through different evidence, notably during the beginning of the interagency collaboration.[162] The practice is that the IO leads these processes through its staff, mostly in physical meetings. However, different staff members are employed depending on the task to be accomplished – several craftsmen work towards increasing the ICC. This matches Bardach's (2001, p. 163) conclusion about developmental dynamics: craftsmanship is done by many players at the same time and these players in turn serve as input for the other craftsmen. The craftsmen rely on the basic elements and the static elements of the operationalized theory and combine them in an intelligent way. In this way, platforming per se does not influence any of the indicators

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[161] Contrary to project management, see 2.2.4.1.
[162] Although participants stress the importance of momentum events as well (e.g. lucky coincidences).

of the dependent variable but is the transmitter determining their respective impacts. This conforms with Bardach's (1998, p. 270) finding that platforming is more focused on the operational capacity of the interagency collaboration. In that sense, it is rightly placed above the static elements spanning across all of them to reflect their use. The craftsman combines them and the influence on the dependent variable and its indicators is then transmitted in one way or another. In fact, many of my findings are similar to Bardach's later work (Bardach, 2001, p. 149, section 2.3.7): multiple and interacting sub-processes that are recursive and subject to external shocks. My suspicion that platforming of international development cooperation is more difficult due to the geographical distances (section 3.4) is not confirmed – the geographical distances are overcome with more meetings. Notwithstanding this, and in line with my theoretical argument, this takes some time as meetings first have to be organized.

Bardach separated three blocks of several sub-processes, a structure which was taken over in the operationalization. However, the level of detail from field data is different for each element. A high level of detail was gathered for some sub-processes (notably from interviews); a low level for others. Consequently and in order to provide a generalizable framework, this paper proposes to keep the structure of three pillars but to omit the sub-processes within. This also accounts for the fact that a stronger interaction between the three pillars and the contained elements within is noticed than stated by Bardach. The sub-processes should only be reflected in the form of the elements but not in a particularly sequenced manner (while the three bigger pillars should keep their sequencing), as the exact sequencing cannot be determined (a similar conclusion to Bardach's).

The right pillar originally covers the elements of trust, leadership acceptance and communication. As this is all about sequencing of interpersonal processes, creating a common logic and a communication network for interagency collaboration – people-centered processes – this pillar is named 'interpersonal processes'. It is of particular importance to increase the exchanges between the interagency collaboration participants. In this case, two previously built communication networks are integrated into the interagency collaboration: the network the IO already had with the donors and the international consultancy and the network many countries already had with each other regarding other technical subject matters. In practice, this was particularly established through physical meetings with all the agencies and agents involved.

The left pillar includes the elements of creative opportunity, intellectual capital and the creation of an implementation network and an advocacy group. As this encompasses processes searching for the entry point (the need for the collaboration, the basic elements of collaboration) as well as the institutional support for the collaboration as such, the name 'institutional processes' is used for it. The practice is to conduct

extensive research on the possible opportunities and capital inputs that one can attract for the interagency collaboration. The agencies joining earlier particularly had an opportunity to substantially shape the face of the collaborative effort.

The top pillar is called 'continuous improvement processes', as it includes improved steering capacity, the operating subsystem and continuous learning. All of these subject previously established elements to improvement processes (participants know each other better, arrangements are refined, etc.) and establish a virtuous cycle in that way. The IO's representatives specifically see this as a normal process in a collaboration that entails technical and political components. As a practice, regular meetings are again required to achieve that.

7.7 Momentum

The second part of the developmental dynamics, the momentum element, is confirmed as well. As in Bardach (1998, p. 270), evidence shows that momentum processes are more related to resources. Two opportunity processes are mainly identified in practice. Firstly, once the project grows and is able to deliver products and results, the interagency collaboration itself becomes an opportunity as more and more agencies and agents talk about it and want to be part of it. This also increases the profile of the collaboration and its subject matter within the respective constituencies. It is related to the turf agencies possess and reflects two effects mentioned by Bardach: enthusiasm and bandwagon effects (Bardach, 1998, p. 276). Secondly, policy and institutional change processes are opportunities for the interagency collaboration to advance as the sudden change in political and institutional setup may provide a window of opportunity for this kind of projects as the needs of the countries (e.g. legal obligations) change. Consensus and trust effects, as in Bardach (1998, p. 276), are not found – and the current framework is accordingly modified. Two vulnerabilities are identified. Firstly, as a general practice, continuity and funding for continuing the interagency collaboration are vulnerabilities, as the agencies doubt that the collaboration would continue if the IO did not receive funds for the project from the donors anymore. Having the collaboration managed by an IO is seen as an advantage, as there is doubt whether the country agencies would continue the project on their own. Secondly, as in Bardach's original theory (Bardach, 1998, p. 296), staff turnover on the technical and political levels is monitored carefully as a source of vulnerability. Change impacts the availability of capable staff and changes political priorities. Interestingly, not only staff changes in the agency directly involved in the collaboration but also in other agencies working with the involved agency represent a risk due to the data requirements from other agencies in this particular interagency collaboration. The participation of the IO is again seen as having a mitigating impact on this risk. Likewise, the risk decreases once the project has been translated into the

workplan of an agency (with stable allocated budget). The risk of becoming cliquish is not encountered as a vulnerability (Bardach, 1998, p. 304). The momentum processes potentially impact all indicators of the dependent variable. However, they are most important to be able to increase the ICC through advancing with the project or not (indicator 1) as well as for collaborating in the future (indicator 4). As they are only potential processes that occasionally occur in an uncontrollable way and may be absent, they are rightly placed as the last element before impacting the dependent variable. They are underexplored in both the interagency collaboration theories presented in section 2.2.3, as well as the findings from other management research, section 2.2.4.

7.8 Additional elements – cross-boundary culture and power

The evidence gathered during field research provides indication that two more elements are important to correctly describe and understand the functioning of interagency collaboration in international development.[163] As theoretically anticipated and relying on previous elaborations, the two are intercultural differences and power. Further elements to be added to Bardach's operationalized theory are not found.

The first one pays tribute to the fact that interagency collaboration in international development takes place on a cross-boundary scale. As theories on interagency collaboration in the public sector usually develop within the same cultural context, this is not part of most of the theories introduced in 2.2.2. Nevertheless, it is already different for the private sector (e.g. joint ventures 2.2.4.3). Cultural differences are understood not as organizational culture (covered in the culture element of the theory), but rather as national culture (Gómez-Miranda, Pérez-López, Argente-Linares, & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2015, p. 365). Consequently, the element to be added should be named 'cross-cultural differences'. In the collaboration studied, there is a certain importance of regional belonging regarding the management of collaboration. Although the findings are mixed, some participants felt more comfortable in this interagency collaboration due to the fact that most participants come from the same region or are familiar with it. Notably for the IO as the collaboration manager, it is seen as an advantage by some participants. While this does not necessarily have to be due to cultural issues (for example, it could be simply that they know each other better), the arguments cited are closely related to the understanding of the region. As this is related to understanding the cultural context, this research attributes it to the cross-cultural differences element. Similarly, some matters that seem to be important to make participants comfortable within the collaboration are attributable to cultural factors (e.g. language, sharing family matters), as this may not be the case in other

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[163] The reader should note that the findings regarding smart practices gathered under the same section during the interviews are not included in this section. A separate section is dedicated to that.

parts of the world. In that sense, from a macro-level view, relying on stereotype-like characterization such as Hall or Hofstede, culturally-dependent issues are found. Notwithstanding this, these do not cause much misunderstanding, as the group is rather homogenous. Although the participants are not from the same country and all these countries have their own cultural identities, most of them are from the same region or know the region well. In this respect, these are all variables that may cause cultural misunderstanding for an outsider (Leung, 2008, p. 60) but participants did not show many problems to make sense of what is going on inside the collaboration (Bird & Osland, 2005, pp. 118-119). Some (not all) participants confirmed that misunderstandings occur but are aware that these occur within one cultural context as well. Therefore, they inquire and try to clarify – one could say they practice awareness, sensitivity and openness. Definitely, no tensions are encountered due to differences (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012, pp. 332-333). However, this sensemaking is not only focused on intercultural differences, but rather practiced in a broader sense, including potential differences due to organizational culture. In addition to the importance of cross-cultural differences for managing interagency collaboration, the participants emphasized that culture mattered regarding the importance of the collaboration as such. They stressed that depending on national culture, people may have very different views on how important the subject is as well as on why and what should be done about it. One can say that it is related how the problem is framed in different countries (Moncrieffe, 2007, p. 2), although it is not related to the problem of framing by outside development practitioners, as discussed in section 2.1.2. This may impact the attention and resources dedicated to this interagency collaboration and thus indirectly impacts advances (indicator 1 of the ICC) and future projects (indicator 4).

Consequently, cross-cultural differences have to be reflected in the theoretical framework to explain interagency collaboration. While these cross-cultural differences are not too important for the management of the collaboration in this case, they may be much more important in other cases (especially when the cultures of the participants are more distinct). Furthermore, the importance attributed to the interagency collaboration depends on national culture even in this case. When incorporating this new element into the existing framework, three possibilities exist. Firstly, it could be an element in the basic elements section alongside with the political and institutional setup. This would be supported by the fact that it is a factor to understand regarding the importance attributed to the interagency collaboration per se. However, it is not as rigid as the other basic elements – political and institutional setup – as cross-cultural differences can be smoothened on a personal level by exposing the participants to one another as well as letting them exchange views and make sense of one another. As a result, this may change. This is not the case for the political and institutional setup which is unchangeable on an individual level at home. Therefore, the new element is not situated on this level. The second option is to place the new element as one

element besides the existing static elements (operating system, resources, steering a course and culture). This was my first thought in the theoretical reflection in section 2.3.8. But the evidence from the field shows that it rather is part of the practices of all these static elements – all of them may entail a cultural aspect that is able to differ from one participant to another and consequently requires sensemaking to be understood. One example is to enable more flexibility to allow a more adequate management in the local context addressing the issue that project management tools are culturally sensitive (Wang and Liu, 2007, p. 61 and 2.2.4.1). The boundaries between organizational and cultural sensemaking thus blur. For that reason, cross-cultural differences are clearly not an element of the static elements anymore. This is further supported by the fact that it does not impact the dependent variable as such but through changes in the static variables and the developmental dynamics making use of them. One cannot make use of cross-cultural differences for a craftsmanship purpose as is possible with the other static elements. Therefore, the third way is preferred here and it is situated as a cross-cutting element flowing through all of the static elements in the background.

'Power differences' is the second element I propose to include in the theoretical framework explaining interagency collaboration in international development. This should be differentiated into structural power issues and actor-related power issues (Hayward & Lukes, 2008, pp. 5-6). On the structural level, more important agencies (in terms of resource endowment, political influence and other factors) display slightly different behavior than less powerful agencies. These differences between agencies are recognized by other agencies. Likewise, the agenda-setting power given to the IO through the donor funds and the related implementation agreements is understood. Nevertheless, as a practice, these structural power differences should not translate into treating more or less powerful agencies differently from the others – the fact that all agencies are treated equally is explicitly recognized as important in this interagency collaboration. They keep their turf and autonomy (see 7.3). In this way, contrary to the literature (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980, p. 638), more power does not translate into more resources. The reason is that the view that the stronger party can impose decisions on others (Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006, p. 100) should be treated with more care. While it is true in the sense that the more powerful party can decide over some resources and issues, not respecting the other parties' interests at all may lead to a break in the relationship. That is not in the interest of the powerful party either, as it impedes achieving the collaborative objectives. For example, the IO manages the majority of the monetary resources received from the donors. But if it completely ignored the interests of the country agencies, they might walk away. As the IO cannot spend the money differently than agreed with the donors, this is not in its interest. That is the difference between mutual dependence and power imbalance (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005, p. 168) – one could also call this controlling mutuality (Waters, 2009a, p. 144).

This has not received sufficient attention in development research (Wilson & Eyben, 2006, p. 116) and the power difference stated in 2.1.2 should be looked at in a bit more nuanced way. On the actor-related side of power, there are some actors who use their power more than others. In fact, taking the leadership to drive interagency collaboration already requires power in a sense. But this is within the limits of what the other agents and agencies tolerate and actually see as necessary to advance with the interagency collaboration. It is advantageous that the project is kept at the technical level to avoid structural as well as actor-related power issues. Power differences impact the dependent variable only indirectly through their influence on other elements (e.g. leaving the other agencies turf or autonomy). Notably, this is the case for advancing towards agreed-on goals (indicator 1) and future projects (indicator 4) – the more powerful party may push the other agencies towards them. Likewise, too much pressure might lead to a break in collaboration and, therefore, no advances and future collaboration at all. Although the power difference element is not overly strong in the case studied, it may be much more important in other cases. Even in the interviews, participants noted that this was much stronger in other interagency collaborations (particularly with bilateral development aid agencies). Therefore, this should be part of the proposed theoretical framework on interagency collaboration in international development aid. Again, the question is where. Similar to cross-cultural difference, power cannot be intelligently used as a process by the craftsman as the static elements can be, for which reason it is unlikely it should be added on the same level. Likewise, it is not a basic element as it may change over time – actors have the possibility to learn to be sensitive to power differences and ease them. Thus, power rather impacts each element inside the static elements (turf, autonomy, resources, etc.) and should consequently be a cross-cutting element across all of them – comparable to cross-cultural differences.

7.9 Dependent variable: ICC

The development of the ICC and its indicators provide insight into whether the elements influence the ICC in the way it was explained. However, one has to keep in mind that not all effects may be found as this is only one case study. In this way, this section details a relative level of the dependent variable through the indicators used to operationalize it. Nevertheless, it does not provide a scale as there is no established baseline against which one could measure it. Furthermore, while the indicators provided are considered as a potential starting point for measurement of interagency collaborations in international development in general, these have to be contextualized and their use assessed from case to case. The concept is expandable in that sense and could be further developed to measure relationship qualities as e.g. in 2.2.4.2 for non-profit research on donor relations. A possible first step could be a concept to measure

the cost-benefit ratio of more effective collaboration to explore savings in collaboration through better management suspected in section 2.1.4.[164]

Definite progress is noted on indicator number 1 throughout the collaboration, the achievement of agreed-on goals in the interagency collaboration, notably data compilation and production of the national reports. While the quantitative progress (number of countries and indicators) is particularly high, qualitative differences exist regarding the quality of the indicators and information produced. Challenges and delays were rather specific in each occurrence and met with a high level of understanding among the collaboration participants (indicator 3). The progress lies within the requirements of the applicable performance agreements (in particular with the donors) and the participants voice satisfaction with the interagency collaboration in general. Flexibility in the project (also to adapt it to the countries' needs) and a good/bad match with political priorities (requiring previous intelligence on the political setup) are mentioned as particularly crucial.

Likewise, progress can be reported for the exchange between the interagency collaboration participants (indicator 2). In terms of both the quality of the exchanges (depth, subject relatedness, etc.) and the quantity (number of exchanges), an increase has happened among all agencies. The IO confirms that this is one of the hidden goals of the project. The most important ingredient for the increase is to organize physical meetings (usually by the IO). This communication and information element has an important influence. But at the same time, agencies report that even the disposition to exchange information with the others is higher.

Regarding indicator number 3, understanding of other agencies' local realities, a high level of understanding is noticed. However, it is not possible to verify if this already existed before with certainty (at least among the country agencies as they have other forums for exchange as well) or if it was entirely created in this interagency collaboration. With respect to the understanding among all agencies (including IO, donors and international consultancy), a better understanding is definitely encountered over the course of the collaboration. In particular and most importantly, this is also true for a high degree of understanding and acceptance in case things do not advance as planned and that there are different paces of advancement within the project. In the first place, a good understanding of the institutional and political setup is most important in this respect as well as the possibility to react flexibly. It should be noted that this indicator is potentially able to capture distance of development professionals and their management tools such as the logframe from the recipients as well (see

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[164] The findings regarding the participant's concept of collaboration gathered under the same section during the interviews are not included. This is detailed in a later section.

discussion in 2.1.2). If the collaboration showed the symptoms of a development cooperation project which reports power and distance issues on the side of the development practitioners, the understanding of other agencies' realities and delays would be low. The indicator can thus be refined in the future to a more sophisticated measurement.

Collaboration on new projects also happens due to this interagency collaboration (indicator 4). Various different forms of new projects are found. First of all the interagency collaboration as such grows, in terms of the countries involved and through additions to the products. Furthermore, new collaborations with other agencies take place within home constituencies and beyond. Lastly, new agencies are created, new sponsors are found and new agreements are concluded for certain actions. This is due to the trust in the other parties to be able to succeed as well as the results shown in the interagency collaboration project.

7.10 Revised theoretical framework: how interagency collaboration in international development aid works

The following figure shows all changes that are incorporated into the theoretical framework of interagency collaboration in international development. It is the summarized affirmative answer to research question one: Bardach's operationalized theory can be productively applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development. All existing elements can be confirmed, but there are some that need to be modified and some that need to be added. It begins with the separation of the institutional and political setup into two different elements at the foundation of collaboration. Inside the static elements, some changes have occurred while leaving the static elements as such intact:

- In the operating system element:
    - o Communication is added as an element;
    - o Flexibility is defined more narrowly;
    - o Mutual understanding loses trust to differentiate the element;
    - o The exchange of assets replaces pure financial exchanges.
- In the resources element:
    - o Turf and autonomy are combined into one element;
    - o Money is amplified to capture other physical in-kind assets as well.
- In the steering the course element, the form is specified as forum.
- In the culture element, bureaucratic culture is revised to organizational culture.

In the developmental dynamics, the detailed staging of processes is replaced by three bigger pillars of stages with different elements without specific sequencing (given the difficulty to clearly differentiate these processes). The momentum element reflects the momenta encountered in international development and the indicators of the ICC are listed. The most notable change is the addition of the elements of cross-cultural differences and power differences that are cross-cutting in the background of the static elements. This demonstrates the fact that these kinds of differences are inherent in and act through the practices encountered under the different static elements once the differences occur. Although these two elements are not overly strong in the interagency collaboration researched, they were present and may be much more important in other cases.

Furthermore, it is to note that the relative importance of these elements depends on the level at which the interagency collaboration participants operate. Some elements are emphasized more by participants on the political level (e.g. political setup) and some more by participants on the technical level (e.g. institutional setup). Likewise, the practices inside the elements may differ according to the level. For instance, communication gets more formal and more often takes a written form once the interlocutors are on a political level.

Regarding the ICC as the dependent variable with its four indicators, one has to understand that different elements impact different indicators, and thus the ICC, in different ways. Some of the elements do not even impact the ICC directly but indirectly through links to other elements (which are not represented for legibility). Consequently, there are differences in how the elements influence the ICC, although the overall logic of the model remains the same. The logic of the model is the answer to research question two, as it shows how the elements impact the dependent variable, the ICC.

Figure 14: Revised theoretical framework of interagency collaboration

Source: Author.

These elements are determined and proven through notable practices in the case study, which is the answer to research question three and summarized in the following table. The left column specifies the element under which the practice is found; the right column describes the practice. The table was constructed and should be read in the following way: "In the case study, it was found that participants…" Interestingly, it was realized later that this table could also be read in a prescriptive way: "A development practitioner in this context should…" However, the latter reading only holds true if the findings of this case study can be generalized to other cases. This will be examined in section 8.

Table 6: Empirically found practices of interagency collaboration in the case

Element	Practice
Institutional setup	Share information on institutional panorama, legislative framework and the project background during technical-level physical meetings in written form.
Political setup	Share information on political priorities and interests verbally during (formal and informal) physical meetings, notably with political-level counterparts and particularly during the beginning of an interagency collaboration.
	Monitor the general political context regularly.
Communication	Use written form for formal communication and commitments with a respectful tone (associated with the political level).
	Use physical meetings to share information and to recognize the contribution of each agency formally.
	Use verbal communication on the technical level to share information on overcoming problems through stories and comments.
Flexibility	React flexibly to operational challenges and changes on legal agreements by adapting timing and products to realities (facilitated by more flexible management tools and funding sources).
Motivation	Remind everyone of the collaboration's benefits for the country's development, professional development and personal development.
Mutual understanding	Regularly organize physical meetings to build understanding and enable continued learning about it, namely on the technical level with IO presence.
Accountability	Ensure full compliance with institutional accountability (steering bodies, funds) by labelling required products to match indicators.
	React flexibly to any other accountability issues by recalling the commitment made as well as countries' benefits, legal obligations

	and peer group comparison.
Exchange of assets	Establish agreements or follow existing rules for the exchange of key assets (e.g. finances, expertise and information).
Turf and autonomy	Do not interfere with other agencies' turf or autonomy as long as the collaboration's goals are reached, thus enabling everyone to achieve individual goals at the same time.
Monetary and other physical in-kind resources	Let the IO manage monetary resources and exchange only other physical in-kind resources with all agencies involved (consultants, travel, information, staff time and the effort to host a physical meeting).
People	Show and communicate results and stress the participation of the IO to avoid delays due to political-level staff rotations.
	Offer additional manpower in the form of consultants to address staff shortages.
Political standing	Communicate political standing through details (e.g. meeting attendance, correspondence, joint problem solving and recognition of achievements and contributions), notably on the political level.
Information	Maintain a constant flow of information among all agencies involved through regular physical meetings (on the political level to share achievements and priorities, on the technical level to share experience).
Vision	Provide a broad vision to allow space for everyone to develop their own vision based on individual motivation.
	Propose, discuss and agree on goals on the technical level through a fair and equal process of reasoned arguments.
Form	Establish a forum to discuss the way forward for the collaboration (within the framework provided by the agreement with the donors).
Leadership	Let the IO lead the majority of the processes related to the project (not the subject matter) in a facilitative and inclusive style.
Organizational culture	Maintain and respect agencies' organizational culture for domestic matters and create team spirit for interagency collaboration.
Negotiation process	Avoid negotiations by conducting informal intelligence on interests before a formal approach and find mutually agreeable solutions.
Trust	Provide time and space for participants to get to know each other on a personal level creating a group spirit through being themselves and sharing information about their private lives.
Platforming	Let the IO's craftsmen lead platforming processes through organizing physical meetings and research to stimulate fruitful interpersonal, institutional and continuous improvement processes.
Momentum	Approach new agencies when the project has shown results or

	when policy and institutional changes in the respective constituencies provide a window of opportunity for collaboration.
	Carefully monitor staff changes and funding of the interagency collaboration as potential vulnerabilities.
Cross-cultural differences	Be aware of, try to make sense of and respect different practices that may be due to cross-cultural differences.
Power differences	Be sensitive to potential power imbalances but treat all agencies involved in the interagency collaboration equally.

Source: Author.

7.11 Smart practices

While the practices of interagency collaboration in international development are summarized in the previous table, the question remains whether there are practices that are particularly smart. To recall: for Bardach (1998, p. 36), the main criterion making a practice smart was creating value on the cheap. Campbell (2006, p. 11) added that smart practices have to capture the reaction to dynamic changes as well. It was previously concluded that it is about combing the static elements through a dynamic process in a smart way (section 3.3.1).

Some of Bardach's (1998) smart practices are found in this case of international development collaboration as well.

- The use of catalytic funds in the form of the donors providing the necessary resources to make interagency collaboration happen. In this way, none of the agencies' budgets are overly impacted. Most importantly, this was recognized as crucial by the IO.
- Focusing on management rather than governance and building consensus only to advance to the next step. In the case study, this is most prominently featured by the high degree of turf and autonomy left to each agency in the implementation of the project and includes treating every agency equally (stressed by the interviewees from the country agencies as crucial for motivation). In this way, ownership of the subject matter stays with the countries, while the IO can focus on its perceived dominion, the management of the interagency collaboration. That creates the necessary spirit to make triangular cooperation work.
- Likewise, it is probable that the right staff members are important. Staff members have to master the skills required for the interagency collaboration processes outlined above, notably on an interpersonal level.
- Lastly, it may be true as well that the smart practice of letting form follow function in creating a rather light steering forum is adhered to.

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In addition to those smart practices already outlined by Eugene Bardach, four more are added here (some of them comparable to some of the generic smart practices proposed by Bardach, 2006b). These four are based on the opinions of the interagency collaboration participants gathered during the interviews and on my reflection on the interpreted findings. Some managerial practices are more dominant and important than others, as they are able to increase tolerance of deficiencies in other elements.

1. Taking time to carefully assess the political and institutional setup is one of these smart practices. Understanding political priorities and needs before embarking on the collaborative effort prevents later delays as more of the effective agencies are selected. This also makes the difference between bad development practitioners (in the sense that they do not understand local realities, see section 2.1.2) and good development practitioners. The way to achieve this is through frequent meetings enabling exchange.

2. Being flexible is a smart practice enabling reaction to externalities and deficits in other elements by combining the existing resources and assets in a new way. In order to be able to do so, it is crucial to count on different funds based on different agreements which lay the foundation for different accountabilities. In that way, agencies are capable of choosing the direction in which to advance and which obligations to fulfill first. Likewise, this helps to overcome the rigidity exhibited by some development management tools, such as the logframe (2.1.2), as well as the inherent uncertainty of managing projects (2.2.4.1).

3. Understanding the practices of appropriate communication on each level and being able to adapt to them is important to demonstrate that one knows how to address the other collaborators. Without it, one may endanger the ability of increasing the ICC at all, as the other participants do not receive the necessary messages to start collaborating.

4. Leaving the management of interagency collaboration to the IO while leaving turf and autonomy on the subject matter to government agencies helps to increase ownership and limit the politicization of collaboration. In this respect, interviewees from government agencies also noted that the IO helps to push them to progress, as the country agencies may not push for results on their own. The meetings are the main forum to do so.

7.12 Capacity, process and craftsmanship

The resulting theoretical framework captures as well that it is capacity rather than action that is important for interagency collaboration. The ICC entails different aspects of capacity and reflects that not acting sometimes reveals a higher ICC, e.g. when all

agencies mutually understand that acting at that point in time may decrease the collaborative capacity. Much of the explanatory power of the ICC in that sense depends on the indicators used to measure it.

The ICC is based on processes and thus provides an entry point for the managerial practices. These practices are used in this paper to prove the presence of the different elements and the importance of their sequencing (as reflected in the platforming of the developmental dynamics elements). The right selection of a process sequence and what to do next is crucial for practices and the smart practices alike. This choice is the essence of what a skilled individual in interagency collaboration has to do – no matter whether it is called spanning organizational boundaries (Alter & Hage, 1993, pp. 46) or craftsmanship as in Bardach. It accounts for the purposiveness of managerial action (Bardach, 1998, pp. 6-7). This encompasses making use of different elements across the whole theoretical framework. Given the emphasis placed on the individual in international development aid literature (section 2.1.2), this is particularly important in the application of interagency collaboration theory in this field.

The IO is the center of craftsmanship. It is recognized by all participants as the manager of the collaboration which balances the different interests involved in the effort. One example is that it shields the country agencies from the development planning tools required by the donors. Therefore, leaving the IO at the center of craftsmanship is a winning strategy for all. It is rooted in the IO's leadership in crafting the interagency collaboration and driving it forward, in particular at the beginning of the collaboration. However, the IO's craftsmanship does not rely on only one individual. Several staff members are involved in different tasks. In general, technical-level staff drive the collaboration forward on the technical level and political-level staff on the political level, in line with Agranoff's (1991, p. 536) findings. Nevertheless, this is not entirely true as political-level staff also shaped the layout and the technical needs assessment of the collaborative effort, particularly at the beginning of the collaboration. It may rather be that McQuaid's (2010, pp. 138-142) diagnosis is correct, that it is important for success that the interacting individuals are on the same level of policy and budgetary responsibility irrespective of task.

7.13 Conclusion: the revised framework of Bardach's theory to answer the research questions

With the elaborations in this section, the research questions can be answered. Regarding research question number one, whether Bardach's operationalized theory can be applied to interagency collaboration of IOs with other organizations in international development cooperation, the answer is yes. The elaborations under each of the sections in this chapter show that all existing elements can be confirmed (part A

of research question one), although some have to be slightly adapted. In this sense, the basic elements of institutional and political setup were separated into two elements of their own. In the static elements, flexibility, mutual understanding, the exchange of assets, other physical in-kind assets, the form and organizational culture were more closely specified. Likewise, the turf and autonomy elements were combined into one. Within the platforming element of the developmental dynamics, the narrowly defined sequencing process of ten platforms is simplified into three big pillars. The momentum element is defined more precisely and the indicators for the ICC are named.

In answer to part B of research question one, which elements are missing, a communication element is added to reflect the importance of communication in international development cooperation and the particular practices encountered in the case study. Likewise, two cross-cutting elements of cross-cultural differences and power differences are added in the background of the static elements. This reflects that these differences are important in international development cooperation and – if encountered – impact all of the static elements. All these changes are demonstrated in the overall revised framework of interagency collaboration in international development in section 7.10. The framework also represents in a summarized way how these elements impact the dependent variable, the ICC, the answer to research question number two. Further explanations on the mechanisms are provided in the respective sections for each element.

"Specifiable method[s] of interacting with a situation that [are] intended to produce some result" (Bardach, 1998, p. 36) – managerial practices in other words – are used to identify these elements and indicate their presence. These practices are listed in table six in section 7.10 and answer research question number three. Nevertheless, these practices should not be confused with smart practices, i.e. practices that combine some elements in a particularly intelligent way to create value on the cheap. Among the ones that had already been identified in the original theory, some are also found in this case. These are the use of catalytic funds, management rather than governance, selecting the right staff members and letting form follow function. In addition, four new smart practices are found: 1. the careful assessment of political and institutional setup, 2. a high degree of flexibility rooted in flexibility with agreements and funds, 3. the use of the right communication, and 4. leaving the management of collaboration in international development to an IO. One of the reasons for the last point is the level of craftsmanship available at IOs. Craftsmanship is equally (maybe even more) important in international development than in other cases of interagency collaboration and may be distributed over different staff members.

8. Conclusion: the revised interagency collaboration framework for international development − a concept for research and practice

This chapter concludes the present research project. It starts by briefly summarizing the results, particularly regarding developing the theoretical framework for interagency collaboration in international development extensively discussed in chapter 7. Subsequently, it discusses its potential for generalization as well as some research implications. Afterwards, the contribution made to science is reviewed. It ends with some thoughts on possible avenues for future research and application in practice.

8.1 Result: a concept for interagency collaboration in international development

The departure point for this research was to understand how interagency collaboration in international development cooperation works. More precisely, the interest was to research interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development. The resulting theory should not only provide the necessary theory to explain the relationships between dependent and independent variables but also connect them to the managerial practices on the ground.

It was found that interagency collaboration in this field is frequent and related to costs but rarely researched. Research conceptualizing and understanding its management functions consequently has scientific relevance and a vast cost-saving potential. Reviewing development cooperation, public management and general management literature, it was noticed that no adequate framework existed which was able to describe and explain interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development. This review was structured by guiding questions to orient the research. Development cooperation with its colonial roots requires a framework sensitive to the context, notably including power and interculturality. The need for sensitivity is related to the debate about ownership of development projects. These have to be added to the different overarching themes already present in interagency collaboration, such as environmental factors, the organizational system, resources, steering the course, the (organizational) culture and logic, and the dynamic evolution of collaboration over time. Together with learnings from project management, public relations, joint ventures and intercultural management, the most apt of these so-called multidimensional models (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 23) was sought for this purpose. In the end, Eugene Bardach's interagency collaboration theory was identified as the best choice, as it comprises the most important of these themes as well as provides flexibility to be adapted. With the theoretical concept on hand, it was possible to revise the guiding questions to the final research questions to be explored.

The methodology to explore the research questions was a case study of the type of Eisenhardt (1989) with a localist view (Alvesson, 2003), crafting an empirical approach with the recognition that the context matters. This reflects the conceptual, exploratory and explanatory intent of this research project. Conducting a case study of one typical case, an interagency collaboration of a UN agency with 19 country agencies, two donors, one international consultancy and one other IO, provided the data needed. Evidence was collected from documentation analysis, observation (with a participatory component) and semi-structured interviews to allow for triangulation and to reflect the views of all participants, as symmetric relations are important (Waters, 2009a, p. 144).

As a result, a comprehensive, theoretical framework was developed and presented in section 7.10 to satisfy the research interest. It explains how interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development works, as found in the case study. The practices encountered in the field (which may contain guiding value for other cases) were specifically listed. Lastly, smart practices were developed to provide examples of effectively increasing the ICC, the dependent variable. The role that the individual staff members, the craftsmen, play in this process was emphasized.

8.2 Validity and generalization: a concept with potential

The framework found empirically conceptualizes and explains how interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development works. At least for the case studied, this is true. The important question is whether it is also applicable to other cases and can be generalized. As the attempt of this research is a qualitative analysis of one case with comparative potential, the hope is that the answer is yes. Nevertheless, learning is contextual (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 4). Due to the research design, my research does not aim for statistical but theoretical generalization.

The first step to draw conclusion about the potential explanatory power for other cases is to ensure that this account has followed the criteria for validity. Reviewing this research against the criteria as summarized by Yin provides the following:

Table 7: Review of research against evaluation criteria for validity

Test	Tactic in case study	Compliance by research
Construct validity	- Multiple sources of evidence - Chain of evidence - Review draft of case study report by key informants	- Documentation analysis, observation and interviews used as sources - Findings documented in section 6 and interpreted in section 7 - Draft sent to all interviewees for

		review
Internal validity	- Pattern matching - Explanation building - Rival explanations discussed - Logic models used	- Pattern matching applied - Explanations built - Rival explanations analyzed and discussed - Logic models used (framework)
External validity	- Theory in single case studies - Replication in multiple case studies	- Theory rigorously applied in single case study - Potential for replication in further case studies in the future
Reliability	- Case study protocol - Case study database	- Case study protocol and database (not accessible to the general public)

Source: Author based on Yin (2009, p. 41).

Consequently, this project has followed the criteria for sound research. Particularly regarding the data quality, the extensive observation period and a 93.6% response rate in the interviews stand out. Not even the top-level bureaucrats of the case studied were missed. In that sense, the validity of the research conducted is seen as high and the researcher has gathered enough information from different sources to overcome his own positionality, having gained access to the field through the IO (see section 4.3.2).

As a result, theoretical generalization is possible. It has to be recalled that the case was selected as one typical case for interagency collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development. As the case does not present any features or behaviors that could be seen as particular, special or rare, the framework developed can be generalized to other cases of this class. One has to remember that IOs were defined as being an international public sector entity established by intergovernmental processes regularly reporting to a governing body (based on Adamou, 2014, p. 222) and that the field of development aid was limited to aid from governments for economic and welfare development on grant or loan below market rate base (Keeley, 2012, p. 49). This limits the room for direct generalization. Nevertheless, if one starts to gradually relax these conditions, the findings from this research are possibly also valuable for interagency collaboration in other circumstances and between other classes of agencies. One example may be interagency collaboration of NGOs in international development or even outside the development world. Another example could be to understand interagency collaboration of IOs with communities in international development. This has been excluded explicitly in section 2 and further research is required to determine mechanisms and limitations, but the framework may be a good starting point.

Post-conflict settings may be a particularly interesting field but also practitioners from this field may be particularly interested in the application of the developed framework. From section 2.1.1, it should be recalled that, due to the breakdown in relationships, post-conflict situations require particular attention to collaboration in general. In that sense, the framework may provide guidance diagnosing what to focus on as "what matters are the interrelationships of the national and international ownerships and the way they act together to generate development effectiveness." (United Nations Development Programme, 2010, p. 23) Therefore, the findings may be of interest to UN missions (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005) and UN country level coordination (Döring & Schreiner, 2012).

The findings also allow answering the question raised in section 4.2.4 based on Yin (2009, pp. 46, 50), whether this case study should be seen as a single case study with embedded sub-units or multiple cases with one holistic unit of analysis. This is important for future research. Given the evidence found, it became clear that the participants of the interagency collaboration studied saw it as one entity, one project that advances only jointly. This is notably signaled by the comments from the interviewees when asked about how they saw collaboration and cooperation and coincides with Bardach's definition of interagency collaboration. Although different participants and agencies advance at different rhythms, all participants always had the common progress and collaboration among all in mind. For them, only one ICC existed and the long-term view dominated (not seeing the interagency collaboration simply as a development project of limited time). This result coincides with Bardach's view that there is only one ICC for each interagency collaboration project. Consequently, the case study has to be classified as a single case study with embedded sub-units of analysis. Most likely, this is the case for other interagency collaborations between IOs and other organizations in international development as well, as the determining characteristic of these projects is the common goal and joint progress as well as the long-term view. Notwithstanding this, it has to be analyzed for each case whether the relationship is focused on the long term and whether it requires all partners advancing jointly. If this is the case, the recommendation from this research for future research is seeing each agency's collaboration with the rest (its 'bilateral' ICC) only as a sub-unit of analysis of one case of a common ICC.

8.3 Contributions and limitations: an integrative concept

This research project makes three contributions to science in particular. The first contribution is a comprehensive literature review focusing on understanding the current thinking of interagency collaboration in international development cooperation. The innovative structure aims to give an overview of the different levels of theories. It goes from macro-level theories (rather centered on the mechanisms) to

micro-level theories (empirically found managerial practices) outlining the importance of meso-level theories in between connecting the two. Moreover, it takes important issues into account, such as capacity, processes and craftsmanship. Within the different levels of theory, the most common overarching themes which authors of interagency collaboration have focused on are identified. This approach provides a comprehensive structure and also grants easy access for future researchers to situate themselves in interagency collaboration.

Based on the structured review, the production of a revised framework explaining interagency collaboration in the area of international development (focusing on IOs and other organizations) is a second contribution and at the heart of my research. In that sense, the concept connects the different theory levels as a meso-level theory covering all themes identified as important for interagency collaboration and adding new ones of particular importance for development cooperation. Employing an existing theory covering many of the themes for which previous research exists is also a step towards the construction of an overarching theory to avoid fragmentation of interagency collaboration research (O'Leary & Vij, 2012, pp. 516-517). Moreover, it allows for incorporating recent tendencies and findings of management in general. It is interesting to note in this regard that Bardach's theory was developed in 1998 (before a good number of the works cited in the literature review) and incorporates findings on interagency collaboration across different management research fields into one framework. However, this research arrived to Bardach's concept in reverse by searching for a framework that encompasses all the different currently existing themes of interagency collaboration. Consequently, the revised framework has great potential to serve as a starting point for future research as well and to become the overarching theory in demand, although it currently receives little attention in research. The field research that was required to construct the revised framework also adds another account of interagency collaboration in the field of international development to the existing research body. This comprises identifying the practices encountered in the field as well as the deduction of smart practices.

Lastly, the results of this research make a contribution to the body of knowledge about development cooperation. The revised framework of interagency collaboration in international development particularly provides scientific evidence for practitioners to draw conclusions for their practical work. In that sense, it seems that some parts of the concept are more relevant to development cooperation, whereas other parts are more important for interagency collaboration theory. First and foremost, this helps to understand better how collaboration works and makes its management more efficient and effective, ultimately reducing associated costs. In addition, and quite unforeseen, an important lesson was learned regarding ownership of international development projects. From the field, a strong distinction of ownership emerged between the

ownership of the project (happily left to the IO in charge of it) and the ownership of the subject matter on the home front (turf and autonomy). This distinction is currently not found in the ownership debate in international development but may be crucial to resolve the ambiguity about who does what in development cooperation.

The limitations of this research mostly lie in its design. Although it is believed to have studied a typical case allowing for generalization, it is possible that the findings were particular to this case only. This may be supported by the fact that the case only included participants from one world region. Further research on other cases should provide the necessary data to conduct a cross-case analysis and validate the findings. In particular, more research is required on the two new cross-cutting elements added to the revised framework empirically. Given that both elements were not strong in this particular case, a better understanding has to be developed regarding how power differences and cross-cultural differences influence the overall ICC.

8.4 Future research and practical application: expanding the concept

The entry points for future research on interagency collaboration in international development aid can be derived from the limitations and thoughts on generalization. First and foremost, the revised concept should be applied to different cases of collaboration between IOs and other organizations in international development cooperation to be able to conduct a cross-case analysis. With more empirical evidence, it will be possible to validate and refine the different elements as well as to better understand the mechanisms at play influencing the ICC and the practices associated with it. Most importantly, this should comprise observational research covering other parts of the world to avoid any regional bias of the findings. This should lead to targeted questionnaires with the objective that future researchers do not necessarily have to undergo immersed observational research again. In this respect, the proposal of including the study of failed collaborations (Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007, p. 48) seems to be promising as well. As a next step, as mentioned under 8.2, the limiting conditions can be relaxed (e.g. not only focusing on IOs, not only focusing on development aid, etc.) to see whether the framework has explanatory power in other contexts as well.

In a larger sense, two important contributions would be important for science in the near future. Firstly, working on a quantifiable measure for the relational quality in interagency collaboration may help to determine the ICC better and provide benchmarks to compare different case studies. The way could be through scales as used in public relations theory mentioned in section 2.2.4.2. In fact, the first steps have already been taken by creating the Interagency Collaboration Assessment Tool (ICAT), which rates the collaborative relationship on a five-point Likert scale

(Polivka, Dresbach, Heimlich, & Elliott, 2001, p. 343). Secondly, an area to investigate further is how much of a project a development project is (and thus the potential insights from project management) and how much of an interagency collaboration it is. Determining the border line may be a challenging enterprise and probably touches on the question of the real retention of autonomy of the agencies involved (Cropper, 1996, p. 82). This links to the development context of each project, as some countries are more aid-dependent than others.

Finally, exchange between researchers of interagency collaboration and development practitioners should be fostered. This is likely to be fruitful for both. The researchers are able to understand the realities on the ground and the application of their findings better, leading to building better models (notably regarding organizations that are not on the same power level such as donor and recipient). The development practitioners may benefit from a better understanding of their daily work which has the potential to make them more efficient and effective. An immediate next step in this direction is deducing a management cockpit from the revised framework of interagency collaboration in international development cooperation allowing development practitioners to monitor key aspects of interagency collaboration.

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II. List of interviews

Country / Organization	Interviewee	Title	Role in project	First interview	Second interview	Place
Bolivia	Franklin Molina	Viceminister of Energy Development	Third level	14.01.2015		Call
	Jorge Leiton	Director of Planning and Energy Integration	Political focal point	27.10.2014		Lima, Peru
	Carla Flores	Econometrician for Hydrocarbons and Energy Forecast	Technical focal point	10.11.2014		Call
Brazil	Amilcar Guerreiro	Director for Economic, Energetic and Environment Studies	Political focal point	28.01.2015		Call
Chile	Hernán Sepúlveda	Professional of the Energy Efficiency Division	Technical focal point	07.11.2014		Santiago, Chile
	Marcelo Padilla	Professional of the Energy Efficiency Division	Technical focal point (before Hernán Sepúlveda)	28.11.2014		Santiago, Chile
Costa Rica	Irene Cañas	Viceminister of Energy	Third level	10.02.2015		Call
	Gloria Villa de la Portilla	Sectorial Director of Energy	Political focal point	27.01.2015		Call
	Arturo Molina	Technical Advisor	Technical focal point (jointly with	08.10.2014	28.10.2014	First interview: Call

			Nobelty Sanchez)			Second interview: Lima, Peru
	Nobelty Sanchez	Technical Advisor	Technical focal point (jointly with Arturo Molina)	08.10.2014		Call
El Salvador	Mario Cáceres	Director of Energy Efficiency	Political focal point	11.11.2014		Call
	Mauricio Ardon	Analyst of Energy Efficiency	Technical focal point	07.11.2014		Call
Guatemala	Edwin Rodas	Viceminister of Energy	Political focal point	07.04.2015		Call
Mexico	Juan Navarrete	Assistant General Director	Political focal point	09.02.2015		Call
	Brenda Valdez	Director of Energy Efficiency Policy Evaluation	Technical focal point	17.02.2015		Call
	Alberto Gloria	Subdirector	Technical focal point (before Brenda Valdez)	27.01.2015		Call
Panama	Fernando Díaz	Director of Electricity	Political focal point	30.01.2015		Call
Paraguay	Gustavo Cazal	Coordinator of the National Energy Efficiency Committee	Political focal point	11.12.2014	06.02.2015	First interview: Santiago, Chile Second

	Name	Position	Role	Date 1	Date 2	Location
						interview: Call
	Daniel Puentes	Chief of the Planning and Statistics Department	Technical focal point (jointly with Hugo Ramirez)	06.02.2015		Call
	Hugo Ramirez	Chief of the Energy Monitoring Department	Technical focal point (jointly with Daniel Puentes)	06.02.2015		Call
	Enrique Buzarquis	Consultant	National consultant	06.02.2015		Call
	Andrés Gonzales	Staff	Technical focal point (before Daniel Puentes)	06.02.2015		Call
Uruguay	Ramón Mendez	National Director of Energy	Political focal point	16.04.2015		Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
	Carolina Mena	Manager of the Area of Demand, Access and Energy Efficiency	Technical focal point (jointly with Alejandra Reyes)	14.07.2014	12.02.2015	First interview: Montevideo, Uruguay Second interview: Call
	Alejandra Reyes	Manager of the Area of Planning, Statistics and Balance	Technical focal point (jointly with Carolina Mena)	14.07.2014	12.02.2015	First interview: Montevideo, Uruguay Second interview: Call

	Alfonso Blanco	Consultant	National consultant	16.10.2014	02.10.2014	First interview: Santiago, Chile Second interview: Lima, Peru
ADEME	Didier Bosseboeuf	Senior Expert / Coordinator of International Economic Studies	Donor rep.	19.10.2014		Lima, Peru
Enerdata	Bruno Lapillonne	Consultant, Vice President and Co-Founder Enerdata	Int. consultant	28.10.2014	01.12.2014	First interview: Lima, Peru Second interview: E-mail
GIZ	Jürgen Klenk	Country Head Chile / Head Cooperation Program	Donor rep.	20.02.2015		Santiago, Chile
	Sina Perri	Advisor in the Cooperation Program	Donor rep.	20.02.2015		Santiago, Chile
OLADE	Katherine Segura	Analyst	Technical focal point	03.12.2014	28.01.2015	First interview: Call Second interview: Call
ECLAC	Hugo Altomonte	Director of the Division of Natural Resources and Infrastructure	Third level	23.02.2015		Santiago, Chile
	Manlio Coviello	Chief of the Unit of Natural	Political focal point	18.05.2015	06.07.2015	First interview:

		Resources and Energy				Santiago, Chile Second interview: New York, USA
	Dr. Andrés Schuschny	Research Assistant	Technical focal point	10.04.2015		Santiago, Chile
	Luiz Horta	Consultant	Int. consultant	28.10.2014		Lima, Peru
	Beno Ruchansky	Consultant	Int. consultant	03.03.2015		Call
ECLAC (Mexico)	Hugo Ventura	Chief of the Unit of Energy and Natural Resources	Political focal point	07.04.2015		Call
	Ryan Carvalho	Associate Economic Affairs Officer	Technical focal point	07.04.2015		Call
Anonymous	Person A		Technical focal point	19.12.2014		Call
	Person B		Technical focal point	27.10.2014		Lima, Peru
	Person C		Political focal point	19.12.2014		Santiago, Chile
	Person D		Technical focal point	16.01.2015		Call
	Person E		Technical focal point	29.10.2014	18.12.2014	First interview: Lima, Peru Second interview: E-mail
	Person F		Technical focal point	10.07.2015		Call

III. Issue guide

Who:
Where:
Date:
Time:
Preparation date:

Introduction / Background project
- Data protection reminder (professors access to all but for the rest anonymized, only country will be mentioned as project participant)
- Recording and name disclosure
- Project idea and reason
Getting started: Just talk (keep in mind: BIEE project)
- Tell me about the BIEE!
- Who started the project?
- What is it all about for you?
- Why do you take part in it?
On collaboration / dependent variable
- What is collaboration for you?
- Why do you collaborate in the BIEE?
- What is the <u>public value/utility</u> for the BIEE and how does it combine with the mission of the public sector?
- With whom do you collaborate in the BIEE? <u>Other countries? Why?</u>
- Who leads / drives the collaboration?
- How do you interact and who determines that?
- What should be the result of the project? The collaboration?
- Is it successful? How do you measure that?
Political and institutional setup
- Explain me briefly how the ministry/directorate is organized!
- Were there changes in the political landscape with respect to energy, energy efficiency and the BIEE?
- Where there any political or institutional difficulties setting up or advancing with the BIEE?
- What are you contributing to the BIEE and why?
- *In case of CEPAL / Donor: Which countries do you think have had important institutional or political difficulties? How do you mitigate these risks?*
Operating system
- <u>How do you communicate with other BIEE parties and ECLAC in the BIEE what to do</u> (to achieve the goals that have been set)? How is it decided how to use the

assets? <u>With whom?</u>
- How much flexibility do you have from your superiors in the BIEE?
- How much do you work as a team in your normal work? How much in the BIEE? <u>Is there teamwork with other BIEE parties?</u>
- What motivates you?
- What do you think are the other parties' concerns and motivations to collaborate in the BIEE? Do the others understand your motivation and concerns? Is this based on the fact that the other agencies understand your concerns or the individuals involved in the project or both? Did you know some of the individuals before?
- <u>Why some countries do not advance so quickly (database, etc.)?</u>
- To whom should you be accountable and how do you ensure that?
- What do you get from the BIEE in terms of assets (finance, etc.)? What do you give? Others?
- <u>What impact had the Europe study tour? Who decides this and who would go?</u>
- <u>Who decides who goes to meetings?</u>

Resources
- Is there a worry about losing turf or autonomy by collaborating in the BIEE with respect to the topics covered by the project?
- How are the money and the people necessary for the project allocated?
- How is the project seen among the political leadership and outside?
- How is the information flow about the project? Information about funds available to the BIEE?
- <u>Why was there a meeting / workshop / etc. in your country? Who paid for that? Organized it? Decided to host it? Details?</u>

Steering a course
- What would you describe as vision, mission and the goals of the BIEE?
- How did you define vision, mission and goals of the BIEE? Which forum takes these kinds of decisions and decisions about the course in general? <u>How does this exactly work?</u> Who decides?
- How was this steering mechanism developed?
- What do you think about this form of decision making? Is it fair and captures all interests? How would you describe the quality of this process?
- How is the leadership in the BIEE organized? Is there a leader, if so who (organization and/or individual)? How was this defined?

Culture
- <u>How would you describe the culture of collaboration in the BIEE?</u> How is the experience working together? Is it very <u>bureaucratic or rather pragmatic</u>?
- How do negotiations take place in the BIEE? How are the outcomes communicated? How is the culture in finding agreement / problem solving?

- How much own decision making capacity does your representative have (delegated authority)?
- Do you trust the other agencies / individuals involved in the BIEE? Why? Do you know them from before? In which context? Was the decision whom to select to represent the country influenced by trust?
- Do you think the other parties of the BIEE trust you?
- Do you think cultural differences influence the culture of the collaboration? Language differences?

Platforming

- How were the phases of building up the collaboration in the BIEE? What are the steps taken currently to continue collaboration in the BIEE? How does it work with newly joining countries?
- Do you feel that the geographical distances matter in the speed or quality of collaboration?
- <u>Is there a difference between formal and informal sequencing (e.g. platforming vs. momentum)?</u>

Momentum building

- Did you experience any (unforeseen) positive or negative events/shocks in the building or ongoing collaboration in the BIEE? Where there any opportunities (reinforcing effects) that facilitated collaboration? Setbacks?
- Do you see any vulnerabilities of the BIEE that are external to the project? Are there any delays? Is there any important staff movement?

Additional topics to cover

- Language / Culture?
- Power?

Conclusion

- How do you judge the level of collaboration between you and other parties of the BIEE before the project? How is it now? What has changed?
- Do you have staff that is particularly skilled in collaboration? If yes, what makes them different?
- Are there any particular smart practices to enhance collaboration?

IV. Hand-out to research subjects

Effective Management of Partnerships
Research outline – Fabian Kreuzer

Working and collaborating with people from different organizations is crucial for advancing professional projects in bureaucracies, public enterprises and international development organizations. At the same time, it is not easy (and even more difficult involving different cultural backgrounds). Projects are designed in a way that the success of these projects requires the pulling on one string of various organizations.

It may be different government entities or the collaboration with donor organizations, multilateral organizations and others or different levels in one organization such as headquarters and the field level that are required to collaborate and the tasks that have to be coordinated can be equally diverse: Data gathering, action on the ground or the exchange of funds. But how to ensure effective collaboration?

Based on Eugene Bardach's interagency collaboration theory, this research takes a closer look into the practices staff members of organizations involved in cooperation projects use in order to advance their projects in different cultural contexts.

In order to do so, the research collects and compiles the observed skills and practices of staff involved in international cooperation projects employ in order to advance their tasks. These accounts are enhanced by informal conversations with the same persons. Formal interviews might be conducted if required and the respective participants agree to those. Confidentiality about the identity and any identifying information will be maintained at all times – field notes will only be accessed by the researcher as well as two professors serving as thesis supervisors for quality assurance.

The combined data will be used to identify essential practices for interagency collaboration in different cultural contexts. This will help to formulate an Interagency Collaborative Capacity in the sense of Bardach's theory.

This will contribute to achieving the following objectives:
- Develop a theory of interagency collaboration for development projects
- Advance the knowledge on collaborative practices that actually work
- Provide advice to organizations on best practices for interagency collaboration

Curriculum Vitae

Fabian Maximilian Kreuzer

Born 5 August 1983 in Ulm (Germany)

Education

2010 – 2016	University of St. Gallen (St. Gallen, Switzerland) PhD Candidate in Management (International Business)
2008 – 2010	Columbia University / School of International and Public Affairs (New York, USA) Master of International Affairs (International Energy Management and Policy)
2008 – 2010	Sciences Po Paris (Paris, France) Master of International Affairs (Environment, Sustainable Development and Risks)
2005 – 2009	University of Hagen (Hagen, Germany) Bachelor of Arts (Cultural Science)
2003 – 2007	University of St. Gallen (St. Gallen, Switzerland) Bachelor of Arts (International Affairs)

Experience

2012 – 2015	United Nations Economic Commissions for Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile) Division for Natural Resources and Infrastructure (Associate Expert)
2010 – 2012	United Nations Environment Programme (Khartoum, Sudan) Post Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (Project Advisor)
2009 – 2010	Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs (New York, USA; Lima, Peru; Khartoum, Sudan) Foundation Mercator (Fellow)

Distinctions

2008 – 2009	Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship
2004 – 2005	Director (Culture), Student Association (University of St. Gallen)